On December 8, 2025, a brief video video was disseminated on You Tube, X and other social media to mark the first anniversary of the overthrow of the Asad regime. For just over three minutes, it showed a speech delivered by an older man wearing a black headband (‘agal) with a red-checkered headcloth and a long robe (gallabiya) with a suit jacket. Identified as Sheikh Hamed al-Faraj al-Salama in the video’s title, the speaker is framed by two large flags of the Syrian revolution and the new Syria, green-white-black with three red stars in the white field. They were held up by a silent and unmoving group of sixteen young men, some dressed in camouflage, others in black. In front, to Sheikh Hamed’s right hand (or more precisely, his right knee), we see two little boys in civilian clothing.
The speaker begins his speech by marking the occasion that prompts the publication of the video:
“Today we celebrate the first anniversary of the fall of the defunct Ba’athist regime in Syria. We congratulate our people and everyone on this occasion, from […] the guesthouse (madafa) of the Wulda – the very guest house [he gestures to the house behind the group] where my father and my younger brother were killed by shelling from the Tabqa airport artillery […] we have stood with the Revolution since its beginning […] we fought in all the battles against the defunct [Baathist] regime […] We are patriots. My grandfather was exiled to Kamaran Island for three years for the sake of this people’s livelihood, and we are ready to make every sacrifice for our people.”
These first seconds of the video thus allow for a political as well as social positioning – the speaker politically aligns not only himself, but a “we” that includes “al-Wulda”, one of Syria’s tribal groups (asha’ir / Sing. ashira), with the victorious Syrian revolution. Terms such as “madafat al-Wulda” i.e. the guesthouse or reception hall of the Wulda, and the clothes worn by Sheikh Hamed, point to this tribal identity, while the educated accent in which the speech is delivered, as well as the dark suit jacket worn over the gallabiya, add a layer of Syrian urbanity.
This entry interrogates how the past has been referenced to underline present-day political claims among some of Syria’s tribal communities (asha’ir or qaba’il) in the Euphrates valley upstream of Raqqa. As an example, I focus on the Wulda ashira, in which I have been interested for a long time. This post is based on fieldwork I conducted in Syria between 2001 and 2011, and a short visit in May 2025.
The Wulda are one of numerous tribal or descent-based social groups which have long served as a fundamental structuring factor for social belonging in Syria’s eastern and southern parts. People who identify as belonging to one of these tribal groups are tied into long genealogies through the male line (although, as I have argued elsewhere, female perspectives are an essential if invisibilized component of this history). Reflecting segmentary models of social order, the Wulda specifically are made up of a number of smaller descent groups (confusingly, also referred to as asha’ir) among them the Nasser (from whom Sheikh Hamed himself has descended), the Ghanim, the Bu M’sarra, the Turn, ‘Ili, etc. Each of them, again, consists of distinct clans and families. In turn, the larger unit of the Wulda itself (like neighbouring groups such as the Afadla or the Sabkha) forms part of the Bu Sha’ban who in turn trace descent from the Zubaid and eventually, the Qahtanite Arabs whose roots lie in Yemen.
The ability to trace one’s genealogy to these ancient roots is particularly important given the collective classification of the Wulda (and other tribes) as “shawaya”, a classificatory term that has historically been distinct both from “sedentaries” (hadar) and also from the Bedouin who can claim Arab authenticity, strong genealogies, and nobility. The term itself is most often explained as a derivative of “shat”, sheep, indicating that “shawaya” were originally herders of small livestock. The term has also been used pejoratively, as an insult to designate the tribal inhabitants of Syria’s Eastern regions who are sometimes feared, but also looked down upon as backward, less civilized, wild and potentially violent.
For a critical intellectual readership, talk of tribes, asha’ir or qaba’il, and descent-based models of social belonging may seem outdated – or even, particularly among (some) anthropologists, suspicious of a dangerously exoticising and Orientalising view of at least part of the Syrian population. Yet for those who identify as a descendant of this milieu, genealogies and narratives about particular groups and ancestors are often a source of fierce pride. Moreover, in times where state structures are weak or even absent, the social networks created by tribal belonging and genealogy serve as a real and vital resource for social solidarity and mutual support.
Genealogies, anecdotes and icons of the tribal past, are a matter of great interest and debate in this region, as well as Syria’s tribal milieu more generally. Thus, to a local audience, Sheikh Hamed’s videotaped reference to his grandfather and his enforced exile immediately evoked a familiar discourse. This reference draws from a well-known narrative that has been told and retold to cement the status of the Wulda as a “patriotic” (watani) tribe. Its roots go back to the colonial era in Syria, the period of the French mandate (1920-1946).
Sheikh Hamed’s grandfather, Muhammad al-Faraj al-Salama (d. 1972) was one of the two paramount sheikhs representing the Wulda tribe during this era, alongside his equally famous cousin, Sheikh Shawakh al-Bursan (d. 1981), whose portrait, featuring a memorable, pointed mustache, has become popular as an iconic image of tribal masculinity on social media, proudly referred to especially by people identifying with the Wulda. The “exile” which is mentioned in the video refers to an event from the 1940s. In July 1941, the administration of Syria had been taken over by the British and the Free French. Before the background of the Second World War, they imposed strict regulations on Syrian cultivators regarding the production and marketing of wheat, which was considered a strategic resource. In 1943, Sheikh Muhammad, who was one of the regions large landowners, was found guilty of “grain hoarding” – i.e., hiding part of the wheat harvest from the authorities. Together with other notables, among them the Shammar sheikh, Daham al-Hadi, he was sent into exile on Qamaran Island in the Red Sea, from where he returned in 1945.
This event has retrospectively been celebrated by members of the Wulda tribe as an example of anti-colonial resistance by the Sheikh and, by extension, the Wulda, underlining their self-ascribed credentials as a “patriotic” tribe. Besides conflicts and battles involving other members of the Wulda, notably the other famous Wulda sheikh of the mandate era, Sheikh Shawakh al-Bursan, Sheikh Muhammad’s exile was one of the moments of Wulda history that was mentioned repeatedly during my fieldwork.
During the 2000s, a number of books authored by writers who for the most part originated from Syria’s tribal milieu themselves amplified such historical perspectives, which had hitherto been transmitted mainly orally. While the books had limited circulation (editions were typically printed by local publishing houses with 1000 or 2000 copies), after 2011, these (and other) iconic references to particularist, tribal histories were made more widely accessible through social media, which during the revolution became a forum for debates, controversies, and political (self)positionings hitherto unheard of for Syria. Beyond textual and discursive sources, images serve as references to Arab tribal values. Among them, visual indications of generosity and hospitality (videos of receptions in tribal guest houses, images of coffee pots, large metal trays or rows of big cooking pots come to mind).
The video from December 2025, cited at the beginning of this text, is an example of such a political self-positioning. In his statement, Sheikh Hamed makes more or less explicit reference to his controversial position as a vocal supporter of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its Syrian Democratic Forces. To counter accusations of “treason”, Sheikh Hamed gestures to descent and tribal history, emphasizing that his understanding of patriotism encompasses the wellbeing of all components of Syrian society (in other words: Kurds as well as Arabs).
The position of the Wulda with regard to Arab-Kurdish politics in the Syrian Jazira (the land between Euphrates and Tigris; i.e., for Syria, the territory east of the Euphrates) has a long and complex history that is directly related to their geography. Historically, for the past two hundred years at least the Wulda have settled on both banks of the Euphrates river upstream of Tabqa. Until the mid-twentieth century, most households derived their income from a combination of seasonally mobile raising of small livestock (mostly sheep), as well as seasonal farming near the river. This gradually was replaced by a sedentary lifestyle and year-round agriculture. The construction of the Euphrates Dam at Ṭabqa, officially inaugurated in 1973, and the ensuing flooding of this part of the Euphrates valley marked a decisive rupture. The emerging reservoir submerged up to three hundred villages, displacing an estimated number of at least 60 000 to 70 000 individuals. A significant part of these so-called “submerged Arabs” (“Arab al-Ghamr” or “Maghmurin”), the majority of whom identified with different branches of the Wulda, were resettled in the Syrian Jazira on lands that had previously been farmed by ethnic Kurds. As Arabization measure and “Syria’s greatest social engineering project” of the Baathist era, a chain of thirty-nine new villages now formed the so-called “Arab belt”.
While the Arab belt villages have been governed by the Kurdish-led AANES since 2012, most Wulda villages on the Euphrates between 2013 and 2017 were ruled by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as part of its “Caliphate” centered in Raqqa. Since its demise, the area around Raqqa and the Jazira more generally became part of the AANES governed territories – a situation that is changing dramatically just as this blog post is being written.
For the Autonomous Administration, the co-optation of the Arab tribes of the Jazira was an important political goal; and not least, more than half of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were estimated to be Arab tribal fighters. Among other measures, tribal representatives were included in local councils. In 2017 Sheikh Mahmoud Shawakh al-Bursan of the Wulda, distant cousin of Sheikh Hamed and son of above-mentioned anti-colonial hero, Sheikh Shawakh al-Bursan, was appointed to co-chair (together with a female Kurdish civil engineer, Leila Mustafa) the Raqqa Civilian Council (RCC).
Sheikh Mahmud’s and Sheikh Hamed’s public support for the AANES and the SDF can be seen as a pragmatic position, echoing earlier accommodations of Baathist structures. However, in light of the political polarization between Arab and Kurdish sides in the Syrian conflict, and wide-spread anti-Kurdish sentiment, Sheikh Hamed’s support for the AANES has also been explicitly criticized as “betrayal” of the Arab cause. Thus, Sheikh Hamed’s speech of December 2025 can also be understood as a way to counter this criticism by balancing support for the AANES with equal support for the new leaders of Syria.
While a more detailed account of the different positions taken by men who claim to speak in the name of the Wulda, or the Bu Sha’ban, cannot be given here, it is important to note that the above-mentioned Wulda notables’ declarations of support for AANES are countered by others who have lent support to political and paramilitary forces on other sides of the conflict in Syria. Thus, in a familiar historical pattern, representatives of the Wulda and related groups have politically aligned with different, even opposing sides. Tribal fighters who identify as members of “the Bu Shaaban” or other descent groups related to the Wulda have also inscribed themselves into formalised structures of the Syrian revolution, including the HTS.
Among the tribal notables who have vocally opposed the AANES is Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Bursan, another descendant of famous anti-colonial hero, Sheikh Shawakh. Using social media, Sheikh Abd al-Qadir has repeatedly called on the tribal fighters of the Euphrates valley to rise up in arms against the SDF – most recently in the January 2026 war between the two sides. To support his political agenda, he, too, draws on the anti-colonial history of the Wulda, and especially the role played by above-mentioned, famous Shawakh al-Bursan, who is remembered locally for his armed opposition to French mandate forces. In the case of Sheikh Abd al-Qadir, this past is invoked mainly through visual means. Besides clothes that are typically worn by tribesmen of a certain social status, Sheikh Abd al-Qadir cultivates a mustache that closely resembles that of Sheikh Shawakh, creating immediate visual associations between the two men.
A final point that must be noted but cannot be explored here in detail is the gendered nature of this digital universe: the images and iconic references to tribal history described here project a distinctly male image of history as well as politics in the Syrian Jazira. From this vantage point, a particular image of tribal masculinity is an integral part of these references (strongly contrasting with otherwise gendered images of female activists and fighters, for instance – but not exclusively – characteristic of Kurdish representations).
The Syrian uprising against the Asad regime, which has transformed Syrian society in so many ways, has also impacted the role of Syria’s tribal groups. Men who position themselves as members of Syria’s tribal milieu legitimize and mobilize support for different, even opposed political positions in (post)revolutionary Syria by referencing well-known tropes and images of tribal history – expressing values such as “patriotism”, hospitality, masculinity, courage – that are well familiar from earlier decades. But the persistence of these symbols and tropes despite the considerable changes that this region has seen over the past fifteen years should not be taken as an indication that Arab tribal identity is unchanging or even timeless. Rather, the value attributed to certain symbols of social belonging based on descent and genealogy can be seen as a response to unstable and changeable political orders on the ground.
Katharina Lange is a senior research fellow at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in Berlin with fieldwork experience in Syria and Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, among others. Her current research focuses on oral and gendered histories, rural and agrarian lives, and the impact of war and violence on livelihoods in northern Syria.
Cite as: Lange, K. 2026. “Uses of the Past by Representatives of Syria’s tribal groups (asha’ir) – the Wulda example” Focaalblog, April 6. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/04/06/katharina-lange-uses-of-the-past-by-representatives-of-syrias-tribal-groups-ashair-the-wulda-example/
