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Pablo Semán and Ariel Wilkis: Rebellion of the bastards: the rise of the extreme right in Argentina

The growth of extreme right-wing forces in the Argentine political process expresses the combination of global trends and specific trends associated with local political history. It also expresses the need to understand the embeddedness of these political preferences in the social experiences shaped by the generalized decline of the middle and popular classes, sedimented in a long cycle of forty years and currently intensified by the derivations of the pandemic and the leaps in annual inflation in 2017 and 2021 (in which it passed, respectively, from 25% to 50% per annum and from 50% to 100% per annum).


It is impossible to deny the correspondence with those right wing processes taking place in different world regions and countries (see Engelen, 2023; Henkel et al., 2019; Kalb, 2020; Pasieka, 2018). The longer-term trend that explains these triumphs is the complex and contradictory reconfiguration of economics and politics since the fall of the Berlin Wall, if we need an iconic date. The global dynamics of capitalism no longer just erode national democracy but have started to generate alternative proposals to re-establish social order on a national scale, underwritten by the cultural fragmentation and economic discontent produced by economic (neo)liberalization.

Image 1: A 2002 demonstration against the financial “Corralito” in La Plata, Argentina, photo by Barcex

The expressions of the extreme right represent a form of illiberalism claiming political institutions at the limits of democracy that would overcome the fragmentation of national units suffering from the international mobility of capital. The accumulation of unresolved problems is changing the social structure and the political process: the rising vulnerability of working classes leads to the abandonment of traditional parties. The result is radicalizing tendencies within the elites as well as the replacement of incumbent political elites with new ‘populist’ ones.

Capitalism and democracy have become divorced from each other. Now, the crisis of the national states and their political systems has finally become politically visible, in a deep and organic sense.

What happens in Argentina or Brazil, in this context, involves patterns that are different from  the dynamics of the northern hemisphere.  In the region there are no transnational institutional aggregations such as the European Union. In Europe, the EU is both a target and a moderator of the illiberal turns in Poland, Italy or Hungary. The supranational powers, without being totally determinant, tend to moderate the character and pace of political and economic reforms. A coup d’état like those that occurred in Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012) Bolivia (2019), or Brazil (2023) is highly improbable in Europe today.

This is due not only to a difference in the political regimes, but also to a socio-economic process that has been producing especially in South America a deep discontent among a very volatile electorate. In countries such as Brazil and Argentina, the transitions to democracy in the 1980s were accompanied by hyperinflation and external debt crises, followed by monetarist stabilization and exclusionary ‘modernization policies’ in the 1990s, followed by new compensatory policies in the 2000s. The overall result of these processes was transformation of social structures marked by the growth of inequality, the growth of economically fragile popular classes, and the polarization of the middle classes. The long cycle of social transformations in these countries has coexisted with short cycles such as the 2000s where an emerging “new” middle class experienced a social mobility. As a result, in countries such as Argentina and Brazil the states have less capacity to respond to growing popular demands, which themselves tend to be more urgent than in the global North.

Analysts have noted a rightward lurch in the political options available to Argentine voters in recent years. In the analysis, however, insufficient attention is given to the impact of the popular experience of high inflation: the constant tightening of belts, growing household debt, an inability to budget, a political tunnel vision focused exclusively on inflation, with great impact on the expectations for the future, which are  increasingly negative and desperate.

The pandemic triggered inflation in countries around the world that had experienced price stability for decades. In 2022, the war in Ukraine drove inflation even higher. The case of Argentina was exception: the country had been suffering from spiraling inflation for over a decade. After a relative drop in inflation in 2020, in which annual inflation reached 36.1%, Argentina suffered another year of high inflation (50.9%) in 2021 (INDEC, 2021). In 2022, it reached 94.8% for the year, leaving Argentina fifth on the ranking of countries with the highest inflation worldwide behind Venezuela (305.7%), Zimbabwe (244%), Lebanon (142%), and Sudan (102%) (Infobae, 2023). Local factors exacerbated the situation: a shortage of dollars (a historical problem magnified by the pandemic), the pressure from the IMF to address the fiscal deficit eliminating subsidies to public services and a monetary culture shaped by inflationary inertia contributed as well.

This inflationary dynamic intensifies the erosion of politics by multiplying the mismatch between social demands and state capacities. At this point it is necessary to underline the socio-political element that is part of the inflationary dynamics. The trade unions in the first Peronism (1946-1956), and the trade unions and social organizations in the later Peronism that was part of the “progressive wave” of the 2000s, have been the political agency of social and economic protections that guaranteed welfare levels for the working class. The flip side of these arrangements has been a lack of foreign exchange earnings (external restriction is the constant of the Argentine economy since the middle of the last century) to sustain them. Nor did the unions and social organizations have the necessary political strength to transform the performance of the economy. The scarcity of foreign exchange has turned the dollar price over time into the anchor of all prices in the economy without it being a dollarized economy in the strict sense of the term (Luzzi and Wilkis, 2023). The chronic devaluations of the Argentine peso – and the concomitant inflation – are the short term escape from the structural contradiction between strong working class forces on the one hand and an economic organization that hollows out their effective power at the same time.  

At the time of writing these notes and six months before the presidential elections, the libertarian candidate Javier Milei has a vote intention of around 20-25%. He is the main promoter of the dollarization of the Argentine economy. It is in this context that the rise of candidate Milei can be understood.  His position implies the rejection of “everything that is there” and its replacement by a utopian free competition that rewards the best without the parasitic intervention of the state. This program of denunciation channels towards the Right the multiple contemporary dissatisfactions. On the one hand, it is not clear at this stage of the electoral process that Milei will either triumph or just survive as a candidate. On the other hand, it is clear that he has extended the possibilities of political articulation so that other candidates, who perhaps have more potential, can follow his path. It reflects the popular exhaustion with inflation, relegating to a second place demands that used to occupy a central place in the public agenda, such as unemployment or insecurity. Dollarization continues and completes the exclusionary and polarizing dynamics of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. The promise of a stable currency is going to have a very high social cost.

The neo-liberal demands that after the 2001 crisis in Argentina had been left almost without an audience, are returning with a vengeance: dollarization is inevitably accompanied by demands for the privatization of institutions such as education and health care. They celebrate individual initiative and denounce the crisis of public services as of their own making. The mood of society towards the performance of the state – increasingly questioned before the pandemic, much more so by the end of it, and even more intensely after – is very favorable to the right wing libertarian privatizers: “si no me vas ayudar por lo menos no me molestes” (“if you are not going to help me, at least don’t bother me”). The promise of dollarization suits these sentiments. The U.S. dollar is a currency devoid of the arbitrariness of the Argentine state (and the governmental elite that commands it), a state that is perceived as guilty of disorganizing and worsening daily life through its inability to provide stability to the national peso. In a society in which people did the impossible to get through the long months of lockdown while weathering inflation, the pandemic left people with the distinct feeling that the state was coming up dramatically short. The controversial dynamics of an unknown virus affected the state and rendered it increasingly illegitimate. The pandemic, by damaging the civic bond of trust with the state, strengthened the anarcho-libertarian thesis.

Image 2: Javier Milei in 2014 at the World Economic Forum on Latina America in Panama City, photo by World Economic Forum

The pandemic and spiraling inflation are in Argentina intertwined processes in which sacrifice became a common currency. Argentine society emerged from the pandemic with an ideology that was family-oriented, anti-state, and anti-politics. More people had been convinced that government spending was the primary source of inflation, demanding in some cases extreme state cutbacks. The rise of right-leaning or extreme right options, the declining interest in politics, and a growing dissatisfaction with the political class all predate the pandemic and the high inflation, but the latter have profoundly accelerated existing trends.

The Right has renewed and sharpened its own repertoire of actions. During the last 12 years, a political consensus that established certain prohibitions began to be explicitly challenged: notes of racism, of vindication of the last military dictatorship, of macho vindictiveness in the face of gender agendas that many had believed to be in retreat are reborn with force in the public space. However, the growth of the Right is not only due to the ideological radicalism of some of its promoters, who have accumulated significant political capital to establish themselves as an autonomous force in relation to the mainstream right wing that governed in the period 2015-2019. That growth is also predicated on the weariness of the voters of the traditional parties (Left and Right).

Despite its cultural predominance, Peronism today in government has been losing since at least 2008 the battle for the interpretation of economic life in growing sectors of the population. A social majority, which includes part of the popular classes, identifies with its antipode in a dialectic in which the libertarian Right takes on a specific local meaning.

A great part of this electorate cannot be described as furious, pragmatic or reactive to all political positions equally. They want to improve economically, they believe in their own efforts, they demand order and market. And they do so less because of agreement with right-wing intellectuals and publicists than because of a long experience in which those right-wing ideas seem to become preferable.  There is an authoritarian liberalism which, following Richard Hoggart (1957), must be seen as a contemporary development of the subaltern classes. These, contrary to what the political elites expect, especially those of the left, embrace the Right. This is also a  reaction against the deference that the progressive forces have tried to impose on it, presuming moral superiority and capacity for leadership beyond the prosaic issues of everyday life.  Thus, the process in which inclusive consensus is dissolved clearly contains a popular reaction against the Left progressivism of the traditional Peronist leadership.

Politics in Argentina has a specific intensity that makes it more than a simple reflection of what is happening in the world. In the 1970s, few countries in the world took state terrorism as far as Argentina. In the 1980s, the trial of the defeated dictators became an exemplary case for human rights. In the 1990s, the intensity of the neoliberal experiment in the country was exceptional when compared to Brazil and Mexico in terms of the scope of privatizations and economic and financial openness. It is worth asking whether this right-wing emergence will not have the same exceptional intensity as its precedents. The antecedents are already in place.


Pablo Semán  is Professor at Universidad Nacional de San Martín and principal researcher at CONICET.

Ariel Wilkis is Professor and Dean at Escuela IDAES, Universidad de San Martín and  researcher at CONICET.


References

Engelen, Ewald 2023. “Another ‘populist’ shake-up in the Netherlands: the BBB revolt” Focaalblog 24 April. https://www.focaalblog.com/2023/04/24/ewald-engelen-another-populist-shake-up-in-the-netherlands-the-bbb-revolt/

Henkel, Heiko, Sindre Bangstad, and Bjørn Enge Bertelsen. 2019. “The politics of affect: Anthropological perspectives on the rise of far-right and right-wing populism in the West.” FocaalBlog, 14 March. http://www.focaalblog.com/2019/03/14/heiko-henkel-and-sindre-bangstad-the-politics-of-affect-anthropological-perspectives-on-the-rise-of-far-right-and-right-wing-populism-in-the-west/

Hoggart, Richard (1957) The uses of literacy: aspects of working-class life with special references to publications and entertainments. London: Chatto and Windus

INDEC (2021) “Índice Precio al Consumidor”, Vol. 6, No 1, december 2021

Infobae (2023) “La Argentina termino cuarta inflación del mundo”, 23 January 2023. https://www.infobae.com/economia/2023/01/13/la-argentina-termino-con-la-cuarta-inflacion-mas-alta-del-mundo-en-2022-detras-de-venezuela-zimbabue-y-libano/

Luzzi, Mariana and Wilkis, Ariel (2023) Dollar: How the U.S. Dollar Became a Popular Currency in Argentina (1930-2019). Alburqueque: New Mexico University Press.

Kalb, Don. 2020. “Covid, Crisis, and the Coming Contestations.” FocaalBlog, 1 June. http://www.focaalblog.com/2020/06/01/don-kalb-covid-crisis-and-the-coming-contestations/

Pasieka, Agnieszka. 2018. “Who is afraid of fascists? The Polish independence march and the rise of the (far?) right.” FocaalBlog, 12 December. www.focaalblog.com/2018/12/12/who-is-afraid-of-fascists-the-polish-independence-march-and-the-rise-of-the-far-right.


Cite as: Semán, Pablo and Wilkis, Ariel 2023. “Rebellion of the bastards: the rise of the extreme right in Argentina” Focaalblog May 11. https://www.focaalblog.com/2023/05/11/pablo-seman-and-ariel-wilkis-rebellion-of-the-bastards-the-rise-of-the-extreme-right-in-argentina