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Claudia Ledderucci, Hugh Gusterson and Roberto González: Drone 2.0: How Big Tech is Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex

Image: Russian drone on the ice of Kyiv Reservoir, disposed of by sappers of State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Chernihiv region on 19 February 2026. Photo by State Emergency Service of Ukraine

What happens when warfare becomes cheaper, faster, and increasingly automated? And what happens when the companies developing these technologies are also seeking to reshape society on behalf of their accumulation imperatives? At a seminar organized by the SIAA (Italian Society of Applied Anthropology) Commission on the Militarization of Knowledge and Society, anthropologists Hugh Gusterson and Roberto González explored two sides of the same transformation: the changing technologies of war and the growing entanglement between Silicon Valley, artificial intelligence, and the military-industrial complex. 

From Reapers to Shaheds: the changing face of drone warfare 

Hugh Gusterson distinguishes between two generations of military drones. Drones 1.0 is represented by the American MQ-9 Reaper, usually associated with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Operated remotely by crews based thousands of kilometers away, often in the United States, these aircraft can linger in the sky for hours, surveilling territories and tracking people identified as potential threats (insurgents, or people who look like they might be). Their use has raised profound questions about targeted killing, accountability, and the distance separating those who operate weapons from those who experience their violence. 

Drones 2.0, including the Iranian-designed Shaheds, now used extensively by Russia against Ukraine and designed for Iranian responses against US-Israeli aggression, represent a novelty because of their affordability and scalability. These inexpensive, long-range weapons can be produced and adapted at a fraction of the cost of conventional military aircraft. Unlike the Reaper, the Shahed is not designed to linger over a target and conduct surveillance. It is designed to attack infrastructures. 

Ukraine has responded with its own expanding drone industry, such as the Liutyi, developing systems that can be modified rapidly, almost in real time, in response to battlefield experience. Some designs initially conceived as “suicide drones” have been adapted for reuse. Drone boats, aerial interceptors, and other remotely operated or increasingly autonomous systems are also changing the battlefield. 

Yet the transformation is not only technological. Drones also change how war is perceived and experienced. They can distance those operating weapons from the physical risks and immediate horrors of combat, even when a human operator remains directly involved. At the same time, their presence can be intensely felt by those living beneath them. The persistent buzzing of drones has become part of the soundscape of the war in Ukraine, where detecting an approaching drone can be a matter of survival. Soldiers must listen carefully for the sounds, sometimes requiring near-total silence to identify incoming threats. Drones therefore distance soldiers from the experience of war but at the same time create new violent intimacies.

As artificial intelligence is increasingly integrated into these systems, the prospect of autonomy raises further questions about human judgement and responsibility. Who, or what, ultimately makes the decision to strike? And who is to be held accountable? And beyond the ethical problems of probability-based targeting, there is also a risk of deskilling, as human operators increasingly defer to machine-generated assessments rather than critically examining them.

Gusterson discussed Lavender, an AI-assisted system used by the Israeli military to identify people suspected of affiliation with Hamas and assign them scores indicating the likelihood of such affiliation. Investigative reporting in 2024 raised concerns about the scale of its use and the extent of human oversight, although the Israeli military disputed aspects of those accounts. Naza, the documentary directed by Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor (Special Jury Prize at the Venice International Film Festival 2026), further inquired into the use of AI-assisted technologies through first-hand accounts by Israeli military intelligence officers. 

Big Tech goes to war 

Roberto González shifted the discussion from the technologies themselves to the political economy behind them. Big Tech’s growing involvement in the military sector is often justified through the language of strategic competition, particularly the supposed need to counter China. An AI arms race is taking shape, with private companies developing systems for surveillance, targeting, battlefield coordination, and augmented reality, while the public debate keeps being stuck on whether AI should be regulated at all.

Will Palantir and Anduril become the new Raytheon and Lockheed Martin? The comparison captures a significant shift in the military-industrial complex. Traditional defense contractors are no longer the only major players: technology firms and start-ups backed by Silicon Valley venture capital are seeking a growing share of military contracts. A new revolving door is emerging between the government, the Pentagon, technology companies, and venture capital, as investors increasingly seek opportunities in military AI and ex Pentagon officials invest in venture capital technologies. The result is a military-industrial landscape in which private investors and technology executives increasingly influence the direction of military research and spending. 

Yet the Silicon Valley-Pentagon relationship is not new. Its roots extend back to the Second World War and the postwar development of the American military-industrial complex. What is changing is the growing centrality of AI and private investments. The consequences are not merely financial. They include environmental costs, the effects of new technologies on military personnel, and the burdens imposed on communities affected by military operations and infrastructure, including data centers. From the citizens’ point of view, these investments also raise a question of public priorities in a period of ‘affordability crisis’ and inflation: what other social needs could be served by resources directed toward militarization and military innovation?

The discussion also touched on Big Tech’s growing enthusiasm for small modular nuclear reactors, presented as a possible energy source for power-hungry data centers and AI infrastructure. This illustrates how the militarization of technology is intertwined with wider transformations in energy, investment, and the social and material infrastructures sustaining the digital economy. 

Techno-utopias, masculinity and the perversion of freedom 

The conversation then moved beyond military applications to the political imaginaries of techno-capitalism. What kinds of worlds do technology entrepreneurs want to build, and what kinds of societies do they hope to leave behind? 

Frontier imagery is central to this imaginary: the idea that new worlds can be founded, territories conquered, and existing political constraints overcome through technological innovation and private enterprise. Projects such as ‘seasteading’ in French Polynesia and ‘network cities’, envisioning autonomous high tech communities established on floating platforms or territories carved out from national states, illustrate the ambition to create alternative deregulated political spaces outside established democratic systems of government. They express a wider techno-utopian desire to escape the constraints of liberal democracy and imagine new forms of social order. At its more authoritarian edges, this imaginary can intersect with what critics describe as technofascism: the contraction of technological and economic power in the hands of a privileged few, combined with hostility toward democratic accountability (González 2026). Such tendencies also have affinities with the “dark enlightenment”, whose proponents reject egalitarian democracy in favor of authoritarian political arrangements.  Masculinity is another important part of this. The leading figures of techno-capitalism are overwhelmingly wealthy white men, but the masculinity they embody does not tend to resemble traditional machismo. It is often presented as nerdy, intellectual, and ostensibly associated with superior intelligence, and indeed eugenics; a masculinity built around natural hierarchy, domination, competition, control and the Uebermensch fantasy of transcending human limitations. 

There is also a paradox at the heart of Silicon Valley’s celebrated commitment to freedom. Its leaders present themselves as independent innovators, unwilling to accept institutional constraints or simply follow market demands. Their wealth and privilege give them considerable freedom to experiment but also the power to shape what others come to need, desire, and depend on. The freedom to invent new worlds is therefore inseparable from the power to impose their consequences on others. Time is part of this political imaginary, too. “Move fast and break things” and “fail fast, fail often” express a culture in which speed is celebrated and disruption becomes a virtue. Applied to military systems, however, this logic has potentially irreversible consequences. AI can accelerate decision-making beyond the pace at which people can fully comprehend, deliberate, or intervene. 

The discussion ended with questions about both the experience of technological warfare and the methods available for studying it. Does remote warfare create greater distance from death, or does it simply redistribute the ways in which death is experienced? The operator may be physically removed from the battlefield, but people living under drones encounter their presence through sound, anticipation, fear, and the constant need to remain alert. These sonic landscapes remind us that war–even if technological–is not experienced only through images, targets, and data, but also through the senses and the transformation of everyday environments. 

The audience also asked how anthropologists can study institutions that are powerful, distant, secretive and often inaccessible. Gusterson proposed the idea of polymorphous engagement (Gusterson 1997): rather than relying exclusively on conventional, long-term participant observation in a single field site, researchers can follow their subjects across multiple settings and sources, combining interviews, documents, public statements, media reports, and other forms of evidence. 

Rebecca Solnit wrote that “we are both more isolated and less private than we’ve ever been” (2025:100). The paradox captures something essential about the age of AI. We feel increasingly isolated from one another even as our lives become more exposed to aggregated but at the same time personalized systems of data collection, prediction and surveillance that keep us apart while reassembling us as niches or bubbles on behalf of capital. 

From the drone buzzing over a battlefield to the algorithm quietly sorting information about our lives, technologies promising greater freedom and autonomy make us also more visible, more measurable, and more vulnerable to forms of power we cannot easily see. The question is not only what technology makes possible, but who controls it, whose worlds it serves, and what forms of freedom remain when the systems shaping our lives become increasingly difficult to escape. 

The recording of the seminar can be accessed here using the password !?d&j$3p


Claudia Ledderucci works in critical militarization studies, with particular attention to coloniality. Her paper “From Nuclear Colonialism to COVID-19 Scepticism” (in The Asia-Pacific Journal of Anthropology) won the 2025 Nadel Essay Prize. 

Hugh Gusterson is a former editor of American Ethnologist, and teaches at the University of British Columbia. He is a prolific editor and author, among others of Drone (2017; winner of the Roy Palmer Civil Liberties Prize). 

Roberto J. González is Professor of Anthropology at San José State University. His most recent book is War Virtually: The Quest to Automate Conflict, Militarize Data, and Predict the Future (2022). He researches Silicon Valley’s relationship with the Pentagon and is completing a book on AI-powered policing and surveillance technologies in the US.


References

González R. J.,  (2026). American technofascism, Human Organization, 85:1, 3-7, DOI: 10.1080/00187259.2025.2585410

Gusterson, H., (1997). Studying Up Revisited. Political and Legal Anthropology Review

Vol. 20, No. 1 (May, 1997), pp. 114-119

Solnit R., (2025). No Straight Roads Takes You There, Granta, London


Cite as: Ledderucci, C., Gusterson, H. and González, R., 2026. “Drone 2.0: How Big Tech is Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex” Focaalblog November 19. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/11/19/claudia-ledderucci-hugh-gusterson-and-roberto-gonzalez-drone-2-0-how-big-tech-is-transforming-the-military-industrial-complex/

Dan Rabinowitz: The Fateful Elections Everybody Lost

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomes President Donald Trump to the Knesset before his address, Monday, October 13, 2025, during a visit to Jerusalem to celebrate the U.S.-brokered ceasefire and hostage release agreement between Israel and Hamas. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Elections with a Loser but No Winner

The Israeli election of October 2026 seems to have produced a clear outcome. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition, which had support from 68 members in the outgoing Knesset (Israel’s parliament), now has only 53 and is unlikely to secure a majority amongst the 120 members. He could hold on to power if he persuades eight of the 67 members across the aisle to cross the line and join him. A creative, seasoned political manipulator, he crushed a number of opposition parties and alliances in his time. In fact soon after the results came out he assembled a team to research Knesset members in opposing parties, identify their weaknesses and tailor honey traps to lure them. Granted, the cards he holds this time are stacked against him. Still, anyone declaring Netanyahu’s political demise does this at his own peril.

Curiously, Netanyahu’s defeat does not necessarily imply there is a winner. The six parties that oppose him hold 67 Knesset seats between them, but pull in different, often diametrically opposed directions. Largest among them is Yashar (21 seats), founded recently by former IDF Chief Gadi Eisenkot. Too new to be predictable, it seems to be moderate centre-right. Another party alongside Eisenkot is The Democrats, the current iteration of Israel’s historic Labour party – left wing, mildly socialist, supports a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Two more parties opposing Netanyahu are hardline centre-right. Both vehemently oppose a Palestinian state, often advocating annexation of rural segments of the West Bank to Israel. Two more parties in this group of six are labelled ‘Arab’, as their electorate comes almost exclusively from the 1.5 million strong community of Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel. One has roots in the Communist Party; the other attracts moderate Islamists.

Dynamics among these six parties are awkward at best. A story comes to mind about the Jew who survived a ship wreck and was stranded on a desert island. Years later a passing ship spots him and sends a dinghy to his rescue. Overjoyed he gathers his meagre belongings, then just before he boards the boat invites his rescuers to tour his tiny island. ‘This tent’, he tells them, ‘is where I slept. That palm tree over there is where I ate my meals. This is the hill I used to climb to scan the ocean for a ship that might rescue me. And these are my two synagogues.’

‘Why two?’ asked a sailor.

‘This one’ the man replies, ‘is where I prayed day in day out. The other, and I swear to you, is where I’d never set foot in my life!’

All six parties ran creative, tight campaigns. To distinguish themselves however, some explicitly declared which parties they would never tolerate in a future coalition. The outcome: a complicated maze of boycotts, counter-boycotts and no-goes reminiscent of the logic puzzle where a farmer tries to get a wolf, a goat and a cabbage across a river without any of them eating anyone else as they await their turn to cross.

Avigdor (Yvette) Lieberman, whose centre-right party won seven Knesset seats, has been most vocal and consistent: his refusal to join a coalition that includes an Arab party or is passively supported by one was adamant. Arab parties, he repeatedly declared, support terrorism and seek to terminate Israel as a Jewish state. Lieberman likewise refuses to join forces with ultra-Orthodox parties (13 Knesset seats between them), whom he labels corrupt, draft-dodging parasites. He is graciously amenable to join a government with Likud (27 Knesset seats), provided Netanyahu, its undisputed leader since 1996, resigns…

Naftali Bennett, leader of another centre-right party who wants to oust Netanyahu, is reluctant to join a coalition with an Arab party as well, but is less outspoken. In 2021 in fact he became Prime Minister as leader of a coalition that was passively supported by an Arab party. Bennett might therefore budge, but he is not a one man show. His party includes several members with ideological roots in the religious, nationalistic Israeli right who will have great difficulty cooperating with an Arab party.

Henry Kissinger once said that there is no such thing as foreign policy: everything is ultimately a domestic issue. Israeli politics is a case in point: the country’s trajectory in coming years, which will undoubtedly affect geostrategic developments across the Middle East and possibly beyond, currently hinges on opinionated secondary players in Jerusalem finding common ground.

The Arab Vote

The refusal of most Israeli political parties, including ones with liberal leanings, to cooperate with Arab parties is a glaring example of what many identify as Israel’s version of Apartheid. This has a history.

Like the Jewish ultra-Orthodox parties, the Arab parties reflect rigid identity politics. My research as a cultural anthropologist led me to describe the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who account for approximately one-fifth of the country’s population, as a “trapped minority”: an indigenous group which saw a constant trickle of immigrants gaining dominance in its homeland, eventually establishing a state that now excludes and marginalizes the original inhabitants.

Jewish immigrants – settlers, refugees, socialist visionaries, others with diverse sensibilities and motivations – have been coming to Palestine/Israel for 150 years. Many framed the move as a return to a biblical homeland. The trickle became a flood following the Second World War and the Holocaust, intensifying further in the 1950s when a million Jews departed Arab countries. Meanwhile, the 1948 war, which led to the establishment of Israel as the Jewish nation-state, forced some 750,000 Palestinians to leave their homes and homeland, ending up as refugees in neighbouring Arab states. By 1949 the residual Palestinian community within Israel, a faint shadow of what it had been prior to the war, accounted for only 16 per cent of the new state’s population. This ratio has remained more or less the same since.

One of the first decisions taken by Israel was to grant its Palestinian residents (most Israelis refer to them as “Israeli Arabs”) full formal citizenship. This enabled them gradual integration into the Israeli economy, a process which intensified and deepened in recent decades. Despite being discriminated against, education levels amongst them rose rapidly and is now evident in their weight amongst doctors and paramedics, engineers, lawyers and high-tech professionals. Their formal citizenship and integration into Israel’s economy distinguishes them from the 5.5 million Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip who, having been incorporated into the Israeli system of control after the 1967 war, were never offered citizenship. Bereft of sovereign status, Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza have their human, civil and political rights habitually trashed, and their capacity to shape their destiny is limited.

The Palestinian citizens of Israel, in contrast, took part in Israel’s political arena from the get-go. They formed political parties, won seats in the Knesset and became, nominally at least, a feature of the political scene. This integration however came with an asterisk: no Arab party has ever been invited to join a ruling coalition, appoint ministers or run a ministry. Yitzhak Rabin did rely on the support of Arab parties when he formed a ruling coalition in 1992, but did so without including them in his government. Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid followed suit in 2021. Like Rabin they too rewarded the support they got with infrastructural upgrades, better educational facilities and enhanced welfare services.

Willingness on the part of mainstream Israeli parties to reluctantly include the Palestinian citizens was anathema to Israel’s right-wing. Incitement against Palestinians, their leaders and against Israeli institutions willing to cooperate with them intensified after October 7 and the war in Gaza. With many Israelis feeling humiliated and betrayed by the massacre, attitudes towards Palestinians hardened, often becoming indiscriminate. Palestinian leaders inside Israel who expressed solidarity with those suffering in Gaza were denounced by Netanyahu and his ultra-nationalist collaborators as fifth columnists and Hamas apologists.

Discriminated and excluded, many Palestinian citizens of Israel lost faith in the political process as an avenue to change. Turnouts in elections dwindled, settling at a level significantly lower than turnouts amongst Jewish Israeli voters.

This changed dramatically in 2026 when, for the first time in many decades Palestinian citizens of Israel came to vote in hordes. Turn out bumped from ca. 50 per cent in 2022 to nearly 80, and dividends were swift: for the first time ever, representation of the Arab sector in the Knesset reflects its share in the country’s population.

This surge in turnout and representation, which had an important impact on the overall result and put a major dent on Netanyahu’s chances to remain in power, came as a direct response to his own policies towards Palestinians. One element was his capitulation to the ultra-nationalist, messianic partners in his coalition and their views about the war on Gaza. Treating this disastrous war as a living miracle, they consistently depicted it as the long awaited apocalypse, designed in heaven to yield a total victory and assert Jewish dominance throughout the region. Netanyahu’s callous willingness to accommodate these twisted visions at the expense of countless Palestinian lives and keep his coalition intact cemented the resolve amongst Palestinian citizens of Israel to vote him out.

A second factor pulling in the same direction was Netanyahu’s policies vis-a-vis the Arab sector itself. Like the messianic hard line view in Gaza, policies designed to hurt the Palestinian citizens of Israel were inspired and often executed by Itamar Ben-Gvir, the violent, racist, convicted felon whom Netanyahu appointed in 2022 as Minister of National Security, an office which includes ministerial supervision of Israel’s police forces. Ben-Gvir, who as minister repeatedly (and illegally) tried to interfere with police operations, was generally ineffective and incompetent. One objective he set for the police however was achieved with ease: a dramatic decline in police resources and presence in Arab towns and villages, resulting in rapid deterioration of law and order. The vacuum invited organized crime on an unprecedented scale, quickly eroding people’s sense of basic personal security. Extortion rackets targeting shops and businesses became the norm. Municipal officials are regularly threatened into submission, forced to hand appointments, civil engineering tenders and other contracts to their intimidators. Illegal firearms, including automatic weapons, proliferate. Murder rates in 2026 doubled in comparison to 2022, with only a fraction of homicides investigated and solved.

The lack of personal security and absence of effective governance eventually outweighed the community’s inherent mistrust of public policy and the political process. Desperate, many in the Arab sector began looking to the central government for deliverance. Many hoped that better representation might inject urgency, change priorities and make a change. The long lines outside polling stations on election day in October 2026 suggested that despair does breed renewed trust in politics.

What Happens Now? Who has time on their side? Could Trump-Style Claims of Corruption and Electoral Fraud Keep Netanyahu in Power?

In the wake of every election, Israel’s political system is entrusted with a dual task: launching the newly elected parliament as a functioning legislative power, and ensuring the continuity of the executive branch by confirming a new government .

A Central Elections Committee, headed by a senior Supreme Court judge, is responsible for publishing the official results a week after election day. The new members of Knesset can then convene, take their oaths, elect a Speaker and begin the legislative work. The Knesset’s second duty is confirming a new government; this will come later.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the largest party in Netanyahu’s 67 strong opposition in the new Knesset, has already announced that once the Knesset has been sworn in he intends to have a Speaker elected, then swiftly move to legislating. First will be a law establishing a State Commission of Inquiry into events and processes surrounding October 7. Next will be legislation to nullify Netanyahu’s attempts since 2023 to effect a judicial ‘reform’, castrate the judicial system, stifle its democratic institutions, turn Israel to a thinly disguised dictatorship and secure Netanyahu’s Orban-like autocratic reign for many years to come.

A rapid assertion of parliamentary control on Eisenkot’s part even before a new government has been confirmed will be the beginning of the end of Netanyahu’s reign. A state commission of inquiry into October 7th that will inevitably examine Netanyahu’s role is ominous for the aging leader. Not surprisingly, his first priority following the elections was to cast doubt on their integrity.

On election day itself Netanyahu released a video claiming the election had been stolen. Uttering half-baked conspiratorial allegations against a political activist in an Arab town who somehow bribed the masses to come out and vote, the video was a poor man’s version of Donald Trump’s distorted 2020 playbook: flimsy shreds of incoherent evidence that allegedly pertain to isolated and implausible incidents. The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee responded three days later, strongly denouncing the clumsy attempt. Even if all suspicions were confirmed, he explained, the scale of the alleged infringements is too small to impact the results. Like Trump in 2020, Netanyahu is not likely to concede and immediately issued a statement that he does not recognize the results. Peddling the notion that the affair has compromised the Arab parties, his immediate goal is to prevent the Central Election Committee from officially publishing the results, delay the inaugural session of the newly elected Knesset and prevent even the first step towards an orderly transfer of power.

Assuming his allegations fail to stick, the process of transferring power to a new government will go on. The first week of November will see the new Knesset sworn in, setting the stage for the next phase: formal negotiations that will eventually determine who is Prime Minister and what his cabinet and coalition will look like.

Israeli law allocates several months for this task, with the President, a ceremonial figure most of the time, taking center stage. He must first invite the leaders of all parties individually and ask them who they think should be entrusted first with the task of forming a government. Having heard them all he then decides who is most likely to form a viable coalition, and formally assigns him with the task. The incumbent has 28 days, with a possible extension of 14 more. If he fails, the task can be assigned for 28 additional days to a leader of another party. If they fail too, a month-long period is declared in which any member of the Knesset may propose a coalition and present it to the Knesset for a confidence vote. If that month passes with no result the Knesset is automatically dissolved and a new election date is set within 90 days.

Throughout this transitional period, which may last months, the new Knesset functions as the legislative branch. The new government, by contrast, has not been formed as yet, and to ensure executive continuity it is the outgoing government, now labelled ‘caretaker government’, that remains in place, with marginally weaker powers. Significantly, Netanyahu will welcome a protracted process along these lines, while he remains Prime Minister. Should the outcome be a new election cycle, he will campaign as the incumbent.

The first leader the president is likely to approach to form a government will most likely be Gadi Eisenkot who will have a number of options, none of them particularly simple.

One is to persuade his reluctant centre-right partners Lieberman and Bennett to form a coalition with the Arab parties or at the very least lean on their parliamentary support. Eager to remove Netanyahu, one of the Arab parties has already hinted at a willingness to do what they have done before: support the coalition ‘from the outside’, i.e vote for it in the confirmation vote without joining it as ministers.

Eisenkot’s next option is to persuade one of the ultra-Orthodox parties to break away from Netanyahu’s corner and join his. The spiritual leaders of one of the two parties hold a grudge against Netanyahu for promises he made to them that were never fulfilled, and have already declared all options to be on the table. Eisenkot will naturally demand that ultra orthodox youngsters enlist to military or civilian service like everybody else. Preventing this, alongside securing funding for yeshivas, are the absolute priority for the religious leaders. If, against all odds, Eisenkot eventually succeeds in mobilizing them, he will need to sell the deal to his immediate partners. Lieberman, in particular, will have to swallow a bitter pill: collaborating with an ultra orthodox party would be a blatant breach of a commitment he had made.

If Eisenkot fails to broker an agreement with either the Arab or the ultra-orthodox parties that is amenable to all members of his own camp, his options will narrow down to two.

One would be to present the Knesset with a small provisional cabinet – only four or five essential ministries, manned by his most trusted lieutenants. The remaining 20 ministries he will keep vacant, available for parties that might join his coalition later. Since a Knesset vote of confidence in favour or against a government is a public, roll-call affair, this move by Eisenkot will put all Knesset members who pledged to oust Netanyahu in a difficult position. Fail to support Eisenkot’s seed cabinet and you give Netanyahu, who will remain in office, a new lease of political life. On the other hand, a vote in favour of Eisenkot at this point will not compel any of his allies to join forces with their nemesis. Confirming Eisenkot’s cabinet in its abbreviated form will put an end to 30 years of Netanyahu’s reign without the need to break a single campaign promise.

Finally, Eisenkot can form a wall to wall national unity government with his natural allies AND Netanyahu, adding 27 Knesset votes to his tally. Each of the two leaders currently insists that this could happen only if he is at the helm, so good luck to us all in getting one of them to budge. Welcome to coalition politics! A universe where flexibility abounds and five months is an eternity – enough time to switch synagogues, perhaps even to ferry a big bad wolf, a naive goat and a reluctant cabbage across a river.


Dan Rabinowitz teaches Anthropology and Environmental Studies at Tel Aviv University. His research areas include ethnicity, political minorities and, more recently, Policy and Social aspects of climate change. He is a long standing contributor to Haaretz’s Op-Ed section, and held leadership positions in environmental NGOs in Israel and abroad.


Cite as: Rabinowitz, D. 2026 “The Fateful Elections Everybody Lost” Focaalblog November 4. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/11/04/dan-rabinowitz-the-fateful-elections-everybody-lost/

Veronika Nagy: Surveilling Sentiments: When Emotion Becomes Evidence

Image 1: Illustration of AI by Champ Panupong Techawongthawon on Unsplash.

In 2024, the German cabinet approved a draft law that expanded deportation criteria to include public expressions that “approve” or “promote” terrorism on platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. Although the Ministry of the Interior subsequently clarified that a single “like” would not automatically suffice, the proposal nevertheless made newly visible a broader development in migration governance and the growing relevance of digital activities, including its affective and often highly ambiguous dimensions, to questions of risk, legitimacy, and deportability. By early 2025, deportation orders were already being issued under these expanded provisions, especially in cases involving protest speech and accusations of antisemitism or incitement. While these cases did not in fact hinge on isolated reactions alone, they made clear that nonverbal expressions on social media had acquired a distinct evidentiary potential within migration casework.

In this blog, I will not primarily analyse the legal status of migrants and the use of likes itself, nor will I argue that online expressions have straightforwardly replaced older forms of migration control. Passports, interviews, case files, and biometric checks remain central to contemporary migration control. Rather, I am interested in how the field of bordering has expanded, so that digital traces such as posts, comments, emojis, reactions, affiliations, and other small residues of everyday online life become increasingly available for institutional interpretation, and in doing so, alter the conditions under which migrants become legible to authorities. Migration scholars, like Petra Molnar (2024) and Annaliese Pelizza (2021), have long shown that the border is no longer confined to the territorial edge, but is distributed across administrative routines, infrastructures of data collection, and dispersed spaces through which mobile lives are rendered knowable. What my Virtual Asylum project showed is that this process is now extending more deeply into the affective textures of digital life, where sentiments, moods, and symbolic gestures may be re-read as indicators of disposition, alignment, or credibility (Nagy 2024).

The argument I want to develop is relatively simple. Across Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands, migrants who arrived during the so-called migration crisis rarely described dramatic encounters with surveillance. Instead, they recounted more subtle and routine changes in their social media practices, shaped by expectations of bureaucratic monitoring.. These adjustments were often framed as routine preparations for asylum or residency procedures, comparable to gathering documents or organising interview notes. Yet they reveal something significant about the present conjuncture, a securitisation of sentiments, where affective traces do not become politically relevant only at the moment they are expressed, but at the moment they are evaluated. In what follows, I first examine these everyday adjustments, which clustered around practices such as precautionary deletion, affective neutralisation, account stratification, and anticipatory compliance. I then show how these practices illuminate a broader shift in migration governance, in which digital traces are increasingly integrated into administrative assessments not only as information, but as cues through which people are sensed and interpreted. I end by reflecting on what it means when emotion becomes evidence and when digital life, once valued primarily as a resource for mobility, communication, and support, also becomes a site of affective bordering.

Everyday Adjustments to Digital Surveillance

During my fieldwork, people didn’t talk about their online practices regarding data sharing and polymedia use as a break with their past networks or a social performance conducted by constant fear. Instead, they described small, practical routines they use to deal with migration bureaucracy in an increasingly data-driven system. Participants from conflict countries along the Western Balkan route – the primary land pathway for irregular migration from the Middle East and Asia into the European Union via the Balkan Peninsula did not usually present these practices as resistance, nor even necessarily as responses to confirmed surveillance. More often, they spoke of them as forms of preparation, actions taken because digital traces had become relevant enough to matter, even if the exact criteria by which they might later be interpreted remained unclear. In that sense, what emerged across interviews was not a common social response to avoid migration authorities, but a series of recurring coping strategies through which migrants sought to manage how they might appear once their digital traces entered administrative circulation.

One of these strategies is what I call precautionary deletion. Several respondents described reviewing and removing older posts before interviews or appointments, not because those materials were overtly political or obviously incriminating, but because they had become too ambiguous once digital histories were understood to have potential relevance for casework. An Afghan respondent in the Netherlands explained that before a scheduled interview, he went through years of older posts and deleted jokes, emojis, and anything that might look disrespectful. The phrase is telling, because the issue was not prohibited content, but interpretive vulnerability. Humour, irony, and casual sociability felt safe within their original context, but not once imagined through the evaluative frame of a bureaucracy concerned with credibility and risk. In that sense, the practice was shaped less by the certainty of monitoring than by the possibility that routine and context-dependent expression might later be read within a framework of risk.

The majority crossing Schengen borders employed practices that I describe as affective neutralisation. Participants, especially those who were hoping to settle in Germany, spoke of refraining from reacting publicly to posts during politically charged periods, not because they lacked anger, grief, or solidarity, but because they wished to avoid generating visible emotional signals that might later be interpreted without context. One respondent explained that she had stopped reacting to public content altogether because “you never know how they read it,” a statement that captures well the uncertainty of these adjustments. The issue was not simply self-censorship in a classical sense, but the effort to minimise expressive traces in an environment where affective gestures, even a heart, an angry emoji, or a supportive comment were taken not only as momentary reactions but as indications of deeper ideological or social orientation. What was being managed here was less the content of speech than the risk of misalignment between intention and institutional interpretation.

The most impressive practice, mainly described by Syrian refugees in Europe, was the maintenance of multiple digital identities for different audiences and purposes. Across Greece and Hungary, respondents described keeping one relatively sparse and predictable account that appeared neutral and ordinary, especially where visibility to institutions was thought possible, while reserving other accounts or channels for more intimate, familial, communal, or politically expressive forms of communication. This was not usually framed as concealment in a dramatic sense, but as a practical way of organising visibility across different social and institutional settings. It reflected an understanding that not all digital spaces are encountered equally, and that emotional expression may be acceptable in one setting while framed as problematic in another. The segmentation of accounts thus worked as a way of separating audiences, obligations, and vulnerabilities, allowing migrants to maintain social connectedness while also managing the risks of being made legible to institutions through the wrong kind of digital exposure.

Running through these different practices in various stages of the mobility paths along the Balkan route, refugees emphasised a broader pattern that can be understood as a form of anticipatory compliance. Participants did not present themselves as reacting to explicit instructions from authorities. Rather, they adjusted in advance, in response to the uncertain but real possibility that online traces might be mobilised during interviews, assessments, or decisions. They had heard of posts being referenced in asylum interviews, or of online material being used to question credibility and some participants had even encountered this directly, while others knew of it through wider migrant networks. Their concern, then, was not abstract surveillance in the general sense, but the concrete and selective use of digital traces in decision-making. This anticipatory dimension is important because it shows that border effects do not only arise when digital content is formally used as evidence, but also when the possibility of such use becomes embedded in the practical reasoning of those subject to migration governance.

According to these narratives there was a clear polymedia culture of affective legibility explained by mobile user refugees as an administrative requirement on the road. Beyond documents and narrative coherence, digital histories and emotional tone are increasingly perceived as relevant to how a person is assessed. Respondents did not usually describe this through legal or policy language. Instead, they spoke through familiar routines of deleting, withholding, separating, cleaning, and simplifying personal responses via online platforms on smart phone devices. Yet these routines indicate that digital platform use has become incorporated into the labour of preparing oneself for bureaucratic encounters. They do not suggest fear-driven withdrawal from digital life, nor do they point to an all-encompassing regime of surveillance. Contextually speaking, these routines show how emotional and digital self-presentation have become part of navigating institutions whose evaluative frames now reach further into the small and often ambiguous traces of everyday online life.

Affective Governance Expands Migration Control

The incorporation of digital activity into migration casework is not occurring in isolation. It reflects a broader administrative shift in which risk-oriented governance increasingly relies on pre-emptive assessments rather than solely on past actions, and in which online expressions, such as comments, reactions, symbolic gestures, and visible affiliations become supplemental indicators of disposition, credibility, or possible alignment. During my fieldwork, I observed how this expansion of scrutiny operates through three interconnected mechanisms. First, the datafication of everyday interaction flattens the thick context of social life into discrete, legible data points, turning fleeting gestures into permanent “traces” for administrative review. Next, affective inference allows officials to judge a person’s character based on their emojis and comments. Finally, through the administrative integration of these traces, these digital fragments are woven into formal evidentiary procedures, transforming the messiness of lived experience into a solidified legal fact used to support legal decision-making processes.

With the rapidly increasing datafication of everyday interactions, the refugees from my research did not describe elaborate intelligence operations or systematic monitoring in a strong sense. Surprisingly, they normalised encounters in which officials referred to digital behaviour, public posts, or content that remained visible online, sometimes from years earlier digital data that were regularly investigated without consent. These instances indicate that digital traces are gradually moving into existing evidentiary frameworks, not necessarily as primary evidence, but as contextual material that can support or complicate judgments about coherence, sincerity, or trustworthiness. What began as a resource for maintaining social ties and accessing information during migration has gradually evolved into a source of administrative data, extending social media’s role into governance and surveillance practices. Platforms like Facebook and Instagram are no longer just for connection but also provide persistent, accessible data that is easily tied to an individual’s identity. Consequently, these digital footprints have become key indicators in migration casework. In this sense, digital interaction becomes not only socially but archivally useful. This practice also relies on a newly digitized affective inference as an assessment logic. This does not always depend on advanced emotional AI or formalised algorithmic analysis, even if those developments form part of the wider landscape discussed in contemporary scholarship on migration control. More immediately, affective inference (Hesp et al 2021) often occurs through modest but consequential acts of interpretation of officers, deciding whether an online expression appears hostile, sympathetic, supportive, provocative, or politically aligned. Respondents repeatedly described uncertainty about how reactions, comments, or expressive symbols might be understood, especially during periods of heightened political tension. The key issue here is that affect is not judged only for what it says, and how language and semantics could matter, but for what it is presumed to reveal about the person who produced it. A reaction becomes legible not only as emotion, but as a possible sign of disposition. This aligns with broader work on emotional AI and soft biometrics, which shows how affective cues are increasingly turned into actionable information. Yet in my fieldwork, I identified how this appeared as a mundane process of making interiority legible by translating private affects into bureaucratic facts, where institutions read the ‘vibe’ of digital traces as a way to fix a person’s character.

Most importantly, these easy-access personal digital traces become administratively integrated into existing procedures of border control practices. The significance of this step lies in the fact that online material does not necessarily need to stand on its own as decisive proof to matter. Participants described religious and politically sensitive posts being discussed during interviews, public profiles being checked for discrepancies, and older content becoming newly relevant because of developments elsewhere. In this way, digital material enters what anthropologists might call an administrative archive (Stoler 2008, Zeitlyn 2012), a digitized cumulative repository of heterogeneous materials used to build an image of a person’s background, reliability, and orientation. Once digital affect enters this archive, its interpretation gains institutional weight, even if selectively and contingently. This is why the distinction between expression and evidence becomes increasingly unstable. A post does not have to be conclusive to become consequential. It only needs to be legible enough to support an inference.

As my research exposed, these digital administrative screening processes do not unfold uniformly across national contexts. In Germany, the expanded deportation framework made people particularly attentive to the possibility that online expressions of political sympathy, anger, or protest might be scrutinised. In the Netherlands, respondents were more likely to describe the removal or cleaning of older posts reflecting their social networks as part of preparing for credibility interviews, reflecting the centrality of coherence within Dutch asylum procedures. In Hungary, concerns often focused on the misreading of multilingual expressions or non-standard dialects, especially where linguistic opacity could heighten the risk of interpretive error associated with terrorism or radicalisation. In Greece, participants more frequently described separating accounts and managing visibility across different social worlds including gender sensitive content. These differences matter because they show that affective governance is not a single coherent apparatus, but a differentiated set of practices shaped by national asylum systems, local bureaucratic cultures, and recent political developments. What ties them together is the techsolutionist perception grounded in concrete encounters that digital affect is relevant to institutional decision-making. Accordingly, what this amounts to is a shift from the evaluation of discrete behaviours to the assessment of affective legibility of the foreigner. Migrants from authoritarian conflict countries quickly understood that their digital presence is not assessed only for explicit wrongdoing, but for what it may signal about them more broadly. Managing visibility, then, becomes part of navigating asylum and residency procedures and daily safety measures, not because digital life has become wholly securitised in an abstract sense, but because expressive traces now travel more easily into evaluative settings where they can acquire new meanings. The border thus expands not only through more data, but through new ways of reading the atmospheres and dispositions that digital life leaves behind.

Experience of Bordering

One of the most striking features of these practices is that they are experienced not as dramatic political acts, but as ordinary forms of maintenance. Migrants described reviewing posts, withholding reactions, simplifying profiles, or dividing accounts much as they described collecting documents or preparing narratives before interviews. This ordinariness matters because it shows how affective bordering does not only take place at moments of enforcement. It becomes woven into the temporalities of everyday life, into habits of checking, editing, pausing, and anticipating. What changes is not simply what people say online, but how they sense themselves being potentially read. This is why it may be useful to think not only in terms of surveillance, but in terms of perception and legibility. The issue is not just that online traces can be seen. According to their testimonies, these can be sensed as clues, referring to fragments of tone, mood, sympathy, irritation, grief, or alignment that may later be folded into judgments about credibility or risk. Participants did not often articulate this through explicit theoretical language, but their practices visualised a shift in the sensory politics of migration governance. Administratively, they were not simply managing information, but the possible feelings and impressions their digital presence might evoke once translated into a bureaucratic setting, considering the risk of misidentification and therefore rejection of authorization of any kind, healthcare, visa, jobs or social housing.

The border, in this sense, is not only encountered at the territorial edge or across an interview desk. It also lingers in the feed, in the archived post, in the hesitation before pressing “like,” and in the late-night work of deciding what to keep and what to delete. This also helps clarify why the effects are often subtle yet consequential. Humour becomes risky because it depends on shared context. Solidarity becomes risky because it may be detached from the event that gave rise to it and reclassified as ideological alignment. Multilingual or culturally specific forms of expression become risky because they do not travel easily into standardised interpretive frames. Under these conditions, neutrality often appears safer than nuance, predictability safer than irony, and sparse self-presentation safer than emotionally layered visibility. The cumulative effect is not necessarily silence in an absolute sense, but a narrowing of the expressive range that feels administratively safe.

The smartphone, long recognised in migration research as indispensable for communication, navigation, and support, therefore appears here in an increasingly ambivalent light. It remains a vital infrastructure of mobility and connection, but it also stores the emotional residue of everyday life in forms that may later become administratively consequential. It contains routes, documents, and contacts, but also jokes, affiliations, grief, humour, and fragments of ordinary sociability. For people in precarious legal positions, this means that the border can no longer be encountered only as a physical line or an institutional procedure but transgressed through the possibility that one’s own digital history may be re-opened and re-read.

When Emotion Becomes Evidence

What began in public debate as a question about whether a single “like” could support deportation, actually points to a broader transformation in how migration control is enacted. Online expressions, including reactions, comments, emojis, affiliations, and other small affective traces increasingly acquire evidentiary potential once they enter administrative circulation. Digital activity now matters not only for what it explicitly says, but for what it may be taken to reveal about a person’s disposition, credibility, or alignment. Precautionary deletion, neutralisation and other forms of anticipatory compliance are not signs of radical withdrawal from digital life, but practical ways of managing how one becomes legible to institutions under conditions of uncertainty. People delete older jokes and emojis not because these are incriminating in themselves, but because they have become too ambiguous once digital traces are folded into case files. They maintain separate accounts not simply to hide, but to organise visibility according to different audiences, obligations, and vulnerabilities. Seen in this light, what is at stake is not only the datafication of migrant lives, a process already documented in digital migration scholarship, but the growing incorporation of emotional tone and online affect into the conditions of administrative legibility. Beyond documents and narrative coherence, the emotional residue of digital interaction is becoming part of how migrants are sensed and assessed. They show that affective traces become consequential at the moment of evaluation, when they are drawn into an administrative archive and made to support wider judgments about sincerity, risk, or political orientation. In that sense, this development resonates with broader discussions of the deep border, emotional AI, and digital migration infrastructures, even if, in practice, what participants encountered was often more ordinary: the selective and contingent use of visible online content in interviews and procedures.

The people I spoke with were above all, trying to avoid being misread. Their accounts suggest that contemporary border regimes increasingly operate not only by verifying facts or documents, but by interpreting atmospheres, dispositions, and expressive cues that are difficult to stabilise once removed from their social context. To recognise this shift is important because it clarifies how bordering expands into everyday digital life without always appearing as a dramatic new regime. The new border security regime lingers in the evaluation of moods, gestures, and sentiments, asking not only where someone comes from or whether they may stay, but what their digital life seems to say about who they are.


Veronika Nagy is a scholar of digital criminology, migration, and security whose work examines how data-driven systems reshape bordering, surveillance, and everyday experiences of institutional scrutiny. Her research focuses on the social and political consequences of digital governance for people in precarious positions.


References

Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021). ‘Deeply felt affect: The emergence of valence in deep active inference’. Neural Computation, 33(2), 398–446.

Molnar, P. (2024). The walls have eyes: Surviving migration in the age of artificial intelligence. The New Press.

Nagy, V. (2024). ‘Social sorting in Europe: Self-censorship in a digital asylum.’ Archiwum Kryminologii/Archives of Criminology, 46(1), 149-179.

Pelizza, A. (2021). Identification as translation: The art of choosing the right spokespersons at the securitized border. Social Studies of Science, 51(4), 487-511. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312720983932

Stoler, A. L. (2008). Along the archival grain: Epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense. Princeton University Press.

Zeitlyn, D. (2012). ‘Anthropology in and of the archives: Possible futures and contingent pasts. Archives as anthropological surrogates.’ Annual Review of Anthropology, 41(1), 461-480.


Cite as: Nagy, V. 2026. “Surveilling Sentiments: When Emotion Becomes Evidence” Focaalblog October 16. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/10/16/veronika-nagy-surveilling-sentiments-when-emotion-becomes-evidence/

Erik Bähre: Becoming sovereign: Brazil’s far-right election victory

Image 1: Sleeping and eating in São Paulo’s inner city in 2024. Photo by author

The far right and extreme right scored a sweeping victory in Brazil’s elections on 4 October. The presidency will be decided in a run-off on 25 October, but even if Flávio Bolsonaro loses – which seems unlikely – the elections are an unprecedented success for Brazil’s far right. Far-right candidates for governor, the Senate and the state and federal legislatures did very well. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) won 121 Chamber seats, making it the biggest party in the Lower House. In several parts of Brazil, especially the South, voters could only choose between right-wing and far-right candidates. A record of 33 million voters stayed at home. Only in the Northeast of Brazil, the poorest and racially most diverse part of the country, did the Workers’ Party (PT) – Lula’s party – win.

Why? It baffles me that the far right continues to do so well and that many seem to vote against their personal economic interests. They also cast a vote against their concerns for safety and security. They vote for someone who de facto goes against their cherished Christian agenda of family and church; they vote against their geopolitical interests and against national sovereignty too. Many voted for an economic agenda that, as many can see, has deepened poverty in neighboring Argentina. What do ‘Bolsonaristas’, whose leader is serving a 27-year prison sentence for attempting a coup d’état and for plotting to murder his political opponents, care about when they go to the polls?

Family values, sex parties and 8 billion Euro

The hypocrisy of the far right is not a weakness: it is part of its appeal. Take Flávio Bolsonaro. He says he wants a country that is guided by Christian family values; he calls the Christian family the cornerstone of society and opposes abortion rights, queer rights and sex before marriage – we know the rhetoric all too well. He likens his campaign to a religious war against the evil left, as if he were a crusader. But what does Flávio himself do? His former business partner has accused him of taking part in parties with sex workers, organised for him and his friends. These parties were allegedly not isolated events but part of a wider web of corruption. He is under investigation by the Supreme Court for corruption and money laundering in connection with Banco Master, a bank whose fraudulent collapse left an 8 billion euro hole in Brazil’s deposit guarantee fund and cost pension funds an estimated 2 billion euro. The bank’s owner is suspected of having channeled millions into a biopic about Flávio’s father (see also Nunes 2026 on Bolsonaro’s 2022 campaign donations). Do people really imagine that their finances and Christian morality are in good hands with this man? I believe most people who vote for him know better. They see the hypocrisy – and my point is that this is precisely why they vote for him.

A clean city

I regularly spend time in São Paulo, where one of the main concerns of the Paulistanos is safety. The far right appeals to these concerns and promises to ‘clean up’ the city. They promise to remove the criminals, the homeless, the drug addicts and other so-called ‘vagabundos’. Time and again they promise to be tough on crime. Both São Paulo’s mayor and the state governor support Bolsonaro and have had years to show what they are worth. Yet the homeless and drug addicts are still there. They used to get together in an area called ‘Cracolandia’ until brutal police operations drove them out. But they are not gone. They now sleep, beg, and use drugs all over the city. When I walk through São Paulo’s city centre, I constantly have to watch my step to avoid human faeces. If anything, the city feels less safe in recent years, especially for women and at night. Far-right politicians have had the opportunity to show how tough on crime they are but they have failed. Paulistanos see this every day, and they complain about it – yet they vote for them again.

Rights to the city

A third example of far-right failure, again from São Paulo. São Paulo’s street carnival is organised by so-called ‘blocos de carnaval’. These blocos are neighbourhood organisations that put together impressive floats with music and dance. Some ‘mega blocos’ draw crowds of over a million people. ‘Acadêmicos do Baixo Augusta’ is São Paulo’s largest mega bloco. For carnival they dress up, play samba and other festive music from Brazil, and parade through the streets of the city. They festively demonstrate inclusivity and show that everyone has the right to the city: queer, black, women, men – all celebrate together. The far right and conservatives object to racial inclusion and what they call ‘gender ideology’. Their politics leave little room for such an inclusive carnival. Instead of supporting the blocos, the city gave the stage to a show by Scottish DJ Calvin Harris. Calvin Harris’s electronic dance music has no Brazilian roots but appeals to a young, white, ‘middle-class’ audience. And where did the municipality schedule it? Exactly on the same street and on the same day as Baixo Augusta’s parade. The city was warned time and again that this was going to be dangerous. Over a million people were expected for Baixo Augusta alone; drawing an even larger crowd to the same street was not safe. What made it worse was that the police had closed off Praça Roosevelt, a nearby square. It was cordoned off with three-meter-high metal panels guarded by police. This left even less space. The mayor did not listen, said that all would be fine, and Calvin Harris drew an estimated million plus young people. It was chaos. On social media people could see youngsters being crushed by the crowd. They had nowhere to go. Some were injured, others fell over the metal barricades that the municipality had put up. The police tried to push youngsters back and when that did not work they started beating them with their batons. In effect, the mayor marginalised Baixo Augusta and the inclusivity it stands for. And everybody could see the incompetence as mostly white youngsters were crushed. And what do people do after having witnessed the violence inflicted on their kids? They vote for the far right, again.

Why vote for failure?

These three vignettes stand for major themes of the elections. The promise that your finances and Christian morality are in good hands: failed. The promise to be tough on crime and make the city feel safe again: failed. The promise to roll back ‘gender ideology’ and ‘identity politics’ and go against racial inclusivity: in the end, it was all so poorly organised that white kids were the ones actually beaten up by the police. To be clear, this is of course not my agenda. I am looking at it from the perspective of far-right voters. Why vote for these Bolsonaristas when they so clearly failed to deliver what you care about, even in a city so firmly in far-right hands?

Hypocrisy as sovereignty

Don Kalb (2025) would approach this through conjuncture, class and capital in which culture wars become a necessary ‘displacement’ of political and economic contradictions. Symbolism and worldviews are no smokescreens: they shape their own reality through which people define personhood. I suggest that we need to read the hypocrisy through Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) figures of the sovereign and the homo sacer. The sovereign, Agamben argues following Carl Schmitt, is the one who decides on the state of exception. The homo sacer, in Roman law, was a person who could be killed with impunity. It is a life without legal or political protection. The sovereign can thus decide when the laws and rules that govern society can be suspended. The hypocrisy is, in fact, an act of sovereignty. The rule of law does not matter when Flávio Bolsonaro says he is fighting a spiritual war for the family while allegedly having parties with sex workers – people that his own rhetoric barely recognises as human beings. He can say that he takes care of your household budget and cost of living while being investigated over his ties to a banking fraud that cost Brazilians billions of euros. Far-right politicians can say they are tough on crime but make the city even less safe. This hypocrisy does not undermine the far right; on the contrary, the far right thrives on it. It symbolises the sovereign status that Bolsonaristas aspire to. They are the ones who decide when the rule of law can be suspended and which lives count. Sometimes this is quite literally so. Someone told me about a dinner party he had attended. Over a glass of beer, one of the guests – who, as usual, was carrying his gun – casually said something like: ‘You know what I would like to do tonight? Go out on the street and just kill someone, just someone, for fun!’ The sovereign needs the homo sacer, those who can be killed without it counting as murder.

Image 2: Screenshot from ‘Mais de 560 mil votos! A deputada mais votada da história de Santa Catarina’ by Metrópolis Oficial (TikTok 4/10 2026) https://vm.tiktok.com/ZGdCNxuvx/

Silenced and amplified voices

This misogynist, racist, queerphobic and classist discourse spreads via social media, which amplifies the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Even those working at the margins of the economy, who like to see themselves as entrepreneurs (think of Uber drivers) are drawn to it. But social media posts circulate differently. I was sent a post on TikTok about the investigations into Flávio Bolsonaro. The post was gone within minutes, before I could see it. Chavoso da USP, the pseudonym of Thiago Torres Moura Santos, is a sociologist, left-wing activist and influencer who fiercely and eloquently speaks out against politicians who criminalise the poor and working class. With his oversized sportswear, Oakley sunglasses, tattoos on his neck and face, he stays true to the working class and funk culture of the urban periphery. He had more than a million followers on Instagram until November last year, when Meta blocked his account without giving an explanation. His voice, so popular among young people from the periphery, is now harder to find and Meta has also blocked other left-wing influencers.

Digital capital has openly aligned with the Right. Social media are, as Don Kalb puts it, the far right’s ‘increasingly well-funded ideological base’ (2026: 6). Júlia Zanatta has just been re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies for the state of Santa Catarina, with a record 560,000 votes. She is vehemently against abortion, supports the Bolsonaristas who were staging a coup d’état in January 2023, and strongly opposes so-called ‘identity politics’, except her own. Her appearance and style speak for themselves. She wears her hair in braids wrapped around the crown of her head, often decorated with flowers. It is a style that evokes the Bund Deutscher Mädel of the Nazi era, an aesthetic that was central to the Nazi ideal of femininity. On TikTok we can see how she took to the streets to celebrate her victory. Surrounded by enthusiastic supporters and expensive cars she walks the streets with a whip in her hand, beating the road in front of her. She screams: ‘This is historic, this is a lot of votes! I want more votes! It went with the whip!’ To give these words more force she cracks her whip again. Is ‘this went with the whip’ only an innocent way to claim a massive and smooth victory? Or is it less innocent in a land that was the last to abolish slavery in the Americas? The imagery of the plantation overseer (feitor) – who whips whoever stands in his way and decides over other people’s lives – is palpable. Rodrigo Nunes (2026) traces how ‘the overseer hired to discipline the plantation workforce became, after abolition, the police officer’. Slavery is not a relic here but continues to resonate in fantasies about social and moral order. Images like these circulate freely on social media and are defended by people who argue that you need to see them in context. But which context?

Dignity on Credit

Why is this important not only to wealthy Brazilians, but also the middle-class? The dignity of the middle-class hinges upon unsustainable consumption patterns that make the distinction between us and them ever more fragile (Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco 2020). The newest iPhone and car must be bought on credit at extremely high interest rates. Credit cards charge more than 400% per year as financial inclusion has become ‘financial expropriation’ (Rugitsky 2026). Their lifestyle is only possible because of cheap labour: restaurant cooks, waiters, Uber drivers, nannies and domestic workers. They are also needed as ‘the other’ against whom one can feel superior. I have often heard people refer to ‘their’ worker as a useless pawn (peão). As if life were a game of chess in which pawns are easily sacrificed for the king.

Lula and the PT campaigned to shorten the working week from six to five days. He campaigned for the dignity of workers and their families and is known for many successful poverty alleviation programs. But, as Kalb (2026) would anticipate, the middle class perceives this as a threat – not only financially, because it raises labour costs for a ‘squeezed middle’ (Toneto 2026), but also, and perhaps even more so, I would argue, because it undermines the sovereign’s freedom to decide over the lives of others. At the same time, Lula is humiliated for being a Northeasterner who came to São Paulo to shine shoes and work in the factory (Bähre and Gomes 2018). The poverty-alleviation programs Lula put in place (with all their limitations) and the partly successful emancipation of women, Brazilians of color and queer people are seen as a threat to the correct hierarchy and middle class identity. The elections have to reinstate the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, I would not be surprised that this social media discourse encourages people to stop voting, disillusioned. While voting is compulsory in Brazil, more than 33 million people – 21 per cent of the electorate – did not vote: a record number.

A sovereign needs a homo sacer

A sovereign is nothing without a homo sacer. Voting for the Bolsonaristas shows that you are, or at least aspire to be, someone who decides when and where the law can be suspended; someone who rules, or aspires to rule, over the dignity and the lives of others. Someone who handles the whip. Ironically, the far right’s failure to deliver is precisely what fuels its success. Hypocrisy performs sovereignty. This is the logic behind the far right. You show that you can decide over homo sacer.


Erik Bähre is a cultural anthropologist at Leiden University whose work explores the moral and political dimensions of economic life, with a particular focus on the nexus of care and finance. His most recent research is on health, insurance and the family in Brazil.


References

Agamben, Giorgio, 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bähre, Erik and Fabíola Gomes, 2018. “Humiliating the Brazilian poor: The iconoclasm of former president Lula”, Anthropology Today 34.

Kalb, Don, 2025. “Introduction: Counterrevolution within and against the Counterrevolution”, in Walden Bello and Don Kalb (eds.), Backlash: The Global Rise of the Radical Right, London: Pluto Press.

Nunes, Rodrigo, 2026. “Brazil: The Future of the Far Right”, interview by Carlos Pérez, Equator, 30 September.

Pinheiro-Machado, Rosana and Lucia Scalco, 2020. “From Hope to Hate: The Rise of Conservative Subjectivity in Brazil,” HAU 10(1).

Rugitsky, Fernando, 2026. “Battleground Brazil”, Sidecar (New Left Review), 2 October.

Toneto, Rodrigo, 2026. “Fiscal Democracy”, Phenomenal World, 19 March.


Cite as: Bähre, E. 2026. “Becoming sovereign: Brazil’s far-right election victory” Focaalblog October 10. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/10/09/erik-bahre-becoming-sovereign-brazils-far-right-election-victory/

Tsvetelina Hristova: Operative and Performative Economies of Information in Communist Bulgaria

The tool factory Bolshevik in Gabrovo was the largest tool factory in the Balkans, picture from the scientific fund “Modern and Contemporary History” from the Regional History Museum, Gabrovo, 1970s. https://h-museum-gabrovo.bg/?p=7268 

In the early 1970s, the socialist state of Bulgaria was starting to develop a series of interconnected systems for the automated governance of different areas of social and economic life. The party established a network of territorial computational centres, institutions that housed mainframe computers for shared use by factories and state employees. This network formed the backbone of a new approach to information in the socialist state, one that evoked hopes and imaginaries that we can easily recognise in our data-driven present: automating production, detecting and eliminating human errors, predictive modelling and economic and social governance based on insights from large quantities of data about the processes on local and global level, increased flexibility in the organisation of production and supply chains. In many ways our present is the future past tense of a story that was being written in the post-WW2 decades of the 20th century on both sides of the Iron Curtain and looking back at these beginnings can help us understand how the current constellation of a data-driven economy consolidated and what possible futures it replaced.

Some level of automated information gathering had already been introduced in factories and institutions at that time. Automated systems of governance (ASU), a concept and practice borrowed from the Soviet experience, were mostly reliant on punch card and punch tape machines, with uneven level of technological sophistication and availability of computing machines. Under the umbrella of the project for Unified System of Social Information (USSI), the communist party envisioned the development of interconnected territorial databases that would collect structured data from industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, state administration, demographic statistical information, and the document flows of state institutions. Party leaders and engineers were imagining this machine-processable data as the key to unlocking a multiplicity of futurities that would solve key problems of the socialist society and radically transform its economic position on the global scene. USSI was conceived as a project to centralise the collection of machine-readable information. But for what purposes and what does this project tell us about the relationship of the socialist state to information? The small town of Gabrovo can give us an insight into this question.

Between 1972 and 1976, a team of engineers and designers assembled in Gabrovo as a local subsidiary of the Scientific Centre of the office for USSI. The team, led by engineer Nikola Vrazhilov, was tasked to develop a pilot module for USSI for the collection and analysis of data from industrial production. The team evaluated the available data collection and data transfer infrastructure at factories and municipal institutions in the region and developed a detailed project for their use in assembling the territorial database for Module Industry. Their archive shows a clever patchwork solution that took into account the different levels of digitalisation of this infrastructure and relied on technological and procedural translation across paper forms, punch card machines, magnetic tape, computers, telephone and telegraph networks. In the process of selecting key indicators to be gathered and writing the code for the BOMP-based programmes that enabled queries and analysis of the data, the question of the relationship between these new technologies for information processing and the traditional information practices of the state became pertinent.

At that point in time, in 1970s Socialist Bulgaria, the network of computational centres was emerging alongside and in an uneasy relationship to the established structures of statistical offices that had so far defined how practices of governance were grounded in information gathering and analysis. And the team in Gabrovo, led by Vrazhilov, was positioned between the two. The team was provided with an office in the building of the municipal computational centre and it had to closely collaborate with the local statistical office. Both of them met Vrazhilov with suspicion, as we can see from an archival trail of complaints and pleas for assistance. But his team played a crucial role as translators between the two models of use of information for governance purposes – the statistical and the computational. While they worked on a pilot project, their ambition was to develop a replicable methodology and code that could be scaled up and used across the country and that would eventually replace the existing incongruent methods of data gathering through statistical paper forms and ASU data. They aimed to establish a standard for digital data storage and use, one based on the principles of deduplication and a single source of truth, which, to this day, define e-government projects around the world.

Diagram of the information flows between factories and state institutions in Bulgaria, developed by Vrazhilov’s team in 1976 (archival unit 1206/1/23 from the Regional Archive in Gabrovo)

A key part of the work of Vrazhilov’s team was translating the indicators from statistical forms submitted to the Central Planning Committee into code that generated structured data and reports. One can argue that the socialist planned economy in itself was an information management project. The 5-year plan was not just a set of performance metrics to be achieved but acted, in itself, as a discursive performance of commitment to building a communist future. This performative aspect of the plan was reinforced even further with reforms in the early 1960s that aimed as decentralising control and giving back power to the workers. As part of this goal, a new form of the plan was introduced – the counter plan. It was proposed by the industrial workers themselves, at each factory, and was conceived as a way to make the planning expectations more realistic and grounded in the knowledge and abilities of the workers’ collectives, the brigades. In reality, though, the counter plan exacerbated the performativity of the plan, proposing even more ambitious achievements for the planning period. On the ground, as we can see from the archives of another state enterprise in Gabrovo, the Experimental Base, this competitive performativity led to perpetual struggle and failure to meet the goals. When faced with failures, however, the management of the factory was forced to prioritise the “material interest” of the workers and compensate them for their time, regardless of the results. As a way to deal with this cycle of ever more ambitious plans and inevitable failures, some factories had started to falsify the data and this was one of the key problems the state wanted to solve with its new computational network and machine-gathered data. By automating the data gathering and analysis, the state hoped to eliminate human errors – a hope that seems to persist in every historical context, regardless of the structure of the economic system.

Vrazhilov was hoping to achieve more. He wanted to use the data gathered daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly from factories in ways that went beyond mere verification. He wanted the data to show more, to reveal patterns that remained obscured in statistics. He coined the term “operative information” (оперативна информация) to refer to this idea. Operative information was a term that had both functional and temporal dimensions. It captured a period shorter than the regular reporting periods for the purposes of the plan. It was meant to capture the flow of production in action. The operative information consisted of data reported daily and within 10-day periods. These shorter periods of reporting were seen as an opportunity to reveal the rhythm of production rather than just expose whether factories fell short of fulfilling the plan. The operative nature of this approach was grounded in the window for intervention that Vrazhilov foresaw. Code would reveal uneven rhythms and then be used to diagnose and remediate the problem in ways reminiscent of what decades later has been termed algorhythmic governance – the regulation of the various temporal cycles of social life through algorithms.

Diagram Technological chain 1, development and maintenance of the datasets in the territorial database, from the Technical project “Development of Territorial System for teleprocessing in the region of Gabrovo, 1976 (Archival unit 1206/1/32 from the Regional Archive in Gabrovo)

Aside from the temporal dimension of production, the notion of operative data is interesting in other ways. The operation carried a multitude of loaded meanings during the Cold War. This term, coming from army jargon, captured the militarised spirit of mobilizing the workers for the competition between the Communist East and the Capitalist West. It also unfolded in a consistent relationship to information and the performativity of language and narrative. In the context of foreign intelligence and espionage, for example in a 1962 classified agreement between the Bulgarian secret police and the Soviet KGB, “operative information” was a term used to refer to data gathered through the structures of operative workers (оперативни работници), the fleet of trained informants of the secret police in communist states. These operative workers also played a key role in the moral and often oppressive economies of information in the country. They, together with untrained and spontaneous informants, gathered social data that could not be captured through the mechanisms of statistical forms and everyone, especially those in position of relative power, lived with the awareness that their actions and motives could be subject to a sort of fidelity test for compliance with the ethos of communism, that their social information and its interpretation were a contested terrain of ideological sense-making. This economy of information, where secrets and revelations acted as tools for control and redistribution of power, closely linked the organisation of industrial production with the circulation of narratives and interpretations. The institutions of the secret police and foreign espionage organs themselves were also incorporated into the initiatives for automated information systems for governance, developing databases and networks with dual use – for civilian and wartime purposes. 

We can stipulate that this complex informational aspect of the operation was shaped by the intellectual legacy of early Soviet figures like the poet Sergey Tretyakov in the early 1930s and anarchist thinkers and experimentators like Aleksey Gastev from the Central Institute for Labour (TsIT) in the 1920s, for both of whom the operation and the operational played a key role in the conceptualisation and enabling of the transformation to a communist social and economic system. Gastev’s “culture of the operation” aimed to provide a critical counterpoint to capitalist Taylorism, a scientific approach to the rhythm of production that had to be harmonised and steady but, above all, to be organised in a way that counters the alienating effects of the mechanisation and automation of capitalist production. Although the scientific organisation of work in texts by Gastev and TsIT drew inspiration from capitalist thinkers like Frederick Taylor (1910s), Frank Gilbreth (1910s) and Henry Ford (with whom TsIT exchanged letters in the 1920s), they insisted on the possibility of using the same methods to different ends, putting the embodied creativity of the worker and the workers’ collective at the centre of the operation. The ideological articulation of communist production was performative in the sense that the poet Sergey Tretyakov had developed in his work – the language of proletarian industrial production and organisation was not merely descriptive of an existing reality but aspired to bring a new communist reality into being. It was interventionist. And we can see this legacy in the aspirations of Vrazhilov for operative information that can not only capture the state of industrial factory production but can intervene into it and steady the rhythm of its flow. 

Vrazhilov’s work was largely met with enthusiasm, and the pilot project was planned to scale up. The traces of his team, however, disappeared in 1977 and his biography shows he was moved to a new position – as a director of the Base for Technological Development of Textile Machine Production in Gabrovo. Yet, the work of Vrazhilov’s team demonstrates how a seemingly technocratic project was deeply embedded in the legacy and aspirations of communism. It was not a project that used uniquely communist machines or approaches to coding or information networks. Rather, the emphasis on what made it socialist was consistently articulated through the language of communist ideology and through the economic base that defined the ownership of the means of production. Perhaps, this leaves us with a question for our present. What if, rather than focusing on the types of data-driven technologies in our lives and looking for technological fixes, we contemplate how to articulate and perform a different future and how to seize the material stratum that underpins it? The performative aspect of the operative information economy in state socialism was precarious and fragile. We have to acknowledge the archives of failures, the moral economy of control and punishment that aimed to contain subjectivities that adopted the performativity of language as means to reconcile the failures of production. And, yet, economic systems are inherently performative and imperfect. Our present AI-driven economy is built on promises and speculations. One crucial difference, however, is that it gradually but consistently limits the possibilities of workers resistance and control and its gains and losses are accounted for in ways that rarely if ever take the “material interest” of the workers as a primary concern.


Tsvetelina Hristova is an anthropologist, critical media studies scholar, and amateur boxer whose interest in social research developed from her involvement in left-wing activism in Bulgaria. Her work explores emerging and alternative forms of governance and control of labor and populations through analysis of the intersections of regimes of technological and political organizing.


We thank the Käte Hamburger Kolleg: Cultures of Research (c:o/re) for permission to reblog their original post, published August 10, 2026: https://khk.rwth-aachen.de/operative-and-performative-economies-of-information-in-communist-bulgaria/


Cite as: Hrsitova, T. 2026. “Operative and Performative Economies of Information in Communist Bulgaria” Käte Hamburger Kolleg: Cultures of Research (c:o/re) August 8. https://khk.rwth-aachen.de/operative-and-performative-economies-of-information-in-communist-bulgaria/

Don Nonini: How is Workers’ Labor Power “Inside” Yet “Beyond” Capital?

Image 1: Potato harvest, Clarketon Community Garden, Clarketon, Edgecombe County. Photo by Willie Jamaal Wright

Reading Don’s Value and Worthlessness (hereafter VAW)has been one of the peak experiences of my intellectual life. VAW promises to become one of the key texts in the Marxist anthropology of the 21st century. It displays Don’s rigorous Marxist theorizing, his study of the history of capitalism, and an ethnographic epistemology grounded in dialectical moves from the concreteness of lives laboring under capitalism “up” to the abstractions of theory, and then back “down” to the concrete to illuminate these lives. All this Don boisterously juxtaposes with a series of cogent yet cranky and highly enjoyable polemics against David Graeber, Marcel Mauss, moral anthropology, ontological anthropology, and other anthropological culturalisms.

Theoretically, in VAW Don has set out key conceptual contributions to any present and future Marxist anthropology: the law of value, the dialectic of use value and exchange value, double devaluations, critical junctions, hidden histories, uneven and combined development, insidious capital, and value regimes; and ethnographically: flexible familism (Eindhoven), post-socialist “worthless Poles” (Wroclaw), and the “politics of leftovers” (Cluj). VAW is quite clearly a book audaciously put together from decades of keen and incisive Marxist theorizing, historical analysis, and long-term ethnographic research – all of it infused with Don’s compassion for working people.

Above all, reading VAW made explicit to me the realization that I had long left unexamined about the history of postwar capitalism: As Don puts it (Kalb 2025:55), “What if there is no outside to capital? What if we have to start from the assumption that the whole of social life and the planet has now been usurped by the rough rule of capital…?” Don’s devastating critique in VAW (Kalb 2025:3-12, 18-19, 40-58) of prefigurative idealist anarchism and David Graeber’s work puts paid to the idea that today anyone in the world is “outside capitalism.” Everyone alive today finds themselves in some relationship to it – the vast majority of people for the worse, entangled in its deleterious effects. Uneven proletarianization of an increasing majority of the world’s human population as “broadly working-class” (Kalb 2025:187-188) is now universal, including among global Northern academics.

How is Marxist ethnography Illuminated by the history of capitalism — and of social movements?

I have read with great interest the FocaalBlogtexts by Stefan Voicu, Jaume Franquesa, Sharryn Kasmir, and Ida Susser on VAW, as well as Don’s rejoinder. Don’s commentators all offer important insights, but I want to focus on the heated debate between Ida and Don. Ida argues that commoning, and the presence of organic intellectuals articulating a counter hegemony are characteristic signs of the emergence of a leftist movement in the case of the Yellow Vests. Don’s rejoinder trenchantly takes exception to Ida’s argument by arguing that these phenomena were also present within the rightwing neonationalist movements of CEE workers he has studied, and are thus not diagnostic of the left.

This contention between Ida and Don is consequential. Here Don deals a doubly unfair hand to Ida. First, while Don has the advantage of the retrospective comparative histories of post-1980s CEE workers’ movements allowing him over time (1997-2007; Kalb 2025:73) to draw his brilliant inferences about how double devaluation is connected to the emergence of right wing movements; Ida in her very recent ethnography of the Yellow Vests (Susser 2026), whose history still remains largely “hidden,” has no such retrospective to draw on. Second, unlike the two decades post-socialist period that Don studied, Ida’s fieldwork on the Yellow Vests comes out of the recent accelerated political instabilities of the interregnum’s Polanyian counter movements on the left and right in the 2020s. Ida’s findings are necessarily provisional. That said, Ida argues cogently from her ethnography that the processes of Yellow Vests’ commoning and solidarity building combined with the efforts of its organic intellectuals show the attempt to build a leftist counter hegemony against the savage abuses of the French neoliberal state. Although the outcome is as yet unclear, Ida persuasively shows that what we see so far is that the Yellow Vests have turned to the left. Her assessment deserves our respectful attention.

Also worthy of respect is Ida’s discussion of counterhegemonic ideology by organic intellectuals who can be instrumental in forming leftist social movements. Such an ideology when combined with workers’ material resources can limit the effects of double devaluations (Kalb 2025: 29) in generating a turn to the right. These resources include workers’ labor power outside the wage-labor relation; income streams such as pensions and state transfer payments (e.g. for food, health care); knowledges, skills, tools, machines, land, etc. for collective provisioning; and the aid and assistance of allies, including agencies of the liberal state. Counterhegemonic ideologies that draw on collective histories (e.g., “Black Lives Matter,” “resisting fascism”) can armor workers against the individualism and isolating humiliations crucial to their devaluation (e.g., “you’re not productive, you deserve to be fired,” “you’re worthless”). I present one such example below. What is now needed in my view is open-minded critical discussion about leftist social movements in formation – generously framed between comrades.

The Use Value of Workers’ Labor Power: For Whom?

Like any masterpiece, VAW invites the reader to ask questions which the author has pointed to but not followed up on. In any event, reading VAW has helped this reader refine them. Don’s work (Kalb and Mollona 2018:1-29; Kalb 2024) makes clear his deep commitment to the analysis and critical support of the “urban insurrections” of 2011, more recent ones, and ones on their way, and more broadly to understanding the conditions that make them possible. What are these conditions, from whence do they arise, and what are their implications for research? In this context, I’d like to look briefly at what my book (Nonini and Holland 2024) and others (e.g. Susser 2026) might have to say about one of his least developed, even neglected, topics.

This is the use value of labor power exerted by the broadly defined working classes, but not as Karl Marx in Capital v.1 and Don in VAW refer to it – the use value of the labor power of workers for the capitalist in the process of appropriating surplus value – but instead the use value of waged and unwaged workers’ labor power for themselves and for those on whom they depend and who depend in turn on them in what Don refers to as the “biographical” process of social reproduction. Lebowitz (2003: 145) points to workers’ “’absolutely necessary’” private labor “outside the sphere of capital,” i.e., outside the domain of the wage-labor relation and its appropriation of surplus value – so in this sense “beyond capital.”

Let’s put this in the context of the current conjuncture. In a recent article Don (Kalb 2024: 3) has pointed to “traces of reversal” in the 2020s of labor’s losses under globalization and suggests that “a new cycle of labor may be in the offing.” This began surprisingly in the US “where unions have declined more than anywhere else”, but where schoolteachers, academics, and Hollywood writers in 2021 went successfully on strike, and then in 2023 United Auto Workers went out on strike against the Big Three auto manufacturers in “a militant labor mobilization the like of which have not been seen since the 1970s.” US labor’s actions initiated against Tesla in the US led to solidarity strikes against Tesla by Swedish, Danish and Norwegian trade unionists (Kalb 2024:3-4).

Will these manifestations of recent labor “unrest” consolidate into the emergence of a Polanyian counter movement on the left? If the labor activism of the 2020s is like periods in the past when leftist social movements have risen, we would expect this would be manifestly evident in ferocious organizing within labor unions and in antiracist, women’s, housing and environmental movements, extending labor’s power through strikes, consumer boycotts, and street and legal battles, and eventual capitalist concessions — in line with the law of value. But this will occur only to the extent that these shifts can draw on the collective resources of the broadly defined working class itself. Strikers on picket lines need meals prepared for them; families with workers on strike require child and elder care, etc.

I submit that these collective resources are being brought together (in part) through a shift in how workers act in very material ways to show they “value” the use value of their own labor power not only by denying it to the capitalist in the sphere of production, but also by expanding its uses within the social reproduction of everyday life toward collective, militant and disruptive ends. Neither working people nor their labor power are mere “objects” of capital. As Marx (1976:283) pointed out, in the course of class struggle over time, the worker “acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.” In doing so workers develop new needs that capital produces but cannot satisfy (e.g., higher wages, healthy air, clean water, adequate housing, nutritional food) (Lebowitz 2003: 178-189).

It is in this sphere of social reproduction that we can look for shifts in how workers labor to care for one another, organize collectively, make and sustain commons, find ways of defining and manifesting new needs and new kinds of collective consumption, and undertake the self- and collective-production and use of (petty) surplus. These can buttress a successful counterattack by the broad working-class on capital.

But many workers may not do some or any of these things. There are no guarantees. Their responses to declining capitalist hegemony in the US may be destructive, individualist, or racist, xenophobic, or even draw some to Trumpist neonationalism (Nonini 2026). As politically committed scholars, we need to understand what “works” and what doesn’t under these conditions.

Working people in the southern US have adapted their living labor outside the wage-labor relation to building their collective capacities and meeting their collective needs to resist capitalist attacks. In the US South, where anti-labor laws prevail, these collective actions of resistance have emerged from churches, antiracist and women’s organizations.

Commons, Needs, Consumption, and Petty Surplus in Rural Eastern North Carolina

Let me be more specific with a brief example from my recent book, Food Activism Today: Sustainability, Climate Change, and Social Justice (Nonini and Holland 2024). The book came out of a collaborative research project set in four different sites in North Carolina during 2009-2011. One of the sites was located in a three-county area within what is called the Black Belt of eastern coastal North Carolina.

In 2009, the few hundred residents of Clarketon, Edgecombe County, were African-Americans, descendants of slaves. Clarketon’s adults were dirt-poor, and owned little property if any other than a few acres of farmland. Other than undertaking very small-scale farming, they either labored in a nearby poultry processing plant or were otherwise unwaged/unemployed, retired or disabled. Within the three counties of the extended field site, they were surrounded by a hostile patchwork of large white-owned “commodity farms,” dotted by small towns each controlled by a very few white corporate managers, local business proprietors and landowners. These towns were situated on a landscape defaced by six prisons holding at least 2,000 prisoners, including a prison centered on a large 3,500 acre prison farm that grew and processed poultry and food crops, and another prison with two “Correction Enterprise” industrial plants producing optical products and printed documents. Both prisons’ industries depended on “convicts”’ expropriated labor power to produce commodities – and expropriated excess surplus value (Ibid., 260-263, 278).

Older adults of Clarketon still had memories of local whites violently attacking them as high schoolers in the 1960s that ended Jim Crow and school segregation. Above all, they said, they feared for “the youth,” their teenage and older children, who faced the dire prospect of being hirable only as low-end minimum-wage service workers in the fast food industry, of joining “gangs,” or being incarcerated in the same prisons that confined many siblings and elder relatives (Ibid.).

The center of residents’ social, religious and working lives outside of wage labor was the Clarketon Baptist Chapel Church and its Garden, both overseen by Reverend Richard Hemmings. The garden consisted of more than 11 acres of land donated by a parishioner of the church, and cultivated by its youth. “The Rev” (Hemmings) brought together a staff consisting of a garden manager, a beekeeper, a tractor mechanic and several retirees as volunteers to carry out a major objective of the church and its garden. This was to teach 15 to 20 Clarketon youth not only how to cultivate the garden and grow crops, but also how to distribute the produce they grew – to provide themselves with produce they could sell for income at a local farmers market to save money earned for their college costs – thus creating surplus for their own use – or keep as food which they could give to their own families to consume, or donate gratis to poorer disabled and retired residents, who were otherwise deficient in food. In doing so, the Rev was teaching youth (and garden staff) a key lesson: it was imperative that food production and distribution be done collectively and be based on solidarity with other Clarketon residents –other youth, elders, family members, and neighbors – through the making of a commons around farmland, collective labor and food production, while also shifting how they thought and acted with respect to their needs and consumption (Ibid., 262-277). As “the Rev” put it about consumption, “you gotta maximize your food, as you gotta cook your own food. You’re not gonna come out of poverty buying [fast food from your] spending money” (Ibid., 266).

Through these simultaneously social and material aspects of food provisioning the Rev taught the youth to develop their own their labor power to achieve the collective goal of contributing to the food security of Clarketon residents, while showing youth how to prepare and protect themselves as they grew older to engage an antagonistic white population who sought to harm them and deemed them worthless, disposable, criminal, and cut off from “society.”

The Rev contrasted this “’Afrocentric economy’” of co-responsibility and mutual support with a “’Eurocentric mindset… of less than, greater than… The struggle [between] the wealthy and the middle class and the poor.… I want to live where there are no classes. There are human beings. When money is the driving factor, then there is a lot of people excluded from the table. The job [i.e. wage labor and exploitation]. That’s how we get poor people’” (Ibid. 272). The Rev’s rejection of a “Eurocentric mindset” in favor of an “Afrocentric economy” is the articulation of a counterhegemonic ideology against US racial capitalism. The Rev is acting as an organic intellectual who connects the youth of Clarketon to one another and to the making of a commons and of community solidarity. In so doing, Rev Hemmings exemplifies the “blues epistemology” that Clyde Woods (1998: 29-39) observed operating among enclaved African-Americans in the rural southern US: the knowledge of a world where the African-American community was assailed on all sides by a hostile white majority, and the imperative in the face of such outside hostility to sustain the integrity of the ‘social dynamics’ of the Black community that suffered racial abuse” (ibid., 278).

Thinking Critically about the Use Value of Workers’ Labor Power

I conclude by turning to Don’s discussion of use values within the biographical processes of social reproduction. Don writes about the place of use-values within social reproduction in an insightful and even moving way – but in my view, too abstractly, ungrounded, and in need of more incisive elaboration toward movement building on the left:

“What we need to develop is an idea of use value as those material and immaterial values embedded in the standards, activities, sites, and essential relationships of our daily as well as long-term social reproduction. You can call them relational use values. We should look at this type of use value dynamically and perceptually. Biographies, collective and individual, are to a considerable extent about the production, reproduction, and indeed accumulation of use values within a shared commons… Accumulation of such relational use values is often experienced as a form of belonging [and]… encapsulates something like social ‘personhood.’ Use value, so conceived, is much of what moves us and what makes us move as we try to produce a life worth living” (Kalb 2025:28).

In the interest of dialogue, based on reflections from the Clarketon Garden project, I offer three provocations about Don’s characterization of use values and social reproduction.

First, it is imperative to distinguish the labors of social reproduction that “function” for capitalism (Weiss 2022) from those that do not (or primarily do not) when workers exert their labor power for their own autonomous practices of commons-making, sharing and care for others outside their time working for capital. An all too common functionalism that assumes that processes of social reproduction “function” only on behalf of capital is vastly different from Marx’s dialectical approach that insists on the two-sided examination of mutual interactions and reciprocal effects between phenomena (Ollman 1993: 31-38, 134-137).

Second, Don writes, we should look at use values within workers’ social reproduction “dynamically and perceptually.” Thus we must consider the use value of their own autonomous labor power within the simultaneous temporal registers of their biographies and the history of capitalism as working people not only transform the material world, but also themselves, leading them to have new needs – needs they become aware of, but that the violence of capitalist exploitation and expropriation denies them from satisfying.

Lastly, a major objective of Marxist-informed ethnography should be to carefully identify how working people respond to capitalist outrages by forming new solidarities among themselves as they collectively discover their new shared needs, learn how to consume together, make commons, and seek to produce surplus outside capitalist control by drawing on their own living labor in long-term projects that build the social movements of the left.


Don Nonini is Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His research interests include class and state formation in colonial and postcolonial Malaysia, and class and racial politics in the Southern U.S. He is currently working on a book on racial capitalism and its ecopolitics.


References

Kalb, D. and M. Mollona (2018). Worldwide mobilizations : Class struggles and urban commoning. New York: Berghahn Books

Kalb, D. (2024). “Tilly reversed? Another cycle of labor and socialism is possible.” International Labor and Working-Class History: 1–9.

Kalb, D. (2025). Value and worthlessness: The rise of the Populist right and other disruptions in the anthropology of capitalism. New York, Berghahn.

Lebowitz, M. (2003) Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class. (2nd ed.). Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marx, K. (1976). Capital : A critique of political economy (Volume 1), with an Introduction by Eugene Mandel, translated by Ben Fowkes. London and New York, Penguin Books.

Nonini, D. (2026). “The Trumpist movement: A class-based counterrevolution against those who would strand the assets of capital? In Backlash: The Global Rise of the Radical Right, D. Kalb and W. Bello, eds. London: Pluto Press, pp. 254-279.

Nonini, D. M. and D. Holland (2024). Food Activism Today: Sustainability, Climate Change, and Social Justice. New York: New York University Press.

Ollman, B. (1993). Dialectical Investigations. New York: Routledge.

Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.

Susser, I. (2026). The Yellow Vests and the Battle for Democracy Taking to the Streets of Paris in the 21st Century. New York: Routledge.

Weiss, H. (2022 ). “Social reproduction is the reproduction of capitalism.” Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 93: 105–111.

Woods, C. (1998). Development arrested: The blues and plantation power in the Mississippi Delta. London: Verso.


Cite as: Nonini, D. 2026. “How is Workers’ Labor Power “Inside” Yet “Beyond” Capital?” Focaalblog July 7. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/07/07/don-nonini-how-is-workers-labor-power-inside-yet-beyond-capital/