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Maria Gunko: Violent faces of the Russian state

 “Our whole state manifested itself in [Verkhniy] Lars, in a concentrated form: violence, mess, corruption, and indifference” – told me Vadim, who left Russia through Georgia shortly after Vladimir Putin announced ‘partial mobilization’ on 21 September 2022. In this essay I argue that this concentrated manifestation of the state showcases how along with the ‘spectacular’ violence against Ukraine since 2014, the Russian state evinced violence against its own citizens.

Verkhniy Lars border checkpoint on September 2022, courtesy of Vadim

Currently, there are many discussions about the Russian invasion of Ukraine since 24 February 2022, including contributions in FocaalBlog on the Russian state, its imperial aspirations and paranoid leaders. While the war in Ukraine has made the “spectacular”, fast violence of the Russian state increasingly visible and discussed, slow violence largely remained out of the spotlight (Vorbrugg, 2022). In general, the invisibility of slow violence is defined not only by its everyday nature, but also by dominant epistemologies that privilege “the public, the rapid, the hot, and the spectacular” (Christian & Dowler, 2019). Within this essay, I attempt to portray a more nuanced and entangled picture of the violent Russian state. To do so, I follow Stef Jansen’s (2015) distinction between two faces of the state that overlap and co-shape each other: statehood and statecraft. Loosely put, these two pertain to the varying sets of state practices that assert power over territory and people (statehood) and that take care of territory and people (statecraft).

Despite the endurance of “statehood as a culture” until the end of 19th-beginning of the 20th century the Russian state – gosudarstvo [государство] – could not really be referred to as omnipresent, especially at its fringes (Ssorin-Chaikov, 2003). Indeed, the Russian imperial state was rather fluid and fragmented. It appeared and disappeared by the act of will but was not busy with extending statecraft across the territory. Engaging in numerous colonial wars, Russian imperial state simultaneously neglected its peoples: “[while] the state was plumping, the people were fading” (Kluchevsky, 1956: 3/12, cited in Etkind, 2022). Bad roads, chaos, poverty, and corruption in provinces were as prominent and recurring motives of Russian literature of the imperial period, as were conquests and the magnificent life of the elites in the capital.  

After the Russian Revolution, the nature of the state changed. The Soviet state, contrary to the imperial one, though not less (rather more) violent, was underpinned by a somewhat ‘modernizing’ and developmental rationality. Combining the policy of ‘benevolence’ with violence and terror, it extracted and controlled, but also attempted to ‘modernize’ the territory and ‘civilize’ its subjects (Hirsch, 2005). Through infrastructure building and provisioning of even the most remote territories, the Soviet state significantly increased its power over land and people.

With the collapse of socialism in the late 20th century came the massive retreat of developmental rationality in what is now post-Soviet Russia. This brought about the decline of support for industries and science, as well as decreasing investments in infrastructure and welfare provision. Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov (2003: 6) writes: “there is a continuity between the late-imperial Russian administrative regime and… the post-Soviet one, it lies in… [the] condition of perpetual disorder that both defines and invites state interventions.” The picture of chronic disorder in Provincial Town N, sketched out by Nikolai Gogol in the novel “State Assessor” (1842) is strikingly similar to the reality of contemporary Russian non-capital towns:

There is no order in this town: doctors walk around dirty in hospitals, patients “look like blacksmiths” and smoke strong tobacco… In the courthouse, the watchmen breed geese and dry clothing. The assessor is always drunk “he smells like he has just left the distillery”; while the judge keeps a memo so that “Solomon himself will not follow what is true and what is not true in it”. The streets are dirty…

The decline of the welfare state has been witnessed throughout the world with the emerging discourses of state failure that pertain to the withdrawal of statecraft. At the same time statehood seems to be reinforced through tightening surveillance and control, emphasis on state symbolic representation (e.g., flags, monuments), national identity building, and enforcement of sovereignty. Within Russia, these parallel trends occur in an immensely concentrated manner.

During my fieldwork in different Russian small towns in 2015–2021, I recall their residents constantly complaining about “lack of state presence.” In doing so, they referred to bad roads, crumbling housing, as well as low quality of utilities and public services, which were the domain of state care in the Soviet period. Yet, the state was present. It was there manifesting itself through Vladimir Putin’s portraits in nearly every governmental and public services building. It was there through the patriotic mobilization around the 9th of May Victory Day and discourse pertaining to Putin’s preferred slogan of “Russia rising from its knees .” It was just a different kind of state, one that is not preoccupied with providing welfare and infrastructures to its own citizens. Instead, it focused on the “protection of Russian speakers”  in neighboring countries attempting to reinforce Russian imperialism within the post-Soviet realm. Thus, concentrating on external affairs and warfare, the Russian state disregarded statecraft within its own territory. This manifested in decay and impoverishment.

An illustration of this may be found in the satirical “Open letter from residents of the Tver oblast to Putin ”, which was widely circulated in the Russian media after the annexing of Crimea in 2014:

We express our deep support for your concern and determination to help the Russian-speaking population outside of Russia. And after your words, for the first time in many years, hope also appeared for us, who live on the historical territory of Russia. We heard on TV that Russia was going to build a bridge across the Kerch Strait for 50 billion rubles. In Tver, the governor also promised residents to construct the Western Bridge, without which the city is suffocating in traffic jams. But he didn’t fulfil his promise…we don’t ask for a bridge – let the engineering troops of fraternal Russia connect the banks of the Volga River at least with a Western Pontoon, dear Supreme Commander. The Russian army could also repair roads and bridges in rural areas of Tver oblast, they have not seen repairs since the Brezhnev program “Roads of the Non-Chernozem territory” …

Kiselyov [Dmitriy Kiselyov – notorious Russian state propaganda spokesman] talked with pain about the destruction of Orthodox churches in Ukraine. How similar this is: architectural monuments, Orthodox churches are also being destroyed in our country. They have been decaying for decades…

The quote from the Open letter highlights the simultaneity of different types of state violence and the sacrifice of statecraft in the name of statehood. Furthermore, hinting at the interconnection between the two, in August 2022, Holod media  published a list of infrastructural projects in Russia which were ‘frozen’ due to the lack of funding. Examples include a bridge over the Lena River in Yakutsk (Sakha Republic), subways in Chelyabinsk (Chelyabinsk oblast) and Omsk (Omsk oblast), a hospital in Nizhnevartovsk (Khanty-Mansi autonomous region). All of these are in regions whose governors volunteered to support the rebuilding of cities in Eastern Ukraine under Russian occupation. While the Russian state erects spectacular infrastructures (e.g., bridge to Crimea, Zaryadie park in Moscow) and invests in warfare, its citizens continue to literally live amidst ruins. Constantly struggling to pursue a decent life, they must self-organize to substitute for statecraft. As noted by Sergey, whom I interviewed in a semi-abandoned Russian Arctic town:

Living in a half-empty apartment building on the outskirts of the city implies a close-knit community. How else? Who will solve our problems – Guriev [Vorkuta mayor]? Gaplikov? [Komi governor]? Putin? Haha. It’s just us…The state does not need us; it does not care for us. And we learnt to get by without it, to manage ourselves…

Vorgashor district of Vorkuta in January 2019, photo by author

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, increasing state attention (read–violence) within Russia was at first directed predominantly towards those who protested against the war in Ukraine . Presented by Putin as a ‘special military operation’, it was initially framed as being aimed at “the liberation of Donbass, the protection of these people [supposedly Russian-speaking Donbass residents] and the creation of conditions that would guarantee the security of Russia itself”. Relying on the language of a policing act,  rather than a genuine military confrontation, the Russian state assumes to be using ‘legitimate force’ within its own domain, of which Ukraine is a part. Thereby, opposing war is equated to opposing legal state duties, inscribed within statehood. 

The ‘partial mobilization’ announced in late September has impacted not just the opposition, but significantly more people in Russia whose life and death became increasingly subjected to sovereign (state) power. Especially disproportionality were affected peoples in Republics,  such as Buryatiya, Kalmykiya, and Tyva where infrastructures are poorly maintained and the life quality is among the lowest in the country. Thereby, among all of Russia’s population, the non-Russian ethnic groups seem to have become victims of exceptional levels of both slow and fast state violence showcasing state-sanctioned racism in the country.

Understandably, Russian citizens did not seem particularly happy with the current instance of the state turning its gaze on them. Following the announcement of “partial” mobilization, mass protests  occurred in various regions of Russia, with videos from the Republics of Dagestan , Tyva , and Sakha  going viral. Furthermore, all airplane tickets for a week ahead to countries that have straight air connections with Russia were sold out. Multi-day queues of cars, bicycles and scooters lined up at the checkpoints along the land borders causing a collapse of the border infrastructures:  

The whole of Russia was in this traffic jam. Literally, [in Verkhniy Lars] we have seen the license plates of almost all regions except for the Far East… we witnessed the most massive bike ride in the history of the Caucasus, since bicycles are considered transport, people were allowed [to cross the border] on them… The closer was the border, the greater became the hustle. Traffic lined up in five rows and the traffic cop fought so that oncoming vehicles could pass at least on the left side of the road…There were mountains of garbage around and a strong smell of urine (Kirill, interviewed September 2022, Yerevan).

Out-migration from Russia since the collapse of state socialism was predominantly framed within the narrative of state failure to deliver a decent life to its citizens, that is the lack of statecraft. However, since the failed political protests of 2011–2012,  the motives started to change. What began as a gradual and selective emigration to escape the repressive state apparatus and exaggerated statehood, turned into a fully-fledged exodus in 2022. It seems that for one’s own sake instead of calling for the state it is better to stay out of its gaze, especially if that state is with imperial ambitions. As wisely commented by a dissident poet Joseph Brodsky in “Letters to a Roman Friend” (1972):

If you happen to be born in an empire,

It’s better to live in a remote province by the sea.

Far from Caesar, and from the blizzard.

There is no need to fawn, to be cowardly, to hurry.

You are saying that all governors are thieves?

But a thief is better by me than a bloodsucker.


Maria Gunko is a DPhil Candidate and Hill Foundation Scholar at COMPAS, University of Oxford within the ERC-funded project EMPTINESS: Living Capitalism and Democracy after (Post)Socialism. She obtained MSc in Human Geography from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 2012 and a postgraduate research degree (Kandidat Nauk) in Human Geography from the Institute of Geography Russian Academy of Sciences in 2015. Maria’s research interests include anthropology of the state and infrastructures, (post)socialism, and urban shrinkage with a geographical focus on Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus.


References

Christian, J.M. & Dowler, L. (2019). Slow and Fast Violence: A Feminist Critique of Binaries. ACME: An International Journal of Critical Geographies 18(5) https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1692

Etkind, A. (2022). Vnutrennyaya kolonizatsiya. Imperskiy opyt Rossii [Internal colonization. Russian imperial experience]. NLO: Moscow

Gunko, M. (2022). “Russian Imperial Gaze”: Reflections from Armenia Since the Start of the Russia-Ukraine Military Conflict. Political Geography, Virtual Forum: War in Ukraine. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102739

Hirsch, F. (2005). Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jansen, S. (2015). Yearnings in the Meantime: “Normal Lives” and the State in a Sarajevo Apartment Complex. New York & Oxford: Berghahn.

Ssorin-Chaikov, N. V. (2003). The Social Life of the State in Subarctic Siberia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Vorbrugg, A. (2022). Ethnographies of Slow Violence: Epistemological Alliances in Fieldwork and Narrating Ruins. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space40(2), 447–462. 


Cite as: Gunko, Maria. 2022. “Violent faces of the Russian state.” Focaalblog 21 October. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/10/21/maria-gunko-violent-faces-of-the-russian-state/

Stephen Campbell: On the dialectics of capitalist expansion: An interview with Christopher Krupa

In April 2022, University of Pennsylvania Press published A Feast of Flowers: Race, Labor, and Postcolonial Capitalism in Ecuador, by University of Toronto anthropologist Christopher Krupa. Tracing the expansion of capitalism in the largely rural, agrarian canton of Cayambe, Krupa’s book is an historically informed ethnography of Ecuador’s cut flower industry. In the interview below, Focaalblog co-editor Stephen Campbell talks with the author about this important new monograph.

Book cover of A Feast of Flowers

Stephen Campbell: First, thank you for agreeing to talk with me about your new book. A Feast of Flowers is brilliant on many levels—most broadly as a theoretically sophisticated contribution to anthropological political economy. To start, I’d like to ask about the book’s background. Could you say a bit on how you came to this project? What were the initial research interests that led you to studying Cayambe’s cut flower industry?

Chris Krupa: Thanks for your kind words about the book, Stephen. I know this is an ethnographic cliché, but I actually didn’t begin this project with the intention of studying the cut flower industry, at least not directly. Since the mid-90s, I’d been spending time living in indigenous communities around Cayambe and had become fascinated with both the political work of territorialized communities and the technical details of indigenous agrarian practice. I was invested in the debates occurring in Marxist anthropology at the time about rural societies, things like the articulation of modes of production and simple commodity production literatures, and was always keeping an eye on the massive export plantation sector then starting to engulf the whole region.

I started trying to map out the complex ways in which any one thing I was interested in—a community, let’s say, or a small plot of commercial onions—was becoming intelligible only as one part of a complex and dynamic social formation that included things like flower plantations and foreign currency markets in them. I found that no matter how I composed this map, capital always seemed to enter my analysis as a kind of disruptive externality, turning the anthropological project into a rather obvious moral tabulation of the violence effected by capitalist expansion, something one could do well enough without much ethnographic or historical research at all.

At the time, we were getting a lot of really competent studies of indigenous political practice in Ecuador by scholars who quite explicitly positioned their scholarship as a contribution to a kind of radical democracy project of expanding the presence of indigenous activism, something that joined with similar projects in other parts of the world. The more time I spent with these movements, the more curious I became about our opponents, which also resonated with the questions the activist-intellectuals I was living and working with were posing to me.

What we didn’t have, and don’t often get, I think, when the terms of contestation are so neatly drawn, are in-depth studies of how power actually works in a historically-specific social formation. This is particularly true, I think, of capital, especially when the dynamics of local capitalist practice seem to express broader patterns going on worldwide, such as, in this case, the expansion of labor-extensive production systems in the Global South dedicated to making specialized goods for Northern consumers.

Through a series of accidents, I managed to get invited to do research inside a flower plantation, which led to further invitations (after many, many refusals), and which kind of opened up this completely bewildering insider’s view of how wealth is made in a place like rural Ecuador today. This was something that the indigenous federations and communities I was aligned with and living in were far more interested in than anything I might have to say about what they were doing. Figuring this out became a major part of my research and took me well over a decade to really piece together, as Part I of the book tracks. It also, I think, tells a different kind of story about how rapid capitalist expansion happened in places like the indigenous highlands of Ecuador in the late 20th century.

SC: The book covers a lot of ground—from a global history of financialisation since the 20th century, to a survey of Ecuadorian race thinking, to industrial psychology, to workplace labour processes. The unifying thread running through the book, however, in my reading, is the dialectics of capitalist expansion. Would that be a fair gloss of the book’s overall conceptual contribution? Or how would you most succinctly state the book’s primary theoretical concerns?

CK: That works. One thing I really wanted to do with the book was provide a deep ethnographic account of primitive accumulation, one that could at least aspire to treating primitive accumulation with all the nuance evident in Marx’s retheorization of it. The crucial thing for me was to address with equal complexity the two inseparable processes Marx identifies as making up primitive accumulation. On the one hand, there are the brute material processes under-girding the consolidation of capitalist class relations and the increasingly narrow organization of these relations and their reproductive capacities around emergent forms of commodity production and capital accumulation. On the other hand, there is the assemblage of a new register of history that reconfigures historical positionings like past, present, and future or then/now distinctions or senses of historical arc and momentum, as well as frames of historical action and intervention, around these material transformations such that broader issues of being and becoming and so on can’t but be inflected with one’s positioning in a new capitalist historicity. There’s been a tendency to emphasize the first of these processes over the second and to reduce everything in that to somewhat shorthanded notions of dispossession, with land theft or things matching the metaphysics of property seizure becoming the iconic, foundational, scene of capitalist arising.

In northern Ecuador, the juridical weight of its rural community system has rendered indigenous land unavailable for capitalist expropriation, and the whole history of land ownership is an important part of the story. But more than that, the constellation of actors and forces and interests that came together in rapidly developing this plantation system in and around indigenous territories in northern Ecuador (which turned the country from a non-producer of commercial flowers to the third largest global exporter of them in only a few years) was infinitely greater than what can be explained by a single violently explosive event like a land grab. It involved all the forces you mention, Stephen, and I wanted to be able to trace out the interactions between these in detail to really outline what this part of primitive accumulation, the first set of processes I mention above, really looked like in this one case, as a model for how such things might be coming together in other parts of the world.

Because so much of this information is secret or not publicly available or just hard to get is probably why we tend to get rather truncated stories of capitalist process—and why it also took me over ten years to write this part of the book. But attending to the other part of this, capital’s interventions into historical production, is equally important because it allows us to see how the people directing these processes situate them in a local reality—what they imagine that to be, why they think it is that way, and how the work they are doing will intervene into that. It is where the foundational logics of capitalist accumulation get de-abstracted, rendered socially specific and concrete, and shape the way that very human component of primitive accumulation—turning people who aren’t wage workers into them—gets actualized and justified in one way or another. And it is where questions arising in our attention to the first set of processes—like, in my case, why the science of industrial psychology figures so prominently in shaping plantation labor systems and securitizing the borders between capital’s inside and outside—get answered. So, all of this, this expanded definition of primitive accumulation and its attendant ethnographic critique of capitalist historicity, is perhaps what I’d say shapes any conceptual or theoretical contributions the book may offer.

SC: You’ve framed your book as a contribution to understanding post-colonial capitalism in general. But you also delve, in much detail, into the specificity of Cayambe’s cut flower industry and its situatedness in Ecuadorian history and in Ecuadorian race thinking. Is there something particular about this case that renders it especially helpful in illuminating the workings of post-colonial capitalism more broadly?

CK:  Yes, I think there is but I should probably clarify what I mean by “postcolonial capitalism”. This is a term of specification not generalization. On the one hand, it is meant to push for a specification of the components of a given capitalist system that draw their force from their invocation of frameworks devised to advance or stabilize a prior colonial system. This involves a pluralization of both capitalism and colonialism and the tracing out of historical continuities between these in their unique historical assemblages.

For instance, it matters a good deal that the Spanish conquest of the northern Andes did not advance through a singularly genocidal agenda and that it wasn’t just the land, as a potentially vacant resource, that was valued. Indigenous people were needed, as both tribute-paying subjects and as workers in the Crown’s labor drafts, in mining operations throughout the colonial Andes, on the agrarian and domestic operations of settlers, and in all kinds of jobs that settlers wanted done for them. The violence of conquest regularly returned to the question of how to fold indigenous subjects most productively into dominant economic and political agendas and reap value from that way.

This orientation comes to define the ways hacienda complexes operated when they took over the entire rural Andes and absorbed indigenous populations into them as resident peons after Independence. And this sets up a particular approach to capitalist development in the 20th century, which itself builds on over 100 years of dominant political thinking in Ecuador that united questions of economy and race, of capitalist expansion and indigeneity, into a single question that then shapes the capitalist-expansion-as-indigenous-salvation script organizing plantation hiring practices, labor processes, and so on, as I discuss throughout the book. So that’s one part of what I mean, which is a kind of broad methodological orientation.

The other part is more specific, in that I use the term “postcolonial capitalism” to characterize a form of capitalism that folds a certain claim to historical intervention into its operational rationality, specifically presenting itself and its expansion as curative of the lingering colonial residues haunting the present. In other words, I don’t use the term “postcolonial” here as an objective descriptor—obviously, if I were to try to locate the mis-en-scene of capitalist arising in highland Ecuador, it could certainly be debated whether “postcolonial” is most effective for capturing its complex temporal register. Similarly, if I were trying to offer a political perspective on that same process, it is open to debate if postcoloniality would best capture that.

Instead, I use the term here to identify what might be called an ideological framework appropriated by capital itself to position itself historically and to overlay the violence of expansion with a claim, drawing on ideas about progressive futurity and temporal momentum, to beneficent social good. Here, the colonial legacy up for grabs is indigenous abjection, the equation of indigeneity with misery and exclusion, and even the relevance of racializing terms like indigeneity at all. Capital’s claim is to finally get over all this—this is what its expansion promises. “Postcolonial capitalism” points to the interactive co-existence of these contradictory processes—the appropriation of colonial residues into the core operational procedures of an expanding capitalist system and the claim that this system is uniquely qualified to eradicate colonial residues from the places it expands into.  

SC: The term “racial capitalism” appears in the book’s introduction, though it’s not a concept to which you explicitly return. Yet, the dialectics of race and capitalism is definitely one of the book’s central concerns. How would you situate your book in relation to the growing literature on racial capitalism? What do you see as your book’s primary contribution to this literature?

CK: Right, well as I’ve said above, one of the core historical threads running through the book is the deep connections between the economic and racial sciences and agendas in Ecuador, and of political projects fusing the two together as a pretext for various sorts of interventions into indigenous territories. By the early 20th century, the idea of “capitalism” in Ecuador becomes hard to think outside of its figuration as a liberating force for highland indigenous people bound in different ways to hacienda enclosures. Capitalism emerges as the solution to what was referred to as the “Indian Problem,” and today’s flower plantations are heirs to this mission. The ethnographic work inside flower plantations in the latter chapters of the book show how this agenda is set in motion in plantation labour systems.

But at another level, I’ve been admittedly quite influenced by the ways early American contributors to the literature on racial capitalism based their use of the concept on a searing critique of the millennialism under-girding conventional capitalist history. Their re-tracing of the rise of capitalist class relations out of post-abolition efforts to continue the economic structure of slavery opens up a pretty important discussion of the inherently racializing character of the location “labour” itself. It also points to our need to continually ferret out the historically specific ways that capitalism disguises the violence inherent to its routine operations. As I show in the book, the social work of primitive accumulation rests entirely on both of these processes in its historical reconstruction of the pre-labouring poor as marked by forms of consequential and often essentialized difference that are progressively overcome by their proletarianization. This is a central narrative trope inherent to primitive accumulation as a genre of elite historicity.

SC: Race is central to your theorisation of post-colonial capitalism. Yet, it struck me that the large white and mestizo populations of Latin America distinguish this region from most post-colonial countries in Asian and Africa. Is that a relevant distinction to make? Would you nonetheless say that the dialectics of race and capitalism that you trace in the book play out similarly in post-colonial contexts elsewhere in the global South?

CK: I can’t answer that question, but I think that’s the sort of fine-grained ethnographic and historical question that I hoped to offer one more source of inspiration for with this book.

SC: One thing that stood out for me was how deeply Hegelian the book is. You write, for example, of “the plantation as an object constituted by relations with forces outside it,” of “the flower as negation,” of narrative frames “located neither entirely inside nor outside” the domain of capital, of “mediation between inner and outer worlds,” of a site of knowledge creation “dialectically related to its opposite,” and of a form of capital accumulation “whose ‘outside is essential,’ of its essence.” This Hegelian dimension is not explicitly named as such in the book. Could you elaborate on how an understanding of Hegelian logic informed your research analysis and writing? Was this an approach you had in mind before you started the project, or was it something that developed over the course of research and writing?

CK: Good catch, Stephen. Guilty. I think one of the most consequential things I did during my graduate training was participate in a slow, page-by-page, group reading, led by Neil Larsen, of Hegel’s Phenomenology, followed immediately by doing the same with Capital V.1. I also, having received zero training in field methods during my graduate education, brought Bertell Ollman’s Alienation with me to the field and used that as my field methods training instead. It’s all there, I suppose, in Ollman’s Hegelian reading of Marx’s method, and it’s striking how well that book works as a primer in ethnographic methodology if you’re interested in the sort of things you and I might be interested in.

Ollman’s reading of Marx centers on his dialectical phenomenology, his radical critique of the object, his explosion of metaphysical notions of presence, and of suchness being an effect of overlapping webs of relations, which logically exist prior to and become determinate of things themselves. How to set all this in dynamic motion as an ethnographer? was a question I asked myself throughout fieldwork and there were a lot of missteps in it along the way. Writing the book, I think I was best able to work through this in the chapters on interiority, especially in the overlaps between notions of psychological interiority that can only be grasped through processes of exteriorization like projection, capital’s outwardly expansive dynamics that only work through processes of interiorizing its externalities, the shifting spatial dynamics codifying capitalist/non-capitalist locations, and the scientific efforts to construct a profile of the inner life of indigenous people as preludes to various forms of external intervention upon them.

SC: One of the recurring themes in your discussion of post-colonial capitalism is the notion of difference. Difference has also been a key theme in the anthropology of capitalism that is influenced by J.K. Gibson Graham. Yet, whereas Gibson-Graham, and the anthropologists whom they’ve influenced, employ a Deleuzian notion of autonomous difference, your book advances an explicitly relational understanding of difference—specifically, of differences that are “internally related.” Would you say that this is a relevant distinction to make? Could you elaborate on your understanding of difference, especially as it pertains to the theorisation of capitalist expansion?

CK: Let me answer this in a slightly different way than I think you might intend. The book is an anthropological critique of political economy and its topic is capitalism. I am not interested in attempting a general theory of something like difference, though I do draw from some of my teachers who were. Difference enters the analytic because it was there from the start. There from the start because the lineage I trace of capitalist thought in Ecuador, right up to the present, begins with, and never ceases to ponder, the question of what the imposition of things like free labour contracts or monetary remuneration of hourly wages or disciplined, routinized labour routines, or regularized working hours might mean for effecting a (spiritual, moral, political) transformation of indigenous society.

The reverse was also true—at a certain point in the late 1800s, questions about what indigenous people are, why they are that way, how they might become different, and so on, get completely entwined with questions about the ways these markers of indigenous difference are determined by the hacienda enclosures to which they are imagined to be universally bound, stimulating the question of what, then, would become of indigenous people, and indigeneity itself as a category of difference, were the haciendas to be replaced by capitalist forms of production. There from the start also because primitive accumulation, as a genre, locates the foundational act of capitalist emergence in an encounter with difference, that is, with a description of a population retroactively constituted as pre-labour and defined by certain features that are magically transformed through their absorption into the project of capitalist expansion. Those originary features are bad or pathological, their transformed conditions are good or curative. This is a pretty standard trope in primitive accumulation’s narrative form, as I said earlier.

To follow your distinction, an “autonomous” notion of difference is as central to capitalist method as a “relational” one is to its critique. The urban and rural poor are so because they are given to sloth and the wasteful expenditure of time, says the former. Time thrift only marks the pre-labouring subject with difference because their potential labour-power is being valued in measured temporal units for your profit, says the latter, who addresses the former as a predator. Difference is there from the start. So is its critique.

SC: To close, could you say a bit about what are you working on now? What is your next project?

CK: I’m currently writing an anthropological history of the late Cold War years in Ecuador, focusing on the way a small guerrilla movement was used by the proto-neoliberal state to justify an expansive campaign of terror. It’s also about the Cold War prison and the intimate solidarities of revolutionary practice, and attempts to do all this through an analytic method that I associate with older Marxist literary criticism.

SC: Thank you so much for taking the time to do this interview. I encourage interested readers of this interview to check out the full book, which is available at the University of Pennsylvania Press website, and elsewhere.


Christopher Krupa is Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Toronto (Scarborough). He has researched and written on Andean Ecuador for over 15 years. He is co-editor (with David Nugent) of State Theory and Andean Politics: New Approaches to the Study of Rule (2015), and author of A Feast of Flowers: Race, Labor, and Postcolonial Capitalism in Ecuador (2022).


Cite as: Campbell, Stephen. 2022. “On the dialectics of capitalist expansion: An interview with Christopher Krupa.” Focaalblog 6 October. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/10/06/stephen-campbell-on-the-dialectics-of-capitalist-expansion-an-interview-with-christopher-krupa/

Mahmudul H. Sumon: What do we learn from hybrid governance in Bangladesh’s garments sector?

Global production networks, as we know today, have repeatedly failed to ensure the rights of workers and their health and safety. These failings have been exposed time and again whenever there has been a disaster. To address these failings, transnational activists have long been arguing for various types of multi-sectoral initiatives (MSIs) in global supply chains that involve private companies, trade union networks from both the global south and north, and national governments. Against this general backdrop and the emergence of some types of MSIs, questions for labor rights activists and critical researchers have become pertinent. What should be our position on transnational regulatory mechanisms or hybrid mechanisms in the “upstream” of the supply chains? What kind of organizational and legal relations should such regimes have; especially so vis-à-vis the state in which they operate? Could such agreements improve workplace health and safety? What role could they have in ensuring workers’ rights?

In this brief essay, I particularly focus on Bangladesh’s ready-made garment industry (RMG) and discuss the plight of one such MSI; the Bangladesh Accord that came into effect after two cataclysmic industrial disasters, namely the Tazreen fire and Rana Plaza building collapse. While thinking through some of the questions, I show that this much-coveted initiative, developed and imagined in the transnational spheres of activism, has faced resistance from key stakeholders of the RMG sector in Bangladesh (i.e., the BGMEA, the representatives of garments employer’s association). I argue that the country’s business elite associated with the RMG sector has been instrumental in facilitating the transformation of the Accord into a national corporate venture, making sure that their interests are protected. In the absence of any political will from the state (in the neoliberal order political will perhaps is an outdated idea), I contend that hybrid governance initiatives are somewhat destined to fail given the government’s strong dependence on the business class for its export earnings (i.e., the state business nexus). The story of Bangladesh Accord’s rise and fall or its continued existence under a new name precisely points to the strong leverage that the country’s business class enjoy over the state.

The emergence of the Bangladesh Accord

The Bangladesh Accord is a legally binding agreement between global brands and retailers on the one hand  and IndustriALL Global Union, UNI Global Union, and their Bangladesh-based affiliate unions on the other hand. The signatories aim to work towards a safe and healthy garment and textile industry in Bangladesh. It came into effect after two cataclysmic events, namely the Tazreen Factory fire (2012) and the Rana Plaza building collapse (2013), which killed 119 and 1134 workers respectively and injured many more. Over 220 companies signed the five-year Accord, and by May 2018 the work of the Bangladesh Accord had achieved significant progress for safer workplaces that covered millions of Bangladeshi garment workers. To maintain and expand the progress achieved under the 2013 Accord, over 190 brands and retailers signed the 2018 Transition Accord with the global unions, a renewed agreement that entered into effect on 1 June 2018.

Some international rights organizations and campaign groups have been instrumental in materializing the Accord in Bangladesh. Many believed it would provide a unique opportunity for a collaboration between national and international rights groups and labor rights organizations on the one hand and international retailers and brands on the other hand to begin a ‘fire and building’ inspection regime in Bangladesh. For labor-rights activists working in the global north, a legally binding agreement between brands and trade unions had been a long-standing demand to transition from the previous voluntary standard for garment production to a “binding” standard.

Activists chanting slogans for punishment of all the accused owners of garment factories starting from the Saraka fire (1990s) to Tazreen fire and Rana Plaza collapse (2013) in Dhaka on May-Day 2013 (photo by Mahmudul H. Sumon)

In design, the Accord is best understood as multi-stakeholder-oriented, with scopes for the participation of activists and civil society, both national and transnational.

Although private governance has been a timeworn mechanism in the garment export sector and has been in use for many years in different forms to assess supplier conduct, scholars have noted some differences between private governance and the newly installed Bangladesh Accord. The Accord has been an experiment in “co-governed private regulation” that included global union federations in addition to foreign brands and had the potential to challenge the relations of power between labor and employers.

The stated objective of the Bangladesh Accord has been to introduce an inspection regime aiming for “a safe and sustainable Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garments (“RMG”) industry in which no worker needs to fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that could be prevented with reasonable health and safety measures” (quoted from the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh text dated May 13, 2013). However, the said inspections have been limited to factories from where the signatory brands of the Accord sourced their products. The Accord had built-in training programs for what it called the workers’ “empowerment” and “awareness” and had plans for the sustainability of the project.

A look back at the period immediately after the Rana Plaza disaster reveals that when it comes to labor reforms, the Bangladeshi government (i.e., the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Labour and Employment) mostly reacted to the situation, responding foremost to the demands put forward by the European Union and the USA. Curiously, the US embassy in Dhaka made a lot of the noises to bring in changes in the labor law for issues such as freedom of association of the workers and easing rules for the EPZs so that worker’s rights were protected. On the face of it, the government complied with these demands, as reflected in amendments to the Bangladesh Labour Law in 2013 (which first came into effect in 2006). In government documents, the main concern for these amendments was slated as “workers’ safety, welfare, and rights and promoting trade unionism and collective bargaining”. The National Occupational Health and Safety Policy was also adopted by the government in 2013. In total, the government reported 76 amended sections and 8 new sections incorporated in the Bangladesh Labour Act. The government also changed the EPZ legislation and introduced rights to unionization which were previously withheld.

The BGMEA smear campaign against the Bangladesh Accord

In the first five years of its mandate, the Bangladesh Accord secured a remediation process for a good number of factories and was deemed “successful” by transnational observers. But as time elapsed and the disaster faded from international public memory it became apparent that the remediation requirements enforced by the Accord administration were not welcomed by factory owners and particularly not by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). More and more “voices” that criticized the Accord appeared in public discussions, pamphlets, and workshops organized by the factory owning elite and their representatives in Dhaka.

The BGMEA is the trade body that looks after the interests of local capitalists in the sector. It enjoys leverage over the government because of the export earnings from garment manufacturing. Their semi-clandestine campaign against the Accord indicates new safety procedures were not easy to flout and turned out to be a “costly” endeavor for local factory owners. Industry leaders showed detest for the new mechanisms publicly in newspaper op-eds. During a workshop organized by an international non-governmental organization working in Dhaka, one owner of a group of factories with an important position in the BGMEA demanded that factory owners should have the option for “self-governance” (statement from the managing director of a renowned group of industries in a day-long policy event space organized by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Dhaka (n.d.), personal observation). 

There is clear evidence to suggest that throughout the implementation period of the Accord, the relationship between the BGMEA and the Accord enforcement teams deteriorated. Important representatives of the government evaluated the Accord’s new governance regime as “interfering” with the state’s affairs. At one roundtable discussion held in Dhaka in July 2018, an official from the Ministry of Labour and Employment stated that they were willing to cancel the Accord’s provisions for good. It is worthwhile to note that during the implementation period of the Accord, the opinions expressed by the Minister of Commerce closely matched those of the BGMEA and the business elite of the country. Enforcement of the Accord has been dubbed as “excesses” by a government key spokesperson, indicating how the government simply dovetailed BGMEA on matters of workplace safety. While the BGMEA’s detest for the Accord perfectly fits with the logic of capitalism in the garment sector, what should we make of the government’s detest for the Accord?

The links between government and BGMEA

As the Accord’s tenure drew to a close and an extension was on the table, the friction came out in the open. After news reports that the BGMEA was committed to bringing all the “different regimes” of governance under one roof, the association developed a proposal to this effect for government approval. As recent as August 2019 the BGMEA is on record to have brought allegations against the Accord for its “going alone” policy even though the association committed to a cooperation between the Accord team and the BGMEA’s “local entrepreneurs and experts”. Indeed, the signatories to the Accord’s extension on 21 June 2017 agreed to continue a fire and building safety program in Bangladesh until midnight of May 31, 2021, after which the task would be handed over to a national regulatory body supported by the International Labor Organization.

In January 2020, a deal was struck between the Accord associations and the BGMEA to establish a Ready-Made Garment Sustainability Council (RSC) which would replace the Accord and operate within the regulatory framework of the laws of Bangladesh. Some international labour rights groups and networks made allegations in a witness signatories’ brief that the RSC’s takeover of the Accord’s Bangladesh operations was an upshot of a “protracted campaign” by the Government of Bangladesh and factory owners against the Accord. Among other things, that employers’ campaign included a court case against the Accord, sued by one disgruntled garment factory owner in Dhaka.

At the inauguration of the RSC, the new initiative was praised as an unprecedented “national” supply chain initiative, adding a flair of nationalism in business. The Accord press statement on the transition said, “RSC is a newly established not-for-profit company in Bangladesh created and governed by global apparel companies, trade unions, and manufacturers.” It was officially registered on May 20, 2020, to be “a permanent safety monitoring and compliance body in the RMG sector in Bangladesh.” All the signatory companies and unions of the Accord and the BGMEA agreed to establish the RSC through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on May 8, 2019. It was also stipulated that the “RSC will continue with factory inspections, remediation monitoring, safety training, and a safety & health complaints mechanism at the RMG factories supplying to Accord signatory companies” and that the programs “will be implemented following the protocols and procedures developed by the Accord, which have also been inherited by the RSC.” The statement further noted

With the transition of the Accord’s Bangladesh office and operations to the RSC, the RSC becomes the organization implementing the in-country safety inspections and programs of the legally binding 2018 Transition Accord agreement between global companies and unions. To ensure the provisions of the 2018 Transition Accord on remediation, inspections, training, and complaints programs are fully and adequately implemented, the Accord International Secretariat based in Amsterdam will cooperate with and support the RSC.

RSC released the following press release now found on its newly established website.

Today the functions of the Bangladesh offices of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh have transitioned to the RMG Sustainability Council (RSC), a permanent national [organisation] with equal representation from RMG manufacturers, global apparel companies, and trade unions representing garment workers.

The press release quoted three people representing three parties of the RSC Board of Directors. Dr. Rubana Huq, the then President of the BGMEA and industry representative on the RSC Board of Directors, said “The RSC is an unprecedented national initiative and through our collective efforts with the brands and trade unions, we will make sure that Bangladesh remains one of the safest countries to source RMG products from.” China Rahman, General Secretary of the IndustriALL Bangladesh Council and trade unions representative on the RSC Board of Directors, said, “Together with our Bangladeshi trade union affiliates, we will help ensure workers in RMG factories have safe workplaces and have access to remedy to address safety concerns and exercise the right to safe workplaces. We will work to ensure that workers […] have trust in the newly established RSC”. Roger Hubert, Regional Head for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Ethiopia for the multinational high-street retailer H&M and brand representative on the RSC Board of Directors, said: “With the establishment of the RSC, brands can continue to honour their supply chain responsibilities that they have committed to through the Accord signed with the trade unions. The RSC will provide the assurance that workplace safety will continue to be addressed throughout out Bangladeshi RMG supply chain.” Dr. Huq was categorical in stating that the RSC received its license for operation from the commerce ministry and had taken over ACCORD’s current office and offered all existing staff members to join the RSC.

Uncertain futures under corporate control

After Bangladesh Accord’s transition to a new name there has not been much in the news about ongoing activities. The Accord’s continued operation with new arrangements under the Ministry of Commerce indicates the business elite’s close ties with the ruling political party in Bangladesh. It points to the local power nexus that are at play and business interests prevailing over all other considerations, something commonly seen in literature on global production networks. For all the symbolism involved with the RSC and its “new beginnings”, it is apparent that a truce has been found for the time being. Paradoxically, the “new” developments may resemble a move towards a structural power approach to the problem at hand, where the state’s role is seen as paramount. But in the absence of any political will from the state’s ruling political block, one cannot be too hopeful.


Mahmudul H Sumon is a Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. He can be contacted at: sumonmahmud@juniv.edu.


Cite as: Sumon, Mahmudul H. 2022. “What do we learn from hybrid governance in Bangladesh’s garments sector?” Focaalblog, 13 September. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/09/14/mahmudul-h-sumon-what-do-we-learn-from-hybrid-governance-in-bangladeshs-garments-sector/

akshay khanna & Alice Tilche: That which cannot be spoken

This is the third of our series of blogposts in relation to the Budhan Podcast project. In earlier posts we have looked at narrations of collective suffering and the re-embodiments engendered by the shift from theatre to film. In this post we turn our attention to a particular feature of the emergent form of film, that of sublimation. 


A forum theatre1 workshop conducted as part of the project produced two short plays centered on various experiences of the participants, of discrimination based on tribal identity, caste, gender, colour and class. One of these related to a young Chhara man’s experience as a reporter for a television channel. At the beginning we hear his conversation with his father, who had invested in his children’s education so that they did not fall back into the business of bootlegging, which characterises a large part of the economy of Chharanagar. ‘It is most important’, the father says when the protagonist informs him that he has been called for an interview at the channel, ‘that you represent our people. Society and the state think of us only as criminals, as thieves, as those in the daaru (alcohol) business. This must change’. He enters the interview, after negotiating the suspicions of the guard at the door, and being intimidated by aggressive expressions of social capital by upper caste candidates in the waiting room. The idiom through most of this had been humour – miscommunication, caricature, cheeky references to contemporary political moments, luring the audience into the story and marking a mutual unreadability between the characters on stage. The protagonist sits down, nervously, in front of his prospective colleagues and bosses.  

‘What is your name?’, they ask. ‘Govind’, he replies. ‘Yes, we know, we have read your application, but what is your name?’. Here emerges a curious fact – Govind has dropped his surname. He goes simply by the name Govind.

The question ‘what is your name?’ in India is much more than about what one is to be called. It is the first question that one is asked – for it is through one’s surname that one’s caste is ascertained, one’s relative position in the interaction, and thus one’s status and terms of engagement. There is a long history of people, especially those from oppressed castes and tribes strategically changing their names. In the 1970s and 1980s, socialist movements such as the ‘JP movement’, led to people dropping their surnames en masse so as to disable the privilege function of caste. Today’s young generation of Ambedkarites of different caste backgrounds do the same and it is not uncommon to come across students and young professionals fighting formal systems that require a caste name as a prerequisite for entry and recognition. 

On the insistence of the interviewers, Govind lets out that his ‘full name’ is in fact Govind Chhara. He is from Chharanagar, the interviewers confirm, where there is daaru business, and crime. The interviewers seem unconcerned with the fact that Govind’s expertise is in culture, that he himself is an actor and is interested in covering cinema and art. Even as they eventually give him a job, this has a very specific remit – he is to give them stories from within the world of crime. The rest of the play traces his journey through the crime beat, his engagements with the police who assume that he is intimate with petty criminals, the various ways in which his identity comes to define his career in journalism, leading ultimately to a resignation and a hard-hitting monologue about casteism.  

The play had been performed and now it was time for the forum to take over as members of the audience (in this case from the community) are invited to enact other strategies in dealing with the situation that was just been performed on stage. The first person to come on stage to do things differently happened to be Dakxin. Dakxin who sometimes goes by the name Bajrange, and sometimes by Chhara. Who has taken pride in his name and written and spoken eloquently about the art of theft. It is for the art of being invisible that his ancestors had been hired by kings as spies in the colonial era, it is for their art of theft that they formed a critical part of the early resistance to British rule, and were ultimately branded as Criminal Tribes. Dakxin came onto stage to express a completely different persona to that of Govind: confident, emphasising his name, and, knowing how television works, making a case for himself by offering them connections with the real leaders of crime, the big corporate houses.  

‘What was the difference in the strategy we just saw?’, I asked as the Joker, the figure in forum theatre who facilitates discussion between audience and stage. And in the discussion that followed what articulated was a crucial dilemma for not just the DNT movement, but for struggles of most marginalised and despised groups – How does one relate to the ‘injurious’ name, the name that marks us as criminals, as oppressed castes, as queers, as minority religions? Do we pick it up and instil pride in it, do we emphasise our otherness, or do we disavow the name, or indeed disavow our difference itself? Do we embrace sanitised forms of address or hold on to, and reinvigorate our ‘states of injury’ as names of pride?  

There are multiple elements to this dilemma, but in this post we hone in on the imperative of respectability in representation. This, we find, has been an underlying tension in the podcast series. On one hand we see the framing of the Chhara self (and of other DNT communities) as respectable citizens, speaking purely of the violence visited upon DNT communities, demanding witness to their struggles for survival and worthy for that reason of dignity. This is the voice of dignified victimhood structurally expected in the documentary form, especially where film is conceptualised as an antidote to injurious stereotypes. It is the impeccable saree of the widow we encountered in our second blogpost, it is the quantified data on school dropouts in policy briefs, it is the measured tone of activists laying down facts which might speak for themselves. It is the face of the unfairly marginalised evoking a moral economy.  

This, in turn produces the affect, if not the figure, of the somehow justifiably marginalised. This is the other face. This is the face of the women who run the production side of the alcohol business, the young man who chooses to work in the business of bootlegging, or indeed of petty theft. In other contexts, this is the sex worker who refuses to occupy the palatable image of victimhood, the working-class queer who emphasises her sexualness publicly (rather than the desexualised ‘good gay’ that the law is willing to accommodate in the realm of citizenship), it is the Adivasi community that maintains its non-vegetarianism and alcohol consumption in the face of either Gandhian or Hindutva imperative of transformation into upper caste Hindu aspirational forms. The public transcript, to borrow a phrase from James Scott (1990), in other words, effectively, and at times aggressively, pushes a fundamental truth of being into the realm of the hidden transcript. It creates that which cannot be spoken.  

That which cannot be spoken, does not, however, disappear. It insists, it rearticulates. Episode 4 of the first season of the podcast, titled ‘History of pre and post-independence’ was made specifically to commemorate ‘Vimukti Divas’, the 31st of August, the anniversary of the day in 1952, 4 years after India has itself gained independence from British rule, when the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 was finally repealed. This is now celebrated as the actual Independence Day by millions of people from De-notified Tribes. The episode is a melange of historical retellings tracing the political and legal history of DNTs, interviews with community leaders and most remarkably a conversation between two old women recollecting their childhoods and the various shifts in lives and livelihood. This is all mostly in the measured tone of the respectable citizen. The rupture in the episode, however, comes in the form of a compelling rap song, Hun Janmjat Chor Kada Tiya (‘I was not born a criminal’) a collaboration between young men from Chharanagar, and Bhantu musicians from Maharashtra, that brings the history of DNT and nomadic tribes into lyrical manifestation, starting with the period before criminalisation and laying out the various ways in which the promise of post-coloniality, and of citizenship has been denied. In the song we find a striking disjuncture between spoken word and image, as the chorus ‘I am not a criminal’ contrasts with the affect of the song, the anger in its choreography and the unapologetic ‘bad boy’ aesthetic. Here, for the first time in the series we see that other self, one that expresses a pride in being able to feed one’s people through the art of theft, which expresses anger at the failure of the state and the violence meted upon its people, one that expresses a revolutionary impulse without being tamed in to a policy negotiation. Scott’s hidden transcript has ruptured onto the main stage, partly in words, but most effectively as aesthetic. 

This combination of the respectable, measured voice and a revolutionary voice unfettered by the imperatives of palatability emerges throughout the podcast series. This category of that which cannot be spoken is not, of course limited to the question of respectability. We saw in earlier blogposts, something similar with the experience of pain and the melodramatisation necessary for conveying the experience of death and loss during the pandemic. In the context of indigenous film, a similar technique has been discussed in terms of hyper-realisation. Drawing on Anishinaabe scholar Gerald Vizenor, Biddle and Lea (2018) for instance conceptualise of a “hyper-real of survivance” that uses art (including practices of artificial intensification and faking with the truth) “to make the real more real, when the real is itself what is at risk, at stake: namely, Indigenous history, language, presence”. It is an “hyper-real of survivance” in contexts of erasure of indigenous life and experience and in the absence of responsible media journalism. The striking recurrence here is the role of aesthetics in the expression of that which cannot be spoken, whether this be through music, through dramatic performances and monologues, through evocative cut-aways, soundtrack, poetry or indeed techniques in camera work and editing.  

Freud’s notion of ‘Sublimation’ is a useful starting point for a theoretical meditation on the relationship between these voices as articulating in the podcasts. We may reframe ‘sublimation’ for our purposes, as a mechanism through which an impulse that is too terrifying, or is culturally ‘inappropriate’ to express, re-articulates in another form that is culturally acceptable. In Freud this process is evidence of maturity, whereby the sexual dimension of an ‘infantile erotic wish’ is dispelled in favour of socially acceptable behaviour (Laplanche and Plantis 431-34, cf Buckner). In Freud, we already see this as one of the ‘origins of artistic activity’ (Freud and Strachey, 1905[1953], p. 238). Rather than an evasion of the impulse, its denial, projection or displacement, here we see its transformation, significantly carrying within it the kernel of the impulse itself. There are multiple critiques of Freud’s theory of course, the most striking of which is perhaps Oswald de Andrade’s notion of anthropofagia, a form of cannibalism, as articulating in his 1928 piece, at the same time as we see the publication of Breton’s Surrealist manifesto. The Brazilian artist does not simply reject or resist the idiom of the coloniser, but rather ‘consumes’ it, transforms it and utilises it (Maddox 2014). What we see here is a resistance to the cleaving of the civilised from the savage, and the inversion of the teleology – the indigenous ‘consume’ the coloniser, just as the idiom of respectability is deployed in the podcasts, and yet transformed by their being engulfed in an aesthetic of hyper-realisation. 

A second frame here is the Lacanian approach seeing the inevitable failure of the Symbolic in articulating the Real. Here we see the Real, which by definition cannot be symbolised, constantly returning to haunt the attempts at representation. This haunting in the podcasts is through ruptures generated by aesthetics, a subtle (and often not so subtle) reminder that the voice of respectable victimhood is a failure of representation that nevertheless indexes that which cannot be spoken. The rap song thus ruptures through the respectability of the symbolic and sustains it as an always incomplete object.  

A final theoretical resonance lies with Deleuze’s meditation on the notion of discourse, where he insists that in Foucault’s Archaeological project, every stratum must be understood to be a relationship between the ‘articulable’ (the realm of word, what can be said, what can be written), and the ‘visible’ (that which can be seen). In modernity the articulable gains primacy, and yet, argues Deleuze, “visibilities…remain irreducible to statements and remain all the more so for developing a passion for the action of statements.” (Deleuze 1988:43) What then is the relationship here, between that which is said and that which is made visible? Deleuze conceptualises ‘two lights’, again in reference to Foucault. “…a first light opens up things and brings forth visibilities as flashes and shimmerings, which are the ‘second light’…” (Deleuze 1988:50). The first light, in other words, is the condition for the second being sensed. It is the visible (here, the aesthetic, the musical, the aural) that allows for the articulable (the words of the respectable marginalised) to be experienced beyond itself. In indigenous film we thus see this strategy of surrounding that which can be said, with the aesthetic of that which cannot, which enables the colonised to consume the coloniser and utilise it, for the Real to rupture through the symbolic, refusing erasure through civility. 


Biddle, Jennifer L. and Lea, Tess. Hyperrealism and Other Indigenous Forms of ‘Faking It with the Truth’, in Visual Anthropology Review, 34 ( 1): 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/var.12148

Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Foucault (trans by Seán Hand) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Freud, Sigmund (1905 [1953]), trans. James Strachey, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. VII, London: The Hogarth Press. p. 238

Laplanche, Jean. 1997. Aims of the Psychoanalytic Process, JEP: European Journal of Psychoanalysis, 5, Spring-Fall.  

Maddox, John T. 2014. AfroReggae: “Antropofagia,” Sublimation, and Intimate Revolt in the “Favela” Hispania,  97 (3): 463-476

Scott, James C. (1990), Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, New Haven: Yale University Press.


akshay khanna is a Delhi-based Social Anthropologist, International Development Consultant, theatre practitioner and amateur chef, with training in Law and Medical Anthropology and the author of Sexualness (2016, New Text), which tells a story of Queer movements in India, develops a framework to think the sexual from the global south, and introduces Quantum Physics into the study of the sexual.

Alice Tilche is a lecturer in Anthropology and Museum Studies at the University of Leicester, UK. Her research at the intersection of art and activism employs visual, collaborative and arts-based methods to research social transformations – including work on the cultural politics of indigeneity, migration, nationalism and most recently Covid-19. Alice’s book Adivasi Art and Activism: curation in a nationalist agewas published with Washington University Press in 2022. Her collaborative film projects including Sundarana (2011), Broken Gods (2019) and Budhan-Podcast (2021) have been selected for a number of international film screenings and festivals.

We very much welcome questions and feedback @ alice.tilche@leicester.ac.uk and xaefis@gmail.com


Cite as: Tilche, Alice and khanna, akshay. 2022. “That which cannot be spoken.” Focaalblog, 5 September. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/09/05/alice-tilche-akshay-khanna-that-which-cannot-be-spoken/

Valentina Napolitano & Kristin Norget: Pope Francis, Reconciliation, and the State

At the end of July, a remarkable event unfolded in three distinct but significant sites in Canada. Pope Francis, the Argentinian current supreme pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church, travelled to Maskwacis, Ste. Anne de Beaupré and Iqaluit on his “penitential pilgrimage” in Turtle Island (the Indigenous name for North America), an historic visit intended to allow for “forgiveness” for the heinous acts at Catholic Residential Schools which for over almost a century (1885-1996) separated thousands of Indigenous children from their families and communities and subjected them to awful physical, emotional, and sexual abuse.

The event earned some attention in the media internationally and in Canada, where it monopolized national and local airwaves and the Internet. The media drummed up popular fascination, in “will he, or won’t he?” fashion, with the potential Apology from the Pope – a possibility planted earlier this year in March when a delegation of members of 32 First Nations, Métis and Inuit communities visited the Vatican and met with the Pope to share their experience in residential schools and express the importance of a formal papal declaration of apology in their homeland. Part of the delegation’s aim was a call for the rescinding of the 1492 Treaty of Tordesillas and its accompanying “Doctrine of Discovery”, which originally endowed early Christian explorers the legal authorization to occupy and extract from a supposed ‘terra nullius’.

We draw attention to the need for anthropologists and other scholars to recognize the importance of what is at stake in this papal event as a culmination of colonial histories and processes that are not merely “religious”. While many may read the papal visit as simply an enactment by an archaic religious institution breathing its last breaths on the global stage, there is much more at work here that touches on the most pressing issues of our day concerning (self-)sovereignty, governance and decolonization, and the powerful hidden theopolitical economy of bodies, blood and soil, and the commons that underlies them. As such, this papal visit and other prominent public Church performances also invoke, implicitly though distinctly, themes familiar to many anthropologists in our thinking and research: debt and guilt, capitalism and care, denizen-ship and vulnerability.

A Pope is never a single story, nor a truly singular individual. Technically, the Pope is the Bishop of Rome, in straight lineal descent from Saint Peter, making him a unique combination of the historical person, the geopolitical configuration of the Church (as sovereign of the Vatican City State), and the liturgical, “God-manifested” investiture of the Pontificate. While many regarded the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) as marking a pivotal rejuvenation of the Church and a welcome modernizing shift toward reform and social engagement, the two pontificates that followed Vatican II dampened any such hopes. Both Pope (and now Saint) John Paul II (1978-2005) and Pope Benedict XVI (2005-2013) manifested ambiguous stances toward Indigenous people and the deep histories of violence, neglect, and exploitationin the Americas.

John Paul II, personally invested in a post-cold war politics of anti-communism, was a staunch defender of ‘human life’ as a universal value rather than something to be understood as mediated by social and cultural specificities. He travelled to some 120 countries and oversaw an unprecedented surge in the canonization of new saints, including in the Americas. Yet in this continent he also undid years of efforts by more ‘progressive’ Church factions in promoting participatory democracy, land rights advocacy, human and Indigenous rights, and in the fight against poverty and neoliberal policies of international structural adjustment – the broad canvas of programs that theologically and pastorally became known as part of the movement of Liberation Theology. John Paul II’s geopolitical orientation toward Turtle Island could be summed up by his words during a brief visit in 1984 where, in Ste. Anne de Beaupré, he stated, rather elliptically, “We know that Jesus Christ makes possible reconciliation between peoples, with all its requirements of conversion, justice and social love. If we truly believe that God created us in his image, we shall be able to accept one another with our differences and despite our limitations and our sins.” Reconciliation for this pope was thus fundamentally a repairing enabled by the sweeping of vexing “differences” and past evils under the supposedly apolitical carpet of a transcendent universal (European) catholicity.

In contrast to his predecessor, Benedict XVI appeared more interested in the “Arab world” rather than the Americas, which he visited only briefly twice (Brazil in 2007, and Mexico in 2012, en route to Cuba). In travels to Lebanon, Syria, and Germany he worked to encourage, not always successfully, Christian-Muslimdialogue, visibly more at ease as a theologian rather than a pastor surrounded by a crowd. More generally, he had an infamous role in partly covering priestly sexual abuse before becoming Pope, but also, perhaps unknown to many, while Pope, tried to address the abuses committed within and by members of new 19th and 20th century religious Orders (such as the Congregation of the Legionaries of Christ and their founder Marcial Maciel) that had been much in the grace of John Paul II.  The “traditionalism”–in both theological orthodoxy and disposition – of this German Pope also served to bolster the “old”, pre-Reformation Orders within the church and affirmed the Christian roots of Europe and its ‘civilization’. Yet when Benedict XVI met a First Nations delegation visiting the Vatican in 2009 (headed by then National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Phil Lafontaine), the pontiff expressed a heartfelt shame and sorrow for the suffering of those living with the tragic legacy of Catholic residential schools, and blessed sacred medicine brought by delegation members. However, the Pope’s utterance of remorse took place on Vatican soil, as part of a private visit, not an act of attempted reconciliation on Turtle Island.

When Francis became Pope, however, the world expected something different. As the first Latin American Pope, with a theological and pastoral proximity to the poor and the “peripheries” (though with an unclear association with Argentina’s military regime while Provincial of the Jesuits in Buenos Aires), it was thought he could open the magisterium of the Church to an embracing of the divorced, homosexuality, the ordination of women priests, and the tackling of priestly sexual abuses, while setting in motion a concrete system of reparation. Now, amid the ninth year of his pontificate, an opening on these matters has been only partial.

Nevertheless, Pope Francis has called attention to capitalism’s “culture of waste” and our universal denizen-ship on the earth as “our common home”; in 2015 he met for over three weeks with Indigenous communities in the Amazon toward mobilizing clergy and others for an “Integral Ecology” of “pastoral, cultural, and ecological conversion” in the interests of Indigenous survival. In addition, he has pointed to the aging, “grandfather”–like nature of European societies which he urges must rejuvenate their ancient cultural values by means of new immigrant blood.

These overtures have been appreciated especially by non-Catholics, attracted by their ethically driven politics of inclusion and active collective responsibility in a time of increasing individualist populist politics world-wide. Conservative Catholics, however, have portrayed Francis as a mere pastoral figure rather than one with true theological gravitas, a breaker of traditions rather than an architect of authentic intra-church alliances. Moreover, the ambiguity of this Pope from the Americas is precisely regarding its Indigenous peoples:  they are beloved as ‘primordial’ caretakers of the earth and holders of ancestors’ wisdom yet remain trapped in the romanticizing gaze of Francis in his own embodiment of an immigrant European in the New World.

The most striking image in the just-completed Turtle Island papal pilgrimage is the frail, wheel-chaired body of Francis as the agent of avowed penitence. The popular enthrallment with the highly mediatized story of the papal visit, not just in Canada but worldwide, points to a collective desire for a punctual, perlocutionary healing, as if the spoken apology “for deplorable evil” could perform the erasure of the stubborn stain of guilt not just for the Church. In this context, the Pope as the Church’s metonymic leader becomes the proxy for non-indigenous Canadian society at large (the latter, after all, tacitly accepted the colonial assimilationist system that allowed the unspeakable abuses of Indigenous children to take place).

Indeed, at the very start of his visit this unique (as both the first Jesuit and non-European) Pope could be seen solemnly and pensively cradling his chin and mouth in his hand as if hesitant about the words he would soon be expected to utter. Later, in Maskwacis, he was enveloped in a soundscape of sacred chanting and drumming, grinning as he donned an Indigenous ceremonial headdress. The moment displayed a willful audaciousness typical of the Church, justified by the familiar theological principle of Humanitas – a vitalization of ‘cultures’ under a universal umbrella that sees all members of those Cultures as children of God. Yet, the apparent seamlessness of this harmonious scene later became undone by the raw, devastating, impromptu spectacle of a lone woman, Si Pih Ko, powerfully singing, in Cree, her fist raised to the sky, an alternative version of Canada’s national anthem known as “Our Village”, rebuking the papal presence while protesting the death of her brother in prison.  

Image 1: Chief Wilton Littlechild and Pope Francis, Maskwacis, Alberta, July 26, 2022 (photo by Guglielmo Mangiapane, Reuters; the authors are grateful for the right to publish the image here)

If, as Carl Schmitt says, all political concepts are secularized theological ones, Pope Francis’s  recurring gestures of apology for “cultural destruction” came crashing to a ground of (missed) interpellations and apologies, while he continued to offer his fragile body for a performative Church and State healing of indigenous lives ravaged by the violence of genocide – a word the pontiff spoke only when he was safely on the plane back to Rome.

Thus, the concept of reconciliation by Pope Francis was affectively mobilized through the soil, commons, soundscapes, and bodies as these hinged on the ultimate sacrifice of Christ’s crucifixion and a human/divine suffering that were, in this highly mediatized visit, notably devoid of Marian iconicity. In this framework, the singular yet communal suffering of First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples becomes part of the ‘universal’ redemptive incarnation and blood of Christ, and, by extension, the healing sovereignty of the Canadian state.

The much-anticipated apology for the methodical cruelty of educational Catholic missions, and the Catholic Church’s role in past and ongoing colonialism, cannot be understood simply through an anthropological lens of battles for and refusal of modern state (self-)sovereignty. This 2022 papal journey through Turtle Island made glaringly evident that a colonial Church infrastructure is deeply engrained in a Christianity of the modern Canadian state, as the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops made clear by orchestrating, albeit not in line with Pope Francis’s will, an estranging Eucharistic Mass performed in Latin (an archaic norm abandoned post-Vatican II) in Edmonton’s Commonwealth stadium on July 26. Throughout this visit we beheld an aging papal body answering Indigenous calls for the dis-entangling of Catholic colonial violence through his encounter with the sacred soundscape, walking the soil (even if in a wheelchair), and in his public acts of listening.

‘True’ reconciliation remains a matter of the return of stolen gifts and livelihoods, requiring a new articulation between economies of suffering and indebtedness. From the perspective of Catholic theology, indebtedness is intrinsic to the tension between guilt and debt, where guilt is the unavoidable condition of being born as human (fallen from Eden), and debt is enjoined by God’s gift of life that cannot ever be fully repaid. The tension of guilt and debt in their eternal production of indebtedness is a “vital” theological hinge and a primary force of a capitalist market that functions as a never-ending fulfillment of drives and desires. Reconciliation then is also a much-needed breaking of precisely this theological hinge

Yet, in a way that was perhaps unperceived by many, this papal visit with and beyond the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island affords the possibility that “reconciliation” is not only a matter of voicing and representation, sovereignty and its ongoing unravelling, or retribution and (unmade) apologies. It also a political, theological, and cosmological matter of a mystery of incarnation, in its particular bodily forms of fragility—a fragility now more than ever common to all living beings. As potent as this mystery of incarnation may be for healing, it may not be enough.


Valentina Napolitano is Professor of Anthropology and Connaught Scholar at the University of Toronto. Valentina Napolitano’s work weaves together anthropology, political theology, and Critical Catholic Studies.  She is currently focusing on a book on mysticism and politics in the 21st century.

Kristin Norget is Associate Professor of Anthropology at McGill University. Her current research interests are concerned with mediatization and contemporary strategies of evangelization of the Roman Catholic Church focused on Mexico and Peru. She has also published on issues of indigeneity and Catholic liberation theology in Mexico.


Cite as: Valentina Napolitano and Kristin Norget. 2022. “Pope Francis, Reconciliation, and the State.” Focaalblog, 12 August. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/08/12/valentina-napolitano-kristin-norget-pope-francis-reconciliation-and-the-state/

Derek Hall: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Response to David Harvey

David Harvey’s February 25 FocaalBlog post is presented as “An Interim Report” on  “Recent Events in the Ukraine”. Harvey’s essay effectively covers some of the core forces that have led to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, from the devastating impact of 1990s shock therapy in Russia to Russian reactions to NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 and NATO’s incorporation of new members in central and eastern Europe. As a response in real time to the full-scale invasion of a nation of 40 million people by a nuclear-armed great power, however, it is analytically inadequate and misleading and politically and ethically flawed.

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David Harvey: Remarks on Recent Events in the Ukraine: An Interim Statement

Image 1: Young girl protesting the war in Ukraine, photo by Matti.

This is a provisional text David Harvey prepared for the 2022 American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting. He allowed us, nevertheless, to publish it here because of the escalating Russia-Ukraine crisis.

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Massimiliano Mollona: Why the End of Work Will Not Be the End of Capitalism

One of the lowest moments of my undergraduate studies in Economics back in the 1990s happened whilst reading Tom Peters’ Liberation Management (1992), where the management guru/McKinsey-associate proposes to abolish the tedious, repetitive, and pointless jobs associated with bureaucratic and hierarchical capitalism, and create instead leaner horizontal, collectivist, and autonomous structures, based on meaningful, self-directed, and relationally expanded workers’ actions. I thought to myself: “These bloody managers are appropriating even creativity!” Indeed, that was the beginning of what Boltanski and Chiappello (2005) later called ‘the new spirit of capitalism’. The same charismatic spirit of capitalist reformation echoes in David Graeber’s Bullshit Jobs (2019) despite it being an attempt to actually eliminate it.

Graeber’s Bullshit Jobs is based on the article ‘On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs’, published in 2013 on the blog of Strike! magazine, an umbrella of militant left-wing organizations, which is now closed. The original Strike! page received more than one million hits, and within a week, was translated into a least a dozen languages. In 1930, John Maynard Keynes predicted that, by century’s end, technology would have advanced sufficiently that countries like Great Britain or the United States would have achieved a 15-hour work week.  And yet it didn’t happen. Instead, David argues, “technology has been marshalled, if anything, to figure out ways to make us all work more” and more importantly, on effectively pointless jobs. Crowds of people, in Europe and North America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not really need to be performed. This situation creates deep moral and spiritual damage, “it is a scar across our collective soul” David argues. Yet no one talks about it. Keynes’ promised utopia resurged briefly in the 1960s – remember Andre Gorz’s Farewell to the working-class (1980)? Yet, it never materialised.

Image 1: Fredi’s office, © Masimilliano Mollona

The standard line today is that Keynes didn’t predict the massive increase in consumerism, which rebooted the productive economy, in tandem with the financialization of poverty. Instead, David links the proliferation of bullshit jobs to the explosion of the financial economy. The turning point was the economic deregulation of the 1980s, associated with the new spirit of capitalism, when “the children of the 1960s, used their ideology of cultural liberation, to break the unions and implement the regime of flexible production”. And yet, as I have highlighted in my opening paragraph, flexible production was precisely the result of the managerialist orchestration of expanded and more meaningful tasks for the workforce, and of the sense of expanded agency associated with such “job expansion” – the delusional experience of the new financialised subjects – which Bullshit Jobs advocates as a means against financial capitalism.  Moreover, finance, and the new forms of extractivism associated with it, generates not just bullshit jobs, but also a feudal social system, based on a weirdly sadomasochist protestant work ethics in which the performance of boring and useless jobs and of actions totally separated form real life leads to salvation and economic remuneration whereas the jobs with higher social value are systematically devalued and underpaid. The aim of Bullshit Jobs is to show that neoliberalism is a political project, of the dystopian kind, and not an economic one. In fact, unlike classical capitalism, which was about profit and sound economics, financial capitalism is inherently inefficient and bureaucratic, as is shown by its declining rate of growth worldwide.

By showing that capitalism is a cultural and ideological social construction, which we unconsciously reproduce every day, Bullshit Jobs opens a potential space of collective refusal. By understanding the performative dimensions of economics, we can appreciate that, if we decide so, we can produce a different society, first, by eliminating bullshit jobs. The policy of Universal Basic Income is a possible means to such end.

On the difference between bullshit jobs and shit jobs

Bullshit jobs involve being paid by someone else either on waged or salaried basis for jobs “that are so completely pointless, unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its existence”. They are jobs of smokes and mirrors. They are white collar jobs, full of perks and status, honour, and prestige. But those who perform them knows they are meaningless. In fact, the job holder must pretend their job is important. So, bullshit jobs always contain a degree of falsity and pretence. “The lives of bullshit workers are based on lies”. Shit jobs are the opposite of bullshit. They are jobs that are needed but are not well paid. Jobs that are of benefit to society. They are blue collar and paid by the hour. Undignified, but meaningful. Typically, they consist in the ‘reproductive jobs’ of looking after people, which involve care, empathy and emotional labour (Graeber 2019, 14).  Bullshit and shit jobs cut the private public divide, in the same way they equally flourish under capitalism and under socialism.

There are five types of bullshit jobs:

Flunky jobs exist only or primarily to make someone else feel or look important. They are the jobs of the servants, clients, sycophants, the entourage of those at the top of the feudal retainers. David writes: “imagine that a crowd of indigent, runaways, orphans, criminals, women in desperate situations and other disparate people gather around your mansion…. The obvious thing to do is to slap a uniform on them and assign them to minor task to justify their existence…. Such roles tend to multiply in economies based on rent extraction” (Graeber 2019, 29). Flunkies are modern versions of servants and maids, which David notes, have disappeared in the north Atlantic world.

Goonies are people whose jobs have an aggressive element: telemarketers, corporate lawyers, lobbyist. Working in advertising, marketing and publicity, goonies are always dissatisfied, even if their jobs tend to earn them six-figure salaries.  

Duct tapers are workers who make up for inefficiencies in the system. For instance: IT workers inputting information into excel spread sheets; programmers making different hardware compatible or female administrative assistants, who end up doing a lot of work for their (male) bosses, and with their affective labour, soothing their egos.  

Box tickers prepare reports and reproduce the bureaucratic apparatus of monitoring, surveillance, and performance assessment of work bureaucracies.

Taskmasters are the managers who formulate the strategic mission, assess business performances, compose grids of career progression, and keep the bullshit system alive.

Humorously parodying the kind of pointless categorizations that populate the bullshit workplace, David’s classification is loose and unground. On a closer inspection, it turns out that most bullshit jobs he mentions are in fact, shit jobs. Take for instance the IT workers who fix and repair programs or make different platforms compatible – the duct tapers. They may be bullshit jobs, but they are central in the reproduction of value under platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2016). The workers for the Amazon Mechanical Turk, a crowdsourced platform for so-called “post-human intelligence tasks”, which outsources small and alienating digital work are paid an average of 15 dollars per day, for anything between two and ten hours work, 100 hits per day. Platform capitalism is the productive side of finance, the new site of capitalist value creation and extraction, fully entangled with global industrial production, their digital infrastructures and automation systems. Amazon, Facebook and Google and their shareholders don’t think these jobs are bullshit and won’t let these jobs go without a fight. Or think of the Flunkies such as porters, security guards, maids, freelance care workers.  These ‘shit shit jobs’ are neither blue collar nor white collar but pertain to an unregulated and highly exploitative service economy, which also proliferates with the proliferation of finance.

The confusion seems to stem from the fact that David’s classification focuses on work, rather than on labour, which depoliticises the issue at stake because it discounts the social relation of production, that is, the field of articulations, negotiations and struggles around which some human actions are deemed to acquire more value than others, and underpin the social constructions of skills, tasks, and actions as building-blocks of the whole ritual edifice of bourgeois micro-economics.

Marxism in anthropology has never been too popular, but the attack to productivism and labour value theory in anthropology, from James Ferguson’s book on redistribution, Li Puma and Lee’s on financial circulation, to various analysis on the productivity of the informal economies of slums, has had the bizarre effect of generating a vast market for popular books about work  – whose more recent examples are Jan Lucassen’s (2021) monumental book The Story of Work a New History of Humankind and anthropologist James Suzman’s (2021) blockbuster book Work: A Deep History from Stone Age to the Age of Robots. Like David, Suzman has become a celebrity anthropologist, outspoken about the pointlessness of contemporary work mental and material structures and advocating the 15 hours a week from the perspective of the ‘stone age economics’ of the Ju/Hoansi bushmen of Namibia’s Kalahari desert, which he studied during his PhD in anthropology at Edinburgh university, started after he resigned as senior manager in the diamond mining giant De Beers. Now Suzman runs Antropos ltd, a think-tank that offers ‘anthropological approaches to present-day problem-solving’ at a corporate rate of up to £1,400 per day – half for NGOs (Hunt, 2020).

These culturalist and evolutionary studies of work undervalue the historical materialist aspects of labour, which Marx considers as a real abstraction that is both material and ideological – economic and political. Marxist labour theory of value says that capitalism is a political and economic construction that systematically undervalues and exploits those actions that are attached to a wage relation, which itself is a form of human devalorization. It is not the content of the action that matters. It is the relationships of production that matter, both at the local and global levels, in the entanglement between finance and industry, centres and peripheries, which generate complex entanglements of bullshit, shit, and shit shit jobs.

Besides, David’s argument that the economy of late capitalism is uneconomical, assumes that capitalism, at least at some point, was about economics rather than power and that the economy (or capitalism?) can be fixed, morally and productively, with an efficient work reorganization and that this reorganization consists in sorting out which jobs are more important than others. First, reproductive jobs are more important than productive ones, productive from the point of view capital. But when you look at his classification, nearly all jobs are reproductive, in fact the very problem of productivism, David argues, is that it forgets that the vast majority of the working-class fixes, maintains, looks after – machines, people and objects – rather than heroically fighting on the production line. David’s intuition about the value of maintenance and reproductive labour is a very important one. But, if nearly all human actions are reproductive in large sense, reproductive of the existent world and of existent institutions, how can we distinguish between those which reproduce capitalism such as unpaid housework, and those which reproduce life outside it?  

Image 2: Office work, photo by Andrea Piacquadio.

Instead of looking at how the value of work is socially constructed through the wage relation, David considers the degree of satisfaction afforded by different work, tasks or actions, satisfaction which is directly related to their different affordance of agency and freedom. The emphasis here is on the morality or ethics of freedom rather than the politics of labour, which resonates with Tom Peters’ ideology of freedom management, that is, the idea that work can be abolished or freed, without abolishing capitalist social relations (on this issue see also Ana Cecilia Dinerstein and Harry Pitts, 2021).

In fact, according to David, there is a clear moral divide between bullshit jobs and shit jobs. Shit jobs are morally satisfying and meaningful, whereas bullshit work is immoral, alienating and ultimately dissatisfying because it leaves the bullshitter without agency and creativity and such lack of agency clashes with humans’ natural tendency to find pleasure in seeing one’s action reaching its imagined end. But why is care work so satisfying despite it involving so little agency? Or can a sense of agency emerge from empowering other people’s actions or in the realization that all actions are ultimately equally powerless because deeply relational? An analysis of the social relations surrounding the evaluation of actions, and of the ethical performativity of value, as in Michael Lambek’s (2013) article ‘The Value of Performative Acts’, would have helped here.

Work as protestant ideology or ethics

But it turns out that freedom at work is heavily constrained by the morality of the time.

David is interested in the morality of labour of Northern Europe and North America and in its specific Christian protestant trajectory, and he explicitly leaves out the aristocratic and patriarchal vision of labour held in the Mediterranean and in ancient Greece, whereby physical labour is only for serfs and women. This historically and geographically essentialising classification, which characterises so much Mediterranean anthropology of the 1980s, doesn’t make much sense from the point of view of labour history.

In the feudal economy of Northern Europe, dominated by the Puritan and Protestant ethical framework, paid and waged labour were a form of education and disciplining of the working-class, of training to show good manners, limited to the initial part of one’s life. Its Judeo-Christian vision of humanity, which Sahlins (1996) highlights so well in his ‘The Sadness of Sweetness’, meant that work had to be self-mortifying, sacrificial and redemptive. In such male dominated society, human production is seen as an emulation of the heavenly process of world creation and reproductive labour is considered a mirror, although derivative, of the productive labour of men and God.

Capitalism transformed service into a permanent relation of wage labour but salvaged the ideology of feudalism. In fact, both managerialism and feudalism are forms of abstraction from real production, in which appropriation and distribution of goods, rather than actual production, creates elaborated ranked hierarchy. “Financial capitalism isn’t really capitalism but a form of rent extraction, where the internal logic are different from capitalism… since economic and political imperatives have come to merge… now it resembles managerial feudalism” (Graeber 2019, 181). But were previous forms of capitalism just economical? Is not always profit a form of rent extraction? David criticises the classical assumption shared by both Marxist and bourgeois economists that under feudalism the political and the economical blur because extraction is based on legal principle, whereas in capitalism the economical is abstracted from the political. In fact, he argues, capitalist economics, including work organization, is an entirely political construction. This depiction of Marxism is disingenuous. Marx clearly describes capitalism as a political construction, in which the fictions and abstractions of capital, embodied as much in bourgeois economics as in the material organization of the factory, become real.

More importantly, according to David, under financial capitalism, human life becomes progressively abstracted and surreal, which turns the ethics of Protestantism into a weird sadomasochistic ideology, in which the relation between social benefits and level of compensation is turned upside down; “people should be compensated for horrible jobs because meaningful jobs are already compensating” (Graeber 2019, 213). Productive labour becomes a form of punishment á la Foucault.

David’s Marxism

David’s Weberian and Foucauldian understanding of contemporary capitalism as a weird form of moral punishment and productive madness is a radical change of direction from his previous Marxist analysis of capitalist labour as an inverted form of slavery (Graeber 2006). There, David’s argument of the historical entanglement of capitalism and slavery was part of a broader reflection on structural Marxism, system theory and the political economy approach in anthropology (Sidney Mintz, Eric Wolf and Eric Williams) and engagement with the radical black Marxism of Cedric Robinson. Particularly, David shows that capitalism and slavery share the following traits: both rely on a separation of the place of social (re)production of the labour force, and the place where that labour-power is realized in production – in the case of slavery, this is achieved by transporting laborers bought or stolen from one society into another one; in capitalism, by separating the domestic sphere (the sphere of social production) from the workplace.

The transfer happens by exchanging human powers for money. One effect of that transfer is ‘social death’, in the sense of the devaluation if not annihilation of the community ties and kinship relations and their separation from the workplace. The financial transaction in both cases produces abstract labour, which is pure creative potential and the sheer power of creation. The ideology of freedom which conflicts with how most societies take it for granted that no human is completely free or completely dependent, rather, all have different degrees of rights and obligations. The modern ideal of political liberty, in fact, has historically tended to emerge from societies with extreme forms of chattel slavery.

Such Marxist analysis of the entanglement of capitalism and slavery, tells us much more about contemporary forms of feudal management, the systematic devaluation of reproductive labour and the social construction of unfreedom, than the Weberian approach of Bullshit Jobs.

Reproductive labour

The central theoretical reference in David’s theory of reproductive labour is the feminist scholar Nancy Folbre (2020). For Nancy Folbre, patriarchy is the systematic devaluation of the power of reproducing life by women or alien men such as slaves, which is achieved through three main mechanisms: (1) the creation of property rights and laws that limits the circulation of people and put it under male control; (2) restrictions of rights of women children and sexually non-conforming individuals and (3) under-remuneration of care work.

For Folbre slavery and capitalism are not just moral or cultural systems (associated with patriarchy, aristocracy, caste, or race) or simply work structures (in which factories and plantations mirror each other), but are interrelated political and economic systems in which the wage relation is entangled with and reinforced by conflicting ideological construction of personhood and forms of evaluation of human action. The link between slavery, devaluation of reproductive labour and capitalism is made by Meillassoux (1986) in his anthropology of slavery, which shows how the systematic devaluation of the labour of slaves and the denial of their reproductive powers become a generalised and sustainable economic system only when slavery becomes entangled in merchant capitalism; in the same way in which the systematic devaluation of working-class labour can only be sustainable through the systematic denial of the reproductive labour of women.

Finance

Another Marxist trope in Bullshit Jobs is the link between finance, abstraction, and alienation, whereby the FIRE sectors (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) systematically create abstractions and abstracted organizations which hire ‘complicators’ to increase financial abstractions and the speculation connected to them. Finance creates meaningless ritual and new age gurus, “who paint abstraction as reality, forgetting that there are some things more real than others”. Marx describes capitalism as a form of labour abstraction – CMC to MCM – and finance as a multiplication of such abstract logic. The Marxist philosopher Moishe Postone (1993) considered the abstracted and impersonal kind of work David associates with bullshit labour as the materialization of the commodity form – a real abstraction of capital. But David discusses the proliferation of finance, abstraction and rent extraction as unreasonable and unrealistic deviations from classical capitalism and precisely because unrealistic, to be easily overcome. Even if unrealistic, contemporary forms of rentier capitalism, of the kind described by Christopher Brett (2021) or by Lisa Adkins, Melinda Cooper and Martijn Konings (2020) cannot be challenged simply through work re-organizations or wage redistribution, because it is deeply attached to assets inequality and on feudal power relations which capitalism constantly re-produces, via its impersonal machine.   

Solidarity

But the best part of the book are the descriptions of the creative strategies of resistance of this new precarised and dispossessed class of bullshitters consisting of Wikipedia ghost-writers, occupational poets, toilet graffiti artists, deluded rock stars, professional dropouts, and gossipers. It is precisely in the creative agency of these workers, and in David’s empathy towards them, that the book’s call to action emerges. After all, the book is based on interviews with individuals who had read David’s original article and identified with his political project of demystifying the corporate world. That is, the book is based on a sense of solidarity between David and the bullshitters. In this sense, Bullshit Jobs’ greatest potential is as a work of fiction or an ethnography of direct action, which in defiance of the tragic post-workerist sociological narrative, gives voice to the creative withdrawal, artistic desires, and post-capitalist fantasies of platform workers – whose anti-heroic politics resonates with that of the lost people of Madagascar.  

David’s optimism reflected the hopes about the end of capitalism that opened after the economic crisis of 2008 and embodied in the UK by Corbynism with which David had a strong affiliation. At the time, even the gigantic productivist trade union UNITE supported the elimination of bullshit jobs via the Universal Basic Income as a way into what Aaron Bastani (2020) imagined as a ‘fully automated luxury communism’.

This sense of hope was wiped out by the recent global pandemic, which, if anything, widened the gap between overpriced bullshit jobs and undervalued shit jobs. On the one hand, the lawyers, corporate accountants, the platform managers, the internet influencers and gurus. On the other, the Amazon Turkers, the IT engineers who build new Zoomified working environments, or install powerful optical Internet cables in middle class neighbourhood, the gig workers who deliver groceries, parcels, or health services; the nurses, teachers, and carers who continue to be responsible for the reproduction of life. Deadly on humans, the global pandemic didn’t singlehandedly eliminate any useless job or revaluate productive labour. If anything, it introduced the new category of spectral labour, the labour of nurses who are both underpaid and operate daily under deadly working conditions. If a pandemic cannot change capitalism, interstitial changes, operating ‘through the cracks of capitalism’, as John Holloway (2010)  would say, or cultural prefigurations of ‘what could be’, to use a term of Murray Bookchin (1971), won’t do that either.

I have been working on Universal Basic Income project in Brazil for some time, and I must say that the problematic associated with Bullshit Jobs alerted me of the perils of thinking that work can be eliminated with targeted policy measures without the elimination of capitalist social relations. From where we stand now, and looking back at 2013, when the article was written, seems to glance into a different era, one of intellectual hope and political mobilization, so fully embodied in David’s charismatic figure of scholar and activist. His call to action, as hard to follow as it may seem, continues to strongly resonate with me.


Massimiliano Mollona is Associate Professor at the Department of the Arts at Bologna University and Visiting Research Fellow at the Anthropology Department, in Goldsmiths College, London. He specializes on the anthropology of class, labour and political economy, and the anthropology of art. Mollona is currently working on an ethnography of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in Marica’ Brazil, in collaboration with economists from the Federal Fluminense University of Rio de Janeiro.


This text was presented at David Graeber LSE Tribute Seminar on “Bullshit Jobs”.


References

Adkins Lisa, Cooper Melissa and Martijn Konings. 2020. The Asset Economy. London: Wiley.

Bastani, Aaron, 2020. Fully Automated Luxury Communism: A Manifesto. London: Verso.

Bookchin, Murray. 1971. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Berkeley, California: The Rampants Press.

Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello. 2005. The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso.

Brett, Christopher, 2021. Rentier Capitalism. London: Verso.

Ferguson, James. 2015. To Give a Men a Fish. Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution. Duke University Press.

Dinerstein Ana Cecilia and Harry Pitts. 2021. A World Beyond Work? Labour, Money and the Capitalist State between Crisis and Utopia. Bingley: Emerald Publishing.

Folbre, Nancy. 2020. The Rise and Decline of Patriarchal Systems. An Intersectional Political Economy. London: Verso.

Graeber, David. 2006. Turning Modes of Production inside Out: Or Why Capitalism is a Transformation of Slavery. Critique of Anthropology, 26(1): 61-85.

Graeber, David. 2019. Bullshit Jobs. A Theory. London: Penguin Books.

Gorz, Andre. 1980. Farewell to the working-class. London: Pluto Press.

Holloway, John. 2010. Crack Capitalism. London: Pluto Press.

Hunt, Ellen. 2020. Blue sky thinking: is it time to stop work taking over our lives? The Guardian. Sunday 4, October 2020.

Lambek, Michael, 2013. The Value of Performative Acts. HAU Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Vol 2 (2).

Lee, Benjamin and Edward Li Puma. Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginations of Modernity. Public Culture. 14(1): 191-213.

Lucassen, Jan. 2021. The Story of Work a New History of Humankind. Yale University Press.

Meillassoux, Claude. 1986. The Anthropology of Slavery. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Peters, Tom. 1992. Liberation Management. London: Alfred and Knopf.

Postone, Moishe. 1993. Time, Labor and Social Domination. A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. 1996. The Sadness of Sweetness: The Native Anthropology of Western Cosmology. Current Anthropology. 37(3): 385-428.

Srnicek, Nick. 2016. Platform Capitalism. Oxford: Polity Press.

Suzman, James, Work: A Deep History from Stone Age to the Age of Robots. London: Penguin Press.


Cite as: Mollona, Massimiliano. 2022. “Why the End of Work Will Not Be the End of Capitalism.” FocaalBlog, 22 February. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/02/22/massimiliano-mollona-why-the-end-of-work-will-not-be-the-end-of-capitalism/

David Graeber LSE Tribute Seminar: Bullshit Jobs

Chair: Alpa Shah

Discussants: Massimiliano Mollona & Andrew Sanchez

When David Graeber published his article ‘On the phenomenon of bullshit jobs’ in Strike! in 2013, he knew he struck a chord in the public imagination. As soon as the article went up, the Strike! website went down for too much traffic. The article quickly became viral and was translated into at least a dozen languages. Before long, quotes from the piece appeared in the form of guerrilla posters on the London Underground with messages such as: “It’s as if someone were out there making up pointless jobs just for the sake of keeping us all working”. The essay’s main thesis was that work had become an end in itself to sustain the logic of neoliberal capitalism, thereby contradicting the myth of capitalist productivity. In 2018, David decided to turn this brief essay into a fully-fledged book with the intention to flesh out the argument more systematically. In this final instalment of the series, Massimilano Mollona and Andrew Sanchez move beyond the buzz sparked by the essay to sift through the conceptual and empirical claims presented in the book. Weaving personal working experience with anthropological theories of work and value (Sanchez), and considering it from the lens of Weberian and Marxist understandings of capitalism (Mollona), they show where the book succeeds and where, in their view, it is found wanting.  


These conversations first took place at the LSE Research Seminar on Anthropological Theory, and are published as a FocaalBlog feature in tribute to the life and work of David Graeber.



Alpa Shah is Professor of Anthropology at LSE, convenes a research theme at the LSE International Inequalities Institute and is author of the award-winning Nightmarch: Among India’s Revolutionary Guerrillas.

Massimiliano Mollona is Associate Professor at the Department of the Arts at Bologna University and Visiting Research Fellow at the Anthropology Department, in Goldsmiths College, London. He specializes on the anthropology of class, labour and political economy, and the anthropology of art. Mollona is currently working on an ethnography of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in Marica’ Brazil, in collaboration with economists from the Federal Fluminense University of Rio de Janeiro.

Andrew Sanchez is Associate Professor in Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge. He has published on economy, labour, and corruption, including Criminal Capital: Violence, Corruption and Class in Industrial India, Labour Politics in an Age of Precarity co-edited with Sian Lazar, and Indeterminacy: Waste, Value and the Imagination co-edited with Catherine Alexander. 

Michael Herzfeld: The Slyness of Stupidity: A Commentary on David Graeber’s “The Utopia of Rules”

David Graeber’s wide-ranging – and, appropriately, sometimes wildly swashbuckling – set of essays sketches his anarchist utopia by default, as a social world free of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, he writes, is “stupid” and “absurd.” Stupid or otherwise, it represents the effect of a vast and powerful set of forces operating through the mechanisms of the modern state, of which the United States is both example and exceptional case. Its goal, in Graeber’s gloomy vision, is to destroy the stability and viability, both social and economic, of entire populations, while congealing ever larger portions of the world’s wealth into ever fewer hands; its stupidity lies in refusing all alternative interpretations to official Diktat (see especially pp. 80-81). Graeber largely ignores bureaucracy’s many non-state versions, a choice that reflects a bias toward current American uses of the term. Instead, he plays creatively and contrastively with the British self-view as anti-bureaucratic (p. 13). This distinction nevertheless entails excessive generalization and elides differing historical trajectories. It is hard now to write critically of Graeber’s provocative thought, grounded as it was in an uncompromising search for social justice and a becoming modesty about the originality of his own ideas, without sounding petty. The significance of his many projects, however, demands both generosity and critique.

To that end, it seems useful to begin by asking whether stupidity rather than (perhaps deliberate) tautology or ritualism, the latter explicitly acknowledged by Graeber (p. 50; see also Hinton 1992; Herzfeld 1992), is the basis of bureaucracy. In many societies, a clear distinction is made between sly cunning and intelligence of morally neutral (or even foolishly innocent) stamp (e.g., Schneider 1969). In his eagerness to debunk the crasser versions of pseudo- or meta-Foucauldian analysis, which at least attribute agency to state operators, Graeber seems to discount the slyness of those bureaucrats who realize that getting people to monitor themselves furthers the state’s rather than the public’s interests. As I have recently noted, the complexity and unpredictability of the various national COVID-19 testing requirements force nervous international travelers to monitor their own actions with ever-increasing unease (Herzfeld 2022a). Graeber also overlooks the helpfulness of some bureaucrats, who may even – indeed, often do – collude with their clients by shifting the interpretation of the rules.   

Image 1: Book cover of The Utopia of Rules

Graeber does distinguish between the system and its operators, but one might wish for a more detailed exploration of where the two diverge. He tells us very little about how agile operators actually bend the system to meet their own and their clients’ exigencies – apparent exceptions that may actually confirm his argument since, by generating a sense of the obligatory gratitude of client to patron, they further weaken resistance to encompassing bureaucratic structures. This is implicit in his argument, but his broad generalizing prevents readers from seeing how the wiliness actually works. Within the utopia of rules, continual adjustment occurs in the form of supposed illegality lurking in the very implementation of legality (see, e.g., Little and Pannella 2021). Graeber’s observation (p. 214) that legality is born of illegal actions is also historically consistent with the crisis of legitimacy posed by the persistence of rebellious forces claimed as heroic forebears by nationalistic state regimes (see Herzfeld 2022b: 39-40). Graeber does nevertheless expose some real cunning, notably when he points out the discrepancy between the virtually flawless operation of ATMs and the deeply flawed operation of American voting machines (p. 35). It is hard to believe, he suggests, that such a glaring discrepancy could be unmotivated; both trajectories serve the same general politico-financial interests.

Graeber is on firmer (because more explicit) ground when he suggests an analogy, albeit an inverse one, between bureaucracy and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism: whereas bureaucratic logic suppresses insight, the equally narrow and schematic analyses of the structuralist master open up exciting new paths. This is surely a more productive comparison than dismissing one system as stupid and the other as genial. Both systems are concerned with classification, one to impose it and the other to decode it. But Lévi-Strauss would never have dismissed indigenous taxonomies as stupid; nor would any anthropologist since Malinowski have considered such a characterization as other than the expression of a colonial and racist contempt for “the Other.” In rightly up-ending power by treating bureaucracy as the Other, Graeber nevertheless refuses it the minimal respect that he surely would have demanded of his students for the taxonomies of other cultural traditions.

It is here that his activism seeps into his anthropology and exposes, as he surely must have desired, the difficulty of trying to do anthropology, especially activist anthropology, in one’s own milieu and at such an inclusive level. While calling bureaucracy stupid seems epistemically retrograde, it may eventually facilitate new political insights – if, that is, someone undertakes the necessary ethnographic labor. The gap between insight and demonstration is one of several tensions exposed, but not necessarily resolved, in Graeber’s book. Some of his more speculative leaps of faith are persuasive – but I found myself wondering whether that was simply because I was already predisposed to agree, and what unexpected subtleties a more ethnographic approach might introduce.

Graeber’s claim that technological advances were deliberately advanced by a capitalist cabal evilly intent on reducing humanity to a collective serfdom does appear to be on target for the period he describes. He provides convincing examples of how specific technologies, poised to take off in directions anticipated by science fiction and other fantasy literatures, have clearly faltered. Whether this remains true – whether his account is more than a conspiracy theory – has perhaps become more questionable even in the short time since his death. More problematic still is his confident attribution of collective intent on the part of neoliberal capitalists to condemn the entire world to servitude. While it is apparently true that during the current pandemic the super-rich have vastly increased their wealth while the numbers of the truly poor in the U.S. alone have soared (see Luhby 2021), the idea of a concerted intentionality risks reproducing precisely the kind of conspiracy theories that favor right-wing panic-mongering (although, unlike the latter, it stands a reasonable chance of eventual vindication). Here, too, he implies an unprovable ability to read collective minds. Moreover, I am unsure that animals are incapable of “creating self-conscious fantasy worlds” (p. 171). Indeed, how can he be so sure?

Such problems typically arise when anthropologists shift from familiar engagements with ethnographic detail to grapple with the big picture. Graeber, an anarchist activist for social justice, was skilled in both practices, but in this book the big picture, along with the speculative reasoning that it tends to generate, predominates. Although educated in the U.S. in what is there called cultural anthropology, and despite his scathing (and largely well-conceived) critique of “globalization,” Graeber does not attend to cultural differences that may affect bureaucratic habits. While too generously acknowledging my own study of bureaucracy, he complains that virtually all the anthropologists who have written about bureaucracy “almost never describe such arrangements as foolish or idiotic” (pp. 237-38n42; cf. Herzfeld 1992). There is, as I have just indicated, good reason for this apparent omission.

With regard to mind-reading, anthropologists do often report on a range of emotional reactions, from astonishment to contempt, that their informants display toward bureaucratic arrangements. It is expressed attitudes that they describe, not innermost thoughts. Indeed, they often also note their informants’ reluctance to read minds (Robbins and Rumsey 2008). The reported reactions and the accompanying skepticism are ethnographically revealing to a level that Graeber’s broad-brush descriptions of capitalism, bureaucracy, and globalization do not always achieve. His description of globalization, in particular, sweeps over cultural differences that – as, for example, James L. Watson (2006) argued so lucidly for consumption in Asian McDonald’s restaurants – may significantly affect how we understand the local significance of apparently global phenomena.

In this sense, all bureaucratic practices must be understood in terms of cultural values shared by bureaucrats and their clients. That argument also fits Graeber’s excellent debunking (pp. 166-174) of bureaucracy’s claim to pure rationality. When one side makes excuses that its interlocutors might indeed view as lamentably stupid, the other side accepts them, not necessarily because they are believable, but because they are conventional. They are a means for both sides to manage otherwise difficult situations, their effective performance always, from one situation to another, mediated by the tension between the conventions for excuse-making and the inventiveness of those involved. This illustrates what I have called “social poetics” (e.g., Herzfeld 2016), a concept that in some respects fits nicely with Graeber’s focus on imagination (see especially his illuminating analogy with the structure and playfulness of language, pp. 199-200, a passage that beautifully exemplifies the important but often-forgotten principle that an explanation based on language does not necessarily reduce all social phenomena to discourse).

An effective bureaucrat – though not necessarily a good one – manages, while appearing to insist on rigid adherence to the rules, to operate them with considerable ingenuity and, yes, imagination. Graeber barely considers the extent to which bureaucrats must deploy the unspoken local social rules in addition to the “stupid” requirements of the official system. While such seesawing between convention and invention is apparently common to all state bureaucracies, the specific modalities may vary enormously. The unfinished task Graeber has bequeathed to his successors is the ethnographic exploration of high-end bureaucratic management. Cultural specificities will loom large in such studies – all the more critically inasmuch as the managers invoke supposedly universal principles to justify their actions.

Let me illustrate with a simple example. During early sojourns in the Netherlands, I found an unsmiling bureaucracy that seemed obsessed with observing the rules. Gradually, however, I learned that, if I met the initial refusal to make an exception or interpret the rules creatively with polite sadness rather than anger, I would subsequently discover that the functionaries had done exactly what I wanted even after declaring it to be impossible; they were experts at identifying exceptions that ultimately validated the system of rules while allowing them to satisfy their clients’ needs. This pattern, I soon discovered, extended from relatively highly-placed officials to restaurant staff members. Other foreigners subsequently confirmed my impressions; some Dutch friends, perhaps bemused, nevertheless also largely agreed.

Despite such assurances, so sweeping a characterization of Dutch bureaucratic practices is unquestionably over-generalized. If that concern holds for a few sentences about one country, however, how much more it must apply to the Graeber’s far larger claim that bureaucracy is invariably stupid. Stupidity does not inhere in a system; it describes the alleged capacities of those who operate the system or the capacities they would like to produce in others (p. 95). To blame the stupid system is an almost proverbial excuse, in many cultural contexts, for failures of both bureaucrat and client. Adroit management of excuses may signal the exact opposite of stupidity.

Graeber’s image of bureaucracy is largely based on the American experience; he posits Madagascar contrastively as, for historical reasons, a place where bureaucracy has little impact on everyday life. But there are vast numbers of intermediate cases (as he recognizes, p. 22). While it is true that the American model threatens to dominate much of the world for reasons that Graeber ably lays out for us as he documents its seemingly inexorable, creeping expansion, it sometimes blinds us to the potentiality for pragmatic variation concealed within its systemic similarity. Hence the unresolved tension in Graeber’s text between the fine ethnographer-historian’s sensitivity to local detail and the political activist’s tendency to universalize local experience.

Some of the generalizations hold true for demonstrable historical reasons. Even then, however, the pandemic-like spread of bureaucratic practices – what Graeber (p.9) calls the Iron Law of Liberalism – is filtered through widely differing sociocultural expectations. Graeber’s Iron Law bears an uncanny (and unacknowledged) resemblance to “Parkinson’s Law” [Parkinson 1958], a similar elaboration of common knowledge; while Graeber may be right to argue (pp. 51-52) that anthropologists have been reluctant to tackle the boring paperwork aspects of bureaucracy, writers like Parkinson can perhaps be read as ethnographers if not as anthropologists in the strict sense. Yet the differences among bureaucratic systems are also important, even with regard to the paperwork (see Hull 2012). Anyone who has experienced the Chinese version of the academic audit culture, which superficially appears to follow the American model in its schematic numerology, quickly apprehends the huge difference in application and impact. Local actors play by local understandings of the rules, as Watson’s observations on globalization would lead us to expect.

In keeping with his critique of its reductionism and reliance on schematization, Graeber sees bureaucracy as the antithesis of imagination, which he identifies with revolution (pp. 92-93). This insight echoes the conventional understanding that bureaucracy often does repress imaginative practices. In reality, however, considerable inventiveness may go into bureaucratic management – something that Graeber repeatedly acknowledges, by showing how “interpretative labor” is carried out largely by the subaltern classes, including lower-level bureaucrats, since those with power feel no pressing need to interpret anything their supposed inferiors do. (The wealthy often don’t even bother to pay taxes; let the minions sort all that out – and, if fines are levied, they will only affect a tiny fraction of the offenders’ wealth.) It is not only the surveilled who must master interpretative techniques; those conducting the surveillance must do the same inasmuch as they will have to file reports with their superiors. This emphasis on the hierarchical positioning of bureaucrats accords with Graeber’s view – generously and convincingly attributed to feminist inspiration – of where interpretative labor occurs.

Image 2: Guns forbidden sign, © Michael Herzfeld

Ethnographic research on policing (e.g., Cabot 2018; Glaeser 1999; Haanstad 2013; Oberfield 2014) complicates – but does not entirely invalidate – Graeber’s generic intimations that police (whatever other goals they may pursue) rarely tackle crime directly (p. 73) and that bureaucracy precludes the exercise of intelligence. Graeber might have argued, reasonably enough, that it is not bureaucrats who are stupid but the bureaucracy. Eliding the actors into the abstract category, however, is a dangerous source of confusion – actually, in Graeber’s own terms, a bureaucratic one.

Graeber’s treatment of police is consistent with his anarchism. There can be no question but that in the American and British contexts it is, sadly, borne out by acts of racist and sexist brutality only recently acknowledged by the media and by the law. Here, however, we might ask whether the turning of the tide (if what we are seeing is more than a mere flash in the pan) parallels a potential recovery of technological mastery and inventiveness. If so, Graeber’s dystopian vision of a world increasingly dominated by a few ruthless, super-rich men, bent on thwarting scientific advances and socio-economic equality alike, might be an overstatement or, at least, a genuine insight into a situation that has nonetheless already begun to change. Agreed, evidence for a return to a more imaginative world is still remarkably thin. Graeber presumably entertained hopes, however, that the world might be re-enchanted, even, perhaps, acquiring a reconfigured and tamed bureaucracy (see p. 164). Only by means of such a conviction could he have sustained his passionate activism.

Here I am struck by the accuracy of the distinction he draws between his concept of imagination and Benedict Anderson’s (1991). While some contest his criticism of Anderson as too narrowly concerned with newspapers and nationalism, the difference is striking. Anderson’s use of imagination has more in common with the semiotic concept of iconicity (we imagine our co-nationals to resemble ourselves), whereas Graeber saw in imagination the recognition of radical difference and innovation. Here again, however, I worry that Graeber’s monochromatic portrayal of bureaucracy – its lack of cultural specificity – overlooks pre-existing and sometimes highly localized cultural predispositions as well as the presence of skilled and sympathetic actors.

Anthropology handed a poisoned chalice to the bureaucratic apparatus of the state in the nineteenth century: the concept of reified, bounded cultures. Historically, our discipline should be taking more responsibility than it has usually admitted for providing the instrument of ideologies that too easily morphed into racism and fascism. By talking about “the state,” Graeber skates around the deployment of the concept of national identity and the threat that this poses to the masses who get dragged into wars and humiliating labor conditions in the name of national redemption – a story that largely confirms his understanding of how capital works on the global stage. The ease with which the idea of the state gets fused with that of the nation-state has recently led me to express a preference for the intentionally clumsier term “bureaucratic ethnonational state” (Herzfeld 2022b). Ethno-nationalism is one of the dirtiest tricks perpetrated against the poor by a self-indulgent leadership. It both deploys local cultural features and is inflected by them; its appeal, framed as liberation, can reinforce local warlordism and global domination at the same time. Anthropological analysis threatens it precisely because it leads us back to the cultural specificities that give the global structures of power their local traction; it also shows that a unidirectional model of globalization is as facile as unidirectional models of social evolution (see, e.g., Tambiah 1989).

Graeber does display some affection for evolutionary conceptions of political life, as when he displays fascination with “heroic” histories. His historical vision of the heroic, however, has more in common with Vico than with Darwin; he does not see heroic societies as representing a single stage of past evolution. Rather, he seeks to recuperate from these exceptional historical moments the power of imagination, now divorced from aristocratic control, as an antidote to the numbing regularities of bureaucracy and as a path to the resuscitation of technological ingenuity.

Graeber describes vast areas of bureaucratic mismanagement with impressive, terrifying accuracy. He is at his best when he ethnographically describes the area of bureaucratic activity that he knows best, that of the academic world. Some other autobiographical moments are ethnographic gems in their own right, notably the sad account of his tussles with the health bureaucracy as his mother lay fatally stricken – a striking disproof of his contention (p. 52) that bureaucratic procedures cannot be subject to lively thick description. Moreover, no academic could seriously dispute his engaging account of how increasing amounts of scholars’ time, as well as that of doctors and other health professionals, are gobbled up by deadening, useless audits (Shore and Wright 1999; Strathern 2000).

Yet resistance remains possible. Graeber correctly observes that no matter what we write, the rest of the world barely even notices. We should nevertheless try to find a way to make the world care; the effective suppression of our calling stifles an important and useful commentary on the state of the world at large. If that were not the case, why would Graeber have written this book? Why would anyone not simply down tools and give up? (Of course, some have; but theirs is a dispiriting surrender to what I call “vicarious fatalism” – the apparently axiomatic ascription of passivity to the underdog by those with power in virtually every social inequality known to humankind.)

Resistance is not easy; some of the impediments are present in our own educational and cultural backgrounds. Graeber’s use of classical Greek (and more generally European) history, for example, hints at the difficulty that all Western anthropologists experience in standing back from their own assumed intellectual and cultural heritage, as well as the intellectual rewards of making that effort. Note, for example, his Vichian emphasis on etymological links between the ancient Greek polis and the modern word “police” and its cognates in multiple languages (not, however, including modern Greek, in which the police is astinomia, the controller of urban space; see also Cabot 2018). The Latin-derived terms “civility” and “civilization” hold similarly rich and ambiguous implications.

“Polite,” on the other hand, probably does not, pace Graeber, share the Greek derivation of “police,” but from a Latin word denoting “cleansing” (with sinister echoes of Mary Douglas’ [1966] perennially useful analysis of purity and pollution). It, too, has a richly ambiguous etymology. “Civility” suggests, as does the Italian use of the adjective civile (see Herzfeld 2009: 182) or even the English “civil society,” that sometimes being civil demands facing the police down when they overstep the boundaries of decency. The polity (classical Greek politeia) may not be a polis or a police state. It may represent an archaic structure pushed aside by violent modernity or it may be a completely novel one such as those imagined by intentional communities. But the possibility of resistance to the bureaucratic ethnonational state, with its police enforcement of conformity to repressive cultural norms, is essential to ensuring a bearable future and is the best way of ensuring civility.

The bureaucratization of morality is decidedly uncivil. An example of audit culture that constrains civility (not to speak of academic freedom!) appears in the bureaucratization of research ethics – a confusion of true ethics (Graeber’s scathing discussion of value-free ethics, pp. 166-67, is especially pertinent here!) with its simulation (a term Graeber usefully derives from Baudrillard and Eco). This perversion of ethics is especially painful for anthropologists because the very unpredictability of their research defies the scientistic logic of bureaucracy (“proposal design”). That logic also ignores the cultural specificity of ethics – an instance of what Graeber (p. 75) calls “ignoring all the subtleties of real social existence” – and now, through the imposition of rules backed by fear of legal consequences, bids fair, if we fail to resist, to make ethnography itself impossible. Occasional revolts against the centrality of ethnography because of past ethical errors risk collusion in perpetuating the injustices of the present, much as segments of the Left, in Graeber’s account (p. 6), have sometimes colluded in spreading the miasma of bureaucracy-speak and its oppressive effects. Intensified bureaucracy is no solution to ethnography’s ethical dilemmas. On the contrary, here as much as anywhere it conforms to Graeber’s striking insight (p. 103) that bureaucratic violence is less about making people talk than forcing them to shut up. Ethnographers, too, must resist being silenced by the avalanche of paperwork.

Ethnography, in fact, can expose abuses of power. It therefore poses a genuine threat to the powerful; ethics regulations not only protect universities from being sued but provide a potential shield for powerful bureaucrats should the anthropologists get too nosy. These authority figures also have resources of their own. A few hardy anthropologists have nevertheless pushed forward with pathbreaking ethnographic studies of dominant financial institutions. Among these, Douglas Holmes (2013), examining the management practices of central banks, offers a clear demonstration of why, as Graeber saw (p. 20), the bourgeoisie so passively obeys the financial bureaucracy. Such studies usefully complicate Graeber’s claim that the weak necessarily perform more interpretative labor than the powerful; they also pierce the iron shield of ethics, with its talk of confidentiality, transparency, and impartiality (otherwise, significantly, called indifference; see p. 184). Holmes, for example, examines the methods with which bank officials study the public – all of them virtual anthropologists, and with nary an ethics committee to restrain them.

Graeber’s book is in every sense a tour de force. I have focused this discussion on a set of interlocking points that strike me as particularly timely for the discipline and for the current state of the world. The book’s main provocation lies in Graeber’s critical reading of both the dominant economic system and the mass-produced and imitative critiques of it that sometimes pass muster as serious academic commentary (or at least satisfy audit-culture assessments for tenure and promotion). Its potential weaknesses lie in his avoidance of specificity where critics could easily find counter-factual examples in local contexts. Offsetting its occasional narrowness of cultural focus is the corrective that it offers to assumptions about universal value and globalization. A good ethnography is always more than simply a description of a local society. The Utopia of Rules is much more – and at times rather less – than an analysis of bureaucracy. It is a challenge still waiting to be taken up “in the field” – wherever that may be. It retains the potential to contradict its own pessimism and affect the trajectory of human society in the years, even decades, ahead.


Michael Herzfeld is Ernest E. Monrad Research Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University and IIAS Professor of Critical Heritage Studies Emeritus at the University of Leiden, is the author of twelve books, most recently Subversive Archaism: Troubling Traditionalists and the Politics of National Heritage, and also including Ours Once More: Folklore Ideology and The Making of Modern Greece and The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy. He is currently working on a global study of crypto-colonialism.


This text was supposed to be presented at David Graeber LSE Tribute Seminar on “Bureaucracy”, but the seminar was canceled by the LSE faculty strike for better working conditions in academia.


References   

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Cite as: Herzfeld, Michael. 2022. “The Slyness of Stupidity: A Commentary on David Graeber’s The Utopia of Rules.” FocaalBlog, 9 February. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/02/09/michael-herzfeld-the-slyness-of-stupidity-a-commentary-on-david-graebers-the-utopia-of-rules/