All posts by Focaal Web Editor

Beatrice Jauregui: Anxious Anticipations: Border-crossing In/security and the Implosion of the US-led Global Order

Image 1: Akwesasne territory. Source: Mohawk Council of Akwesasne

Born on US soil to citizen parents, I applied for my first passport at age 12, when my grandma took me with her to visit Italy and Greece for two weeks. My biggest concern then was packing my best clothes and how the passport picture unfortunately highlighted my crooked teeth and frizzy hair. Ten years later, I renewed the passport to make my second trip overseas, this time to go to India to do independent student research on a grant from my university. Imagine my awe and confusion when—thanks to a letter of introduction by an Indian government official whom I met through a professor—I was able to bypass the customs and immigration lines with a police escort at the airport in New Delhi and get my passport stamped without question in a back office before being shuttled into a gleaming white ambassador car to meet with a senior police officer. These early experiences crossing international borders were therefore smooth. They contrast dramatically with experiences shared by people who have long been Othered and constructed as suspect in various ways. Precisely this sensory experience has become more salient for me recently.

On an episode of The Chris Hedges Report podcast, Canadian writer Omar El Akkad talks about growing up with a “cultural survival kit” that (in large part) traces back to his witnessing a soldier interrogating his father at a checkpoint in Egypt. He says he is always anxious to go through airport border security, and points to how so many people more or less like him (i.e., brown skinned and/or naturalized citizens, with names indexing certain national or religious identities, perhaps with different accents to their spoken English) are “regularly dragged into secondary” inspection at US (or other) border crossings. El Akkad shares that this pervasive experience involves things like “pre-emptively preparing” for interactions with government agents “and trying to put them at ease” so as to suggest to them “don’t be scared” of me. He notes how over time he realized that it would behoove him to behave less “yes, sir, no sir” formally with border security officers, and instead act “more casual because that’s how people who are from here are behaving”. He remarks how only some feel “the cumulative effect” of how border securitization intersects with racism and other forms of discrimination. This is just one account of ways that marginalized peoples sense and embody insecurity at official border crossings globally through consciously altered comportment—never mind the millions who annually attempt to migrate unofficially or illegally, often risking or losing their lives.

I moved to Toronto for work over a decade ago and am now a dual citizen of both Canada and the US. Until recently, crossing between these countries felt easy, oiled by trusted traveler programs and historically friendly political economic relations. The only thing that ever “detained” me was a lonely border agent posted at a remote intersection of western Quebec/upstate New York, who was thinking of going back to school and wanted to chit-chat when he asked about my business and I told him about my scholarly research and teaching on police. He got an impromptu 20 minutes “office hours” session, and it was mildly endearing since that afternoon I was not in a rush while returning to Akwesasne from doing some fieldwork with members of their sister community in Kahnawà:ke, which is a Kanien’kehá:ke (Mohawk) territory near Tiohtià:ke (Montreal). The first time I felt significant anxiety about crossing this complex international boundary was a few days later, when I was informed by Canadian border agents that I could be fined thousands of dollars and my car seized because I had inadvertently not followed proper reporting procedures while conducting research in Akwesasne, a territory that straddles both the US-Canada border, and also the provincial border between Ontario and Quebec.

Akwesasne’ronon (the Kanien’ké:ha word for members of this Indigenous community) experience the insecurity, jurisdictional confusion, and exclusionary power of international border enforcement every day, since boundary lines zigzag irregularly through their land (Image 1). People joke about homes where the kitchen is in Canada and the living room is in the US, and relate far less amusing struggles over which problematic governing agreements dictate action on everything from commercial licenses to speeding tickets and the illegal trafficking of drugs, firearms, and human beings through the territory. As members of a sovereign First Nation recognized by both Canadian and US federal governments, Akwesasne’rono have special rights to move around their territory as needed without incident or incrimination. Unlike US or Canadian citizens—and with the exception of several designated crossings where there are special “express” lanes only accessible to Indigenous people with “native status” cards—Akwesasne’rono are not required to “check in” with officials when they traverse the border, not least since it would be impractical, often impossible to do so. But even people with all of their status documents in order have shared countless stories about being routinely questioned, detained, investigated, or otherwise inconvenienced—and reminded of their colonized Other-ness—by government agents on all sides. One community member with a status card even reported that he had to sit for several hours at a checkpoint one weekday after getting a medical X-ray, since agents detected radiation on him and classified it as suspicious and indicative of a potential security threat.

It is hardly news that even some of the most supposedly “friendly” and “porous” borders for some—especially persons privileged to have passports from globally powerful countries or other types of legitimating documentation—have long been places of anxiety, uncertainty, frustration, fear, paranoia, and terror for others, particularly people identified with groups facing prejudice and discrimination on the basis of indigeneity, nationality, race, religion, and other markers of cultural difference. Many in this latter category have become used to embodied experiences of sensing insecurity in a liminal space of exceptional, arbitrary, and mostly unchecked power meted out by state authority figures.

Recently however, and increasingly so, persons in the former (privileged) category, including myself, have begun sensing insecurity in borderlands as well. A stark case followed the re-election of Donald Trump as US President on a platform that included hard-line anti-immigrant and blatantly racist ideologies. Many have watched with horror as these ideologies play out in constant news streams about ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) raids leading to the kidnapping and deportation of thousands of people across the US. Simultaneously, there are many stories circulating more or less publicly about increasingly arbitrary allegations of “anti-Americanism” and “national security threats” suspicions against persons who express dissent against or negative evaluations of some of the regime’s destructive and incoherent policies.

There are now many news accounts of foreign nationals getting caught up in the US immigration-detention dragnet since the beginning of 2025, sometimes allegedly due to procedural errors or miscommunications. Governments, NGOs, universities, business corporations, and others have been issuing travel warnings to their constituents, advising on how to respond to increased surveillance, search and seizure of electronic devices, denial of entry, and possible detention depending on one’s citizenship status. Stories have been circulating about people having their passports marked with a five-year ban from entering the US simply for being critical of the Trump regime. All of this is of course alarming for millions of people who have any sort of relationship with or reason to travel to the US. And it has dramatically shifted my own sense of in/security, even as someone with all of the (supposed) rights of US citizenship, and the privileges associated with being a well-educated descendent of white European settlers with no criminal record. Before traveling to the US, I now always anticipate interrogation. I carefully review the content of all of my devices; rehearse what I might say if questioned; and even give my children instructions on what (not) to say and do when we travel together. I have never been so anxious when passing through Canada-US border checkpoints, sometimes to the point of feeling physically ill, or unable to eat, bordering on panic attacks, even though I know “rationally” that I have done nothing wrong or anything that should warrant increased scrutiny or sanction.

My exponential increase in anxiety around crossing into the US is not simply speculative paranoia based on distant doomster social media stories and second-hand rumors. It emerges out of two specific circumstances related to expressed recognition of state violence. Foremost is a history of speaking out against occupation, apartheid, and genocide in Palestine/Israel (Bangstad 2025), to the extent that I have been profiled alongside thousands of others on the defamatory Canary Mission website with false charges of being antisemitic and pro-Hamas, and of allegedly supporting “terrorism”. I have viewed documented evidence of persons listed on this untrustworthy propaganda website being interrogated about it explicitly in secondary inspections at the US border; and in some cases, if someone was not a US citizen, they were reportedly banned and denied entry to the US. This is part of a larger pattern of the current US government’s weaponization of antisemitism as a smoke screen to try to bring universities and other institutions to heel with threats of rescinding of federal funding, canceling of work and study visas, and banning international student admissions as punishments or “warnings” for not falling in line with regime policies or allowing open protest of war crimes and atrocities. I admit to feeling afraid even now as I write this, and hope this will not cause harm in the future.

The other key factor that has amplified my sense of anticipatory insecurity about border crossings more generally relates back to my decades of research in India on police and security infrastructure. After some critical comments I made in independent media about harmful discriminatory policies and practices of the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) government that has now been in power there for more than a decade, representatives from the Indian consulate came to my house in Toronto and issued me a “show cause notice”, criminalizing me for alleged “anti-national” activities that violate “the sovereignty and integrity of India”, and accusing me of “clandestine activities” in relation to my research. The charges are as absurd as they are baseless, and a Delhi-based lawyer has done their best to set me up well to fight these allegations in court as needed. But the government’s strategy of harassment and intimidation has compelled me to self-censor. While I still write candidly in scholarly sources about my research, I am more hesitant to respond to inquiries from journalists requesting comments on politically sensitive matters. And while many friends and colleagues already know about this old “news” of my essentially being blacklisted from a place I have considered another home for decades, this is the first time that I’m sharing it publicly in writing, more than three years after state officials first darkened my doorstep. Meanwhile, I have not attempted to return to India, even though I technically still have what is known as OCI (Overseas Citizenship of India) status. I have read and heard about many stories of other persons with this status having their cards revoked, and I fear arriving at that airport—where, recall, I was once able to bypass the long lines of foreign passport holders even though I had never before set foot in the country—only to be deported immediately, like other colleagues who have been unfortunately caught up in the Indian government’s dragnet of nationalistic hyper-securitization.

This is how state harassment and repression of dissent have always worked, of course; through instilling generalized suspicion along ideological divides, engendering amorphous anxiety that accumulates like moss, and shapeshifts into intensified fear and paranoia that spreads like a contagion. Rapidly changing technological capacities aside, most of the routine and exceptional tactics, strategies, and outcomes of potential and actual state violence are not new. But their sensory impact on new populations, and in relation to US power specifically, indicates substantive and seismic shifts. One key feature of these shifts is the increasingly blurry “border” between a palpable fear of mere “inconvenience” (perhaps I’ll miss a flight, or my phone will be seized at the border and I won’t ever get it back) versus the probability of a seriously harmful impact on peoples’ lives (perhaps I’ll be detained indefinitely, or they’ll do a full forensic image of my seized device that will lead to serious legal or financial complications, never mind the violations of privacy). Scaling up and out, it also seems that we are witnessing significant realignments and sea changes in the global order of political economic power, heretofore dominated by the US through what some have called “empire” in the post 1945-era.

Returning to El Akkad’s reflections, he acknowledges that as someone with the privilege of Canadian citizenship, his border-crossing fears have been, if not “silly” (his word), then still mostly about trying to ensure “as few headaches as possible” and to prevent the potential hassle of losing time, money, or equipment. For me as a dual citizen, I would like to continue to feel that the worst I might suffer at the Canada-US border is a short period of detention until I could obtain legal representation. But there is a growing sense that what appears to be intensified and unpredictable border interrogations of anyone and everyone—not just the “usual suspects”, which of course has always been “unjust”—may only get worse, and that the “normal” national and international legal protections may not hold, such that even citizens who don’t protest too much may be subject to extraordinary rendition. It feels like I now know more people than not who express some version of this fear on a regular basis, and especially in the lead up to a trip crossing the US border—or in a decision to avoid going to the US altogether, which also now seems far more common. The boundary between nuisance and violence has become more than a little insecure.

The (again) not new or unique, and yet intensified and arguably more-prevalent-than-ever, sense of insecurity around crossing borders into the US is also indicative of concerns well beyond just mobility and migration. It indexes the decline and fall of political economic forms and cultural ways of life that many people, including some of the wealthiest and heretofore well-protected and well-served by the US-led global order, have long enjoyed and don’t want to let go. Among other touchstones of security, it seems that US-based global and national governing institutions, free speech, legal and regulatory bodies, human and civil rights, social services, educational opportunities, and trust in mediated knowledge production are disintegrating across the board. Many try to go on as before, hoping for a savior in litigation, legislation, or perhaps a new leader, assuming the next US national election occurs on schedule. This mass tendency to “keep calm and carry on” seems to have a deeper sensory structure than mere maintenance of morale in the face of widespread and ongoing degeneration. Perhaps it exhibits something more akin to what Alexei Yurchak (2005) has called “hypernormalization” in the context of the end of Soviet Russia, wherein people expressed a strong sense that things would always continue as they had, even as their world was falling apart around them. I cannot predict with any precision the long-term or even immediate future of the US-led Global Order. But the fluctuations and increasing sense of creeping dread and acute terror that I now feel every time I approach the border of the country of my birth signify the insecurity, if not the complete implosion, of so much that so many of us have always thought to be true and trusted.


Beatrice Jauregui is Associate Professor at the University of Toronto Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies. She is author of Provisional Authority: Police, Order, and Security in India and co-editor of the Sage Handbook of Global Policing and Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency.  


References

Bangstad, Sindre 2025. “The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism and Academic Freedom” Focaalblog 28 March, https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/03/28/sindre-bangstad-the-ihra-working-definition-of-antisemitism-and-academic-freedom/

Yurchak, Alexei. 2005. Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More. The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton University Press.


Cite as: Jauregui, B. 2025. “Anxious Anticipations: Border-crossing In/security and the Implosion of the US-led Global Order” Focaalblog December 22. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/12/22/beatrice-jauregui-anxious-anticipations-border-crossing-in-security-and-the-implosion-of-the-us-led-global-order/

Jolien van Veen: Atmospheric Security in Rio de Janeiro

Image 1: Exú Tranca Rua (left) and Maria Padilha das 7 Encruzilhadas (right) depicted on the walls of the center. Photo by author.

When I started fieldwork in neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro’s North zone in December 2021, the first thing my Brazilian friends told me was to be very careful. The area where I was based was notorious for its high number of armed robberies and for its proximity to a cluster of favelas. Shortly before my arrival in Brazil, the drug trafficking group that effectively controlled the favelas had expanded its territory by blocking roads and installing armed checkpoints at various street corners across the neighborhoods. The local leader (dono) of the group, who identified as a Pentecostal Christian, was accused of orchestrating disappearances, homicides, and extortions, and of destroying temples dedicated to Afro-Brazilian religious practices.

It was against this backdrop of violent events that I conducted an interview with Catarina, a frequent visitor of a local Umbanda center. Umbanda is an Afro-Brazilian religion that contains influences from Roman Catholicism, West-African religious traditions, indigenous beliefs, and Kardecist spiritism. In Umbanda, spiritual guides provide guidance and support on matters of health, money, love, and wellbeing. Catarina lived with her teenage daughter in a commercial district some 15 minutes away from the center, outside the zone of influence of the drug trafficking gang. As we sat in the patio of the center, shaded by the trees that surrounded the open space in front of the terreiro (indoor place of worship), I asked Catarina whether she hadn’t considered visiting a center located closer to her home in an area that was considered less dangerous. She responded the following:

There is a center close to me, which I visit sometimes, but I am not from that center. And I feel very much at peace here. Inside here, it doesn’t feel like I am in this particular neighborhood. It is as if a microclimate (microclima) was created inside here, with the trees and all that. Even if it takes forever for the sessions to start. If you arrive all worked up, inside here you are able to relax, think about life. And thank God, nothing has ever happened to us here. I think that is our protection (é proteção mesmo). Protection that the center gives, which the spirits (entidades) from here give until we arrive at our house. Because nothing ever happened when we left here. While everything is deserted, everything is black.

I was intrigued by Catarina’s attention to the atmospheric qualities of protection. Like other Umbanda practitioners whom I spoke to, Catarina spoke about the protection offered by the center as a material and embodied reality where the dangers of the street were temporarily kept at bay. This is a material and embodied reality that emerges through a series of ritual practices that involve an interplay between objects, bodies, and spirit entities, amongst other things. I offer two examples to illustrate the interplay between these different materialities inside the center.

Champagne and cigarettes

The largest altar in the Umbanda center was dedicated to a group of spirits known collectively as the spirits of the streets (povo da rua). It was located inside a separate building in the courtyard, closed off with an opaque door. The outside wall depicted a large mural painting of the Exú Tranca Rua, protector of the terreiros, and the pomba-gira Maria Padilha das 7 Encruzilhadas, guardian of love, protection, and courage (Image 1). Both figures play an important role in the center as they are called upon to cleanse the center from negative energies (limpar), to open new ways of thinking and being (abrir caminhos) and to shield practitioners from harm (proteger). Because of their ability to protect, the povo da rua are also referred to as guardian spirits (guardiões).

Different from other kinds of spirits, who emphasize benevolence and humility, the povo da rua embody sensuality as well as force. When they incorporate the bodies of the spirit mediums, they dance, smoke, drink, and flirt. To outsiders, the spirits’ human appetites are sometimes mistaken for sinful behavior and for provoking “bad things” (fazer mal). But for my interlocutors, “exú only does good things” (faz bem).

Inside the altar of the povo, a faint red light revealed a row of thirteen statues, representing particular spirits worshipped in the center. Twice a year, the povo receive an extensive offering (oferenda) from the spirit mediums to request guidance and protection for themselves or on behalf of a friend or a family member.

The offerings that I witnessed followed a specific order and were carried out individually. First, a big plate filled with tropical fruits was brought to the altar. The medium then took a pull of a cigarette to appease thefemale spirits. The remaining packet of cigarettes was placed alongside the plate of fruits on the altar. Next, the medium filled a glass of champagne. After taking a sip of the glass, the glass was also placed in front of the statues. To appease the male spirits, the medium took a pull of a cigar and exhaled in the shape of a circle. He or she then filled a glass of cachaça (white rum), took a sip, and placed it on the altar. In the final step, the spirit medium placed a handful of coins in a clay bowl. One of the coins was used to slowly move it over the body, starting with arms crossed, and then directing the coin over the head, knees, legs, and under one of the feet.

The individual offerings were complemented by the traditional food offering for exús, prepared in the small on-site kitchen: a big bowl of toasted manioc flour prepared in Dendê oil, filled with red chili peppers. Softly burning candles and vases filled with red roses and small white flowers were tucked in between the offerings (Image 2). According to the mediums, each of the items placed on the altar to feed the spirits absorbs the spirits’ capacity to cleanse and protect and contributes to the circulation of positive energy and spiritual force inside the center.

The process of preparing the offerings and placing them inside the altar took several hours. After about two weeks, once the offerings were received and “eaten” by the spirits, they were removed from the altar. The rotten fruits were discarded, and the ones that were still edible were taken back home. The flowers, cigarettes, candles, and manioc flower were dispatched near one of the city’s highway intersections, to serve those who wander through the city.

According to Zezé, one of the mediums who works at the center, the offerings to the spirits were not made in vain. When I spoke to him in an interview, he said the following:

The guardian spirits protect those who have faith. Up until today, inside here nothing bad has ever happened, while in the meantime a lot of bad things have happened outside. We’ve had cases where violence happened outside of the gate, shots were being fired, but not even the bullet shells made it in here. That, to me, is proof that this is a protected place.

Zezé’s words echoed those of Catarina. Despite the dangers that surrounded the center, in the comforting presence of the povo da rua, no bullets would pierce the center’s walls.

Image 2: Offerings for the povo da rua. Photo by author.

The swords of Ogum

Besides offerings to the spirits, mediums also channeled spiritual energy through incorporation sessions (giras). One of the sessions I attended at the center was dedicated to Ogum, an orixá associated with strength, courage, and battle. Inspired by African deities, orixás are at the top of the spiritual hierarchy in Umbanda. The session for Ogum was held in the indoor space adjacent to the courtyard where all the spirit incorporations took place. The entire room was painted light blue. Walls were covered with paintings, photos of mediums and visitors, and small spirit altars. A small sign right behind the door read “negative energies prohibited.”

Just like the other sessions, the session for Ogum started with a short prayer followed by drumming. The repetitive drum rhythm worked to induce a trance-like state amongst the mediums and the visitors. One by one, the spirits announced themselves through the bodies of the mediums, which were slowly moving towards the center of the room, with one leg lagging the other and their index fingers pointed out. Their reception was welcomed by the audience, whose clapping and singing grew louder as more spirits descended onto the room:

Eu tenho sete espadas pra me defenderI have seven swords to defend myself
Eu tenho Ogum em minha companhiaI have Ogum in my company
Eu tenho sete espadas pra me defenderI have seven swords to defend myself
Eu tenho Ogum em minha companhiaI have Ogum in my company
Ogum é meu paiOgum is my father
Ogum é meu guiaOgum is my guide
Ogum é meu paiOgum is my father
Na fé de ZambiIn the name of Zambi (the Creator)
E da Virgem MariaAnd the Virgin Mary

By the time Ogum finally announced his presence through the body of a medium it was already close to midnight. A spiritual caretaker guided Ogum to a room in the back of the building to prepare his costume. In the meantime, the other spirit mediums took a single leaf each from the sansevieria plant in the front of the room. A few moments later, Ogum re-entered the room with the air of a dignified man, wearing a red cape, a sword, and a knight’s helmet adorned with a red feather. The other mediums held up their leaves in the air and formed an arch (image 3). Carefully, Ogum was led under the arch and made his way to the front of the altar, where he greeted the mediums and the visitors with an embrace.

Towards the end of the session, the mediums handed each of the visitors one of the leaves to take back home and place it in front of their house. The “swords”, I was told, were considered as an extension of the protective power of Ogum cultivated during the session and served to protect the house from negative energies and to attract prosperity (prosperidade).

Image 3: The swords of Ogum. Photo by author.

Reflections

There is no shortage of people seeking protection and guidance in Brazilian cities, which statistics show are among the most violent on earth. Trapped between militias, drug trafficking groups, and the state, urban residents cultivate spaces where they feel safe, comfortable, and cared for. These spaces of security and comfort are rarely secular. They are inhabited by a range of otherworldly entities who are called upon to protect and to heal (see also Amoruso 2025. Willis 2024), including Afro-Brazilian spirits.

I have illustrated how Afro-Brazilian spirits and the mediums who incorporate them engage in affective relationships that contribute to a sacred, intimate space shielded from the dangers of the street. Each of the objects placed within the center takes part in this affective relationship in different ways: not merely in a symbolic manner, but by absorbing and circulating the spirit’s powers to cleanse, heal, and protect. The champagne and cigarettes on the altar dedicated to the guardian spirits become charged with spiritual powers, while the swords of Ogum, represented by the sansevieria leaves, become an extension of the protective power of the orixá.

My analysis moves from an understanding of security as something that is produced on the level of the state towards an understanding of security as something that is lived and felt in everyday interactions (see also Ghertner, McFann & Goldstein 2020: 3). Moreover, like Anderson (2009), I draw attention to the atmospheric quality of security as an affect that emerges between objects, bodies, and spaces. For ethnographers, it is essential to do justice to the ways in which the senses shape our everyday experiences and ontological realities.


Jolien van Veen is a PhD researcher at the department of Cultural Anthropology at Utrecht University. Her PhD is part of the ERC-funded project “Sacralizing Security: Religion, Violence and Authority in Mega-Cities of the Global South”. She has published in City & Society and the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies.


References

Amoruso, Michael. 2025. Moved by the Dead: Haunting and Devotion in São Paulo, Brazil. University of North Carolina Press.

Anderson, Ben. 2009. “Affective Atmospheres”. Emotion, Space and Society 2: 77-81. DOI:10.1016/j.emospa.2009.08.005

Ghertner, D. Asher, Hudson McFann, and Daniel M. Goldstein, 2020. Futureproof: Security Aesthetics and the Management of Life. Duke University Press.

Willis, Laurie Denyer. 2023. Go With God: Political Exhaustion and Evangelical Possibility in Suburban Brazil. University of California Press.


Cite as: Veen, Jolien van 2025. “Atmospheric Security in Rio de Janeiro” Focaalblog December 22. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/12/22/jolien-van-veen-atmospheric-security-in-rio-de-janeiro/

Tessa Diphoorn and Tomas Salem: Introduction: Sensing (In)Security. New Materialism and The Politics of Security

Image 1: Military police officer patrolling in Mangueira, Brazil. Photo by Tomas Salem

Palm Springs, mid-September 2025. The American flag flies at half-staff across the city in honour of Charlie Krik, right-wing political activist and Trump supporter who was shot and killed in Utah at the beginning of the month.

While gun violence is not foreign to Americans, the assassination of Kirk is met with shock, anger, and disbelief by many, but also with glee and a sense of divine justice by others, as Kirk ardently opposed gun control policies across his social media platforms, including his wildly popular podcast show.

In Palm Springs’ affluent middle-class neighbourhoods, a young couple working in the local art industry is quick to note the irony. They are not Trump supporters and politically far from the far-right, but like many Americans, they own guns which they use both for protection and play.

When a stranger passes out on the sidewalk in front of their home, smelling alcohol and old sweat, the guns offer a sense of security, and are carried as a precautionary measure. While the couple have sympathy for the man and his obvious suffering, they emphasise that this is a family neighbourhood. The kids that live here should not be exposed to these scenes.

As the young couple debates how to address the situation, a neighbour pulls up in a big, white pick-up truck. He wears a spotless, white polo shirt with SECURITY embroidered on the chest and carries a gun on his hip. Taking charge of the situation, he calls the police, who soon arrive to detain the man sleeping on the street corner.

The neighbours chat while they wait for the officers to arrive, and the security man explains that he lives a few houses down the road, that he is a former marine and police officer, and that he likes to keep his neighbourhood safe. The man is friendly and polite, and offers his number to the young couple, should they ever need assistance.

And indeed, they soon do: their roommate is a former substance addict and apparently, as the couple eventually speculate, also a practitioner of some sort of black magic. When he is asked not to treat himself to the soda cans that are in the fridge, he spirals into an escalating episode of rage.

He yells at them to fuck off at the top of his lungs, his anger reverberating through the home. “I have never felt so disrespected in my life,” Rob, the male half of the couple asserts. Over the next days and weeks, tension between the couple and the roommate builds as they try to evict him. “Oh yes, we all own guns,” Rob dryly notes when asked if the evicted roommate is armed.

Eventually, after weeks of emotional distress, they call on their security neighbour to negotiate the conditions of the roommates’ eviction. They commended his professional and calm demeanour. Their impression of the vigilante has changed from scepticism to trust. They feel safer that he is around, and prefer his assistance to that of the police—at least on this occasion.

As they clean out their old roommate’s room, they find bone fragments, human teeth, and a doll that they describe as having an unsettling energy. They burn the teeth in their yard and cleanse the room with sage and incense.

The scenes from contemporary US, observed by Tomas Salem, show how sensations of (in)security are perceived, constructed, and negotiated through a set of materialities that include guns, social media, unsettling bodies, national symbols, mind-altering substances, and ontologically ambiguous objects, as well as perceived energies, political pundits, and the institutions and agencies usually associated with the provision of security.

Some of these elements, such as guns, are commonly linked to the field of security and evoke strong emotions, reactions, and opinions.

Firearms are habitually subjected to processes of political polarisation and simultaneously perceived as elements of risk or guarantors of safety. Similarly, unsettling bodies—the drunk, the migrant, the racialised, or the emotionally volatile—also shape feelings of (un)safety and fear. Additionally, ontological assumptions about the life of objects can produce feelings of anxiety, restlessness, or insecurity, or they can calm such feelings.

Over the past decade, scholars and artists alike have begun to rethink security not just as a set of institutions or policies, but as something deeply felt, material, and sensory. From drone surveillance to facial recognition, from border fences to biometric databases, security today is not only managed through laws and strategies; it is experienced through bodies, affects, and technologies. The hum of a CCTV camera, the buzz of a phone alert, or the tension in a checkpoint queue all contribute to how security takes shape in everyday life.

In this series, we place the sensorial at the forefront of anthropological inquiry into everyday practices and understandings of (in)security.

What does it mean to sense security? Anthropologists working with ideas from new materialism and posthumanist thought have helped push this conversation forward. Rather than seeing humans as the only actors in our analysis of security, these perspectives draw attention to the agency of things and examine how technologies, infrastructures, and environments participate in producing (in)security.

The concept of sensing here works in multiple directions: humans sense danger or safety, but sensors, algorithms, and data infrastructures also “sense” the world, classifying and responding in ways that shape our collective experience. Security becomes not just something we enforce or feel, but something co-produced by human and nonhuman actors alike.

New materialist approaches remind us that sensing is never neutral. The technologies that claim to detect threat or measure risk often reproduce the same racialized and colonial hierarchies that have long structured the security field.

In this sense, studying sensing and materiality is also about uncovering how inequalities are embedded in the very textures of security, in codes, in infrastructures, and in atmospheres.

In this feature, we are interested in better understanding how embodied emotional registers are manipulated in political projects, especially those responding to widespread anxieties about the future. To sense (in)security is to inhabit a world where matter, technology, and emotion converge.

Which lives and movements are rendered visible, and which remain unseen? How do certain bodies become “suspicious” in the eyes of a security guard, vigilante neighbour, or algorithm?

By focusing on the sensorial as the locus of interplay between materiality and experience, and thus, of our ontology or perception of reality, the contributions reveal the nuanced dialectics of security and insecurity in contemporary life.

Key to this exploration are the ways in which bodies, objects, and technologies, from algorithms to uniforms and weapons, shape sensations of (in)security. We are interested in analysing how a sensorial approach that foregrounds sensorial understandings and interpretations provides in-depth analysis of how feelings of (in)security are experienced and translated.

This feature also underlines how anthropology offers a distinctive way to engage with these questions.

Ethnography brings us close to the affective atmospheres and sensory details of security worlds, including the fear, boredom, adrenaline, anticipation, or unease that circulate between people, technologies, and spaces. Thinking of security through sensing thus invites us to move beyond abstract notions of protection or control, and instead to ask how security feels, where it resides, and how it takes shape through the material world around us.

By zooming in on the often-invisible ways in which the sensorial is securitized, the diverse case studies that constitute this collection reveal how political orders and normative frameworks mobilize the senses to maintain control.

Like the scenes we observed in the United States, the essays in this feature trace how the sensory is mobilized to maintain, and sometimes subvert, orders of control across settings as diverse as the US border, Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, Rome’s Roma camps, Mozambique’s political protests, and Denmark’s urban margins.

Through its diverse cases, this feature emphasizes that security is not only a set of practices but a mode of perception. To sense (in)security means to rethink how we study security, and how we feel it as citizens and anthropologists.


Tessa Diphoorn is an Associate Professor at the Department of Cultural Anthropology at Utrecht University, and her research and teaching focus on policing, security, violence, and authority in Kenya and South Africa. She is the author of Twilight Policing. Private Security and Violence in Urban South Africa (University of California Press, 2016)the co-editor of the edited volume, Security Blurs: The Politics of Plural Security Provision (Routledge, 2019), and the co-curator of Nairobi Becoming: Security, Certainty, and Contingency (Punctum Books, 2024).

Tomas Salem is a social anthropologist who completed his PhD research on happiness, environmental ethics, and tourism at the University of Bergen. He is also the author of Policing the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: Cosmologies of War and The Far-Right (Palgrave 2024). 


Cite as: Diphoorn, T. & Salem, T. 2025. “Sensing (In)Security. New materialism and The Politics of Security” Focaalblog December 22. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/12/22/tessa-diphoorn-and-tomas-salem-introduction-sensing-insecurity-new-materialism-and-the-politics-of-security/

Oane Visser: COP30 and the shifting spaces for food movements at global summits

Image 1: The president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with COP30 mascot, Curupira. Photo by Ricardo Stuckert

This year, COP30 took place in Brazil. Unlike last year’s COP29 in Azerbaijan, this one aimed to be an inclusive climate summit. The Brazilian COP organizers explicitly welcomed activists, while a large people’s summit was also unfolding simultaneously. Yet, the predominant trend of climate summits of the past years has been one of diminishing space for fishers’ and agrarian movements. This blog post looks back at the shrinkage of space for food movements (used here as a shorthand term to refer to both agrarian and often neglected fishers’ movements) over the past years that culminated in an extremely weak presence of fishers’ and agrarian movements at last year’s COP29 held in Baku (Visser and Swen 2024, Visser and Swen 2025). This, despite its venue at the shore of the Caspian Sea, in front of artisanal fishers. The case of food movements, which often represent small-scale food producers on the front line of climate change effects, reflects broader tendencies that social movements and NGOs face at climate summits. I examine whether the significantly more open COP30 summit suggests a change of course or merely a temporary aberration from a downward trend in food movements at COPs and other summits.

COP30 Brazil: inclusivity

“COP30 is where lived experience must translate into urgent climate action”, stated Ambassador Corrêa do Lago, COP30 President-Designate, in the run-up to the meetings. “We want people from every walk of life”, including “activists and artists” (..) “to join us in Belém to take collective action”, was the welcoming invitation of COP30’s CEO, Ana Toni, explicitly extended to civil society actors. This annual meeting, organized by the UN Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat since 1995, was accompanied by a People’s Summit attended by 1,300 civil society organizations, including numerous food movements, and some 30,000 participants.

Social movements in the sphere of food and agriculture responded positively to Brazil’s hosting of the COP. La Via Campesina, the world’s largest movement of small-scale food producers, stated that “COP30 takes place in a context favourable to popular organization, in Brazil, a land of great social movements that do not give up and that welcome us with open arms and hearts in struggle.”  More than in the past year, social movements actively organized in the run-up to COP30. Fishers’ movements and NGOs (WFFP, COAST foundation, FIAN International) organized a pre-COP in Dhaka, shortly before the COP commenced in Brazil.

Voices from civil society critiqued the COP30, however, for not living up to the promise of inclusivity. Critiques focused on the representation of indigenous people from the Amazon, especially since the COP took place in the Brazilian Amazon city of Belém. During the first week of the proceedings, indigenous people forced their way into the COP venue to demand more voice in negotiations, notably about the management of the Amazon forests. They urged a meeting with the Brazilian President, an action which led to clashes with security guards.

Overall, however, statements regarding this COP’s inclusivity have mostly been moderately positive. “This effort we [social movements] have made to be at the Summit is going well – with great difficulty, but still going well,” said People’s Summit organizer and trade union representative Ivan González. Following up several smaller protests–including by indigenous people–in the preceding days, tens of thousands of activists hit the streets on Saturday, 15 November, in the ‘Great People’s March’. A participant stated that “After two years without public demonstrations during COPs, this is a new era, it is very motivating and engaging to have civil society on the streets again.” Given that the planet has already overcome a heating of 1.5 degrees Celsius, it’s more urgent than ever that civil society is mobilized. In fact, it’s already been four years since the last big demonstration was held at a COP (in Glasgow), with the COPs in states with little tolerance for dissent, such as Egypt, the UAE, and Azerbaijan in between.

Image 2: Protests in Belém near COP30 venue, 15 November 2025. Photo by Xuthoria

COP29: restricted societal space

In the run-up to the COP29 the previous year in Baku, an official video promoted it as “a truly inclusive COP where all voices are heard” (COP29 Azerbaijan 2024). Yet, foreign media and civil society organizations widely criticized the restrictive approach to civil society by the COP29 organization. They spoke of a ‘charade of openness’, with international civil movements’ presence being severely limited and Azerbaijani movements being denied access, with no single local or regional fishers’ movement present.

Just offshore of Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, COP delegates could witness the major challenges Caspian artisanal fishers face. COP attendees could see the nearby oil rigs, which hamper the fishers in their movements. A knowledgeable visitor could observe how the Caspian coastline has receded due to climate change (because of increased evaporation) and a range of other factors. The latter includes large dam construction in the rivers that flow into the Sea, as well as widespread irrigation based on water from these rivers.

The result is a falling water level, in contrast to the rising sea level in most parts of the world (the Caspian Sea is strictly speaking not a sea as it is not linked to an ocean, and its water is less salty than normal seas). The Caspian water level falls some 7 cm per year. In some places, the coastline has moved back horizontally by 12 meters already. With the receding coastline and the warming of the sea water, many fish species have moved to deeper waters. These deeper parts of the sea are further offshore and risky to reach for artisanal fishers in their small boats.

Despite the major changes that Caspian fishers face, as in most places, the voice of artisanal fishers has been marginal, in this Caspian case, even absent, in marine policy-making (Visser and Swen 2025). The establishment of marine zones where fishing is prohibited, such as conservation zones and oil extraction (and planned offshore wind turbines) areas, is conducted without consultation with artisanal fishers. Caspian fishers consider the government’s marine policies, such as the process of the establishment of zones, quotas, and moratoria (for instance, for sturgeon and beluga), to be flawed and unjust.

In sum, artisanal fishers in the Caspian are already starkly affected by the negative consequences of climate change. As such, the issues discussed at the COP29 climate summit near their fishing grounds, but inaccessible to the local fishers, were of great importance to them.

COPs, climate & ocean summits: declining space for movements?

International movements of small-scale food producers and low-capital processers (fishers, fish workers, peasants, farm workers, pastoralists) do have representation at the COPs. The COP summit with the largest imprint of civil organisations was the COP21, at which the Paris Agreement to keep the temperature rise at 1.5 degrees Celsius was reached. A simultaneous society-led summit took place. Numerous food movements, including 15 representatives from fishers’ movements (Mills 2021), participated in it. The side-summit closed with a large demonstration with over 30.000 participants.

A few years before that, another remarkable milestone regarding the inclusion of small-scale food producers in global fora was reached with the opening of the World Committee for Food Security (CFS) of the UN to societal organisations and other non-state actors. Activists from agrarian and fishers’ movements managed to raise attention for the needs of small-scale producers, such as the demand for ‘food sovereignty’.

However, since Paris, the representation of food movements (and of social movements generally) at global summits has been eroding. In the CFS, multinationals have expanded their presence, putting the voice of movements “under threat” (Duncan et al. 2022). Regarding the COPs, a trend towards stringent visa regulations and increased repression of civil society by host countries of ‘less than democratic’ nature, such as Egypt (COP27), UAE (COP28), and Azerbaijan (COP29), has constrained civil society’s role. Regarding agrarian movements specifically, even their presence at COP30 pales compared with delegates from the fossil fuel industry (every 1 in 25 delegates, amounting to some 7000 delegates, come from this sector alone). The same is true for the large agribusinesses, like Bayer and Yara, which are deeply invested in continuing conventional agriculture based on chemicals and fertilizer, as well as for large processing firms like Nestlé and PepsiCo. One of the discussions in the COP booths and lounges of these BigAg firms will be on (foreign) investment for the plan to convert millions of hectares of Brazilian pastureland in the Cerrado into large-scale, intensively worked soy fields. This plan has been widely criticized by local and transnational agrarian movements.

In terms of fisheries movements specifically, the UN Oceans Conference (UNOC) summits show a downward trend. At the ICSF side event of the UNOC 2025 summit in Nice, it was noted that “fishers have faced serious barriers to participation, including being turned away from ocean action panels due to insufficient space for civil society and lack of interpretation in side events.”

Looking ahead

The inclusive approach of the COP30 hosted by Brazil is in stark contrast with the overall trend. With the upcoming COPs to take place in Turkey (COP31) and India (COP32), the global climate summit will be hosted by countries that, while not having such a vibrant civil society as Brazil, are more open to civil society deliberation than the UAE and Azerbaijan. Yet freedom of speech is declining in both India and Turkey. The democratic profile of the host countries suggests that the inclusivity of the forthcoming COPs will be somewhere in between the low point of COP28 and COP29 and the high openness of COP30 in Brazil. But it is not only the nature of the host country and the COP that determines the space at global summits for fishers and wider food movements. At the CFS, social movements are also encountering headwind, and at the latest UNOC, held in France, the country of the vibrant 2015 COP with the Paris Agreement, fishers’ movements faced multiple obstacles to their participation. In sum, while the inclusivity of COP30 is a much-needed breath of fresh air for social movements, the overall openness of UN summits for fishers’ organizations and other social movements is likely to remain under threat.


Oane Visser is associate professor in agrarian, food & environmental studies at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam, and research associate at the Independent Social Research Foundation, London.


References

Duncan, Jessica, Nadia Lambek and Priscilla Claeys 2021. The committee on World Food Security. Advances and challenges 10 years after the reform. Un monde sans faim: Gouverner la sécurité alimentaire. Paris: SciencePo Les Presses.

Mills, Elyse (2021) The politics of transnational fishers’ movements, Journal of Peasant Studies, 50 (2): 665-690.

Visser, Oane and Nina Swen (2024) COP29, climate politics and Caspian fisheries, Focaalblog, November 12.

Visser, Oane and Nina Swen (2025) Artisanal fishers and COP29. Climate summit politics in Azerbaijan’s Caspian sea, Anthropology Today, 41 (5): 15-18. https://rai.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10/1111/1467-8322.70019


Cite as: Visser, Oane 2025. “COP30 and the shifting spaces for food movements at global summits” Focaalblog November 27. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/11/27/oane-visser-cop30-and-the-shifting-spaces-for-food-movements-at-global-summits/

Astrea Nikolovska: Geopolitics Socks

Image 1: Gift shop window in Belgrade, May 2025, photo by Astrea Nikolovska

In the mid-2010s, the tourist center of Belgrade was full of various souvenirs featuring the image of Vladimir Putin. T-shirts, hoodies, mugs, pins, and magnets were sold at every souvenir stand. It was not particularly surprising, given that Serbian people have long felt a particular closeness to Russia. The Pan-Slavic idea of a brotherhood rooted in similarities in language, script, and a shared “Slavic soul” still carries emotional weight in Serbian popular imagination (Đorđević et al. 2023). It also should not be forgotten that, in and around the 2010s, Putin was not yet the image of evil he represents today. In 2008, he danced with George W. Bush in Sochi, exchanged gifts and understanding for 16 years with Angela Merkel, and remained a regular interlocutor and a “victim” of Emmanuel Macron’s “charm.” At that time, he was still seen as an authoritarian, but one the West could work with. Even though the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Eastern Ukraine framed Putin as “the bad guy,” he was the kind of bad guythatthe “West” could still do business with. A decade later, despite Putin’s fall from grace in the eyes of the “West,” in Serbia, the situation did not change much. His face continues to fill souvenir shelves across Belgrade: Putin on mugs, Putin on T-shirts, and now, additionally, Putin on socks. But he is no longer alone.Putin on socks in 2025 comes in the company of Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, Muammar Gaddafi, Viktor Orbán, and many other strongmen of similar provenance.

Although these socks are sold in a country that has been historically and currently entangled with many of these political figures (Bieber and Tzifakis 2019), having itself a leader worthy of being included in this gallery (Dufalla and Metodieva 2024), they are not part of any sort of state propaganda or institutionalized narrative. They are a pop-cultural, vernacular object that emerged from below. Stumbling upon a souvenir stall where the faces of Kim Jong Un and Trump sit alongside those of Harry Potter, Lionel Messi, and Van Gogh’s auto portrait, the first impression is one of absurdity. What in the world is happening here? How did all these faces come together on a souvenir stall in Belgrade, on no less than a sock? But as philosophy and theatre have taught us (Bennett 2015), absurdity emerges not from nonsense, but from the collapse of sense itself, in that very instant when categories blur and meaning no longer holds.

The absurdity here reveals an ongoing collapse of the symbolic order, the contemporary political and social momentum in which distinctions between fiction and politics, villain and hero, history and fantasy, and most importantly, “East and West,” no longer hold (Hall 2018, Krastev and Holmes 2019). In Serbia, a country that has been navigating complex alignments, these socks can be seen as tokens of political ambivalence; they neither celebrate the politicians depicted on them nor entirely ridicule them. They become a site where contemporary contradictions are literally woven together. Stepping into them, one also steps into a world where politics is increasingly driven by affect and spectacle, rather than ideology or coherence (Mouffe 2014).

In contrast to “Western” contexts, where affiliations with NATO, the EU, or the UN impose tighter boundaries around political belonging, Serbia inhabits a more fluid, contradictory position. It resists simple categorization due to its decades-long historical association with Yugoslavia. Until the nominal end of the Cold War, Serbia was part of a socialist, non-aligned federation that positioned itself outside both NATO and the Soviet bloc, nurturing the legacy of sovereignty, self-reliance, and skepticism toward global power structures (Stubbs 2023). During the 1990s, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, followed by the UN embargo and international isolation, further complicated this legacy. The NATO bombing in 1999, executed without UN Security Council approval, deepened public resentment toward “Western” institutions and reinforced a sense of betrayal by the global order, and made space for many conspiracy theories about the plans in the “West” to destroy the “East” (Byford and Billig 2001). At the same time, Serbia remained formally tied to many of these same “Western” institutions, borrowing from the World Bank and IMF, belonging to the UN, maintaining the accession dialogue with the EU, and even participating in NATO military exercises. Serbia also actively nurtures political, economic, and cultural ties with Russia and China, deepening its entanglement in competing global projects and imaginaries. These overlapping allegiances do not cancel each other out; instead, they coexist simultaneously, producing a geopolitical orientation that is neither fixed nor static, but ambiguous, ambivalent, and situational.

Image 2: Souvenir stall at the Belgrade fortress Kalemegdan, May 2025, photo by Astrea Nikolovska

This uneasy coexistence of resentment and dependence largely shapes how political symbols like Vladimir Putin and other strongmen emerge as popular objects. In 2010, when Putin made his first appearance around Belgrade’s tourist offer, Radio Free Europe published a short article claiming the Putin souvenirs are part of “Putin mania.” When something is proclaimed “mania,” it often suggests a kind of irrational collective obsession. But can the proliferation of memorabilia featuring Putin’s face truly be dismissed as irrational or delusional? Calling it mania makes it seem like a passing craze or emotional overreaction. Still, this label overlooks the deeper context in which it emerged. It pathologizes a behavior that is not a symptom of a psychological disorder, but rather a popular expression that challenges the dominant hegemonic order that tries to fix identities into clear categories, such as moral, good, and evil, rational and irrational, or, in this case, geopolitical.

In that sense, these socks can be seen not as simple glorification of the strongmen whose images they carry, but as products of the political and ideological confusion, often accompanied by ambivalence, irony, nostalgia, resistance, or general frustration with the world that rapidly gets complicated and devoid of language and politics to articulate the complexities. All of these conditions also frame contemporary populisms (Mazzarella 2019). The socks, therefore, represent a reified form of populism from below, a grassroots aesthetic practice that captures the contradictions, disillusionments, and ambivalences of the current geopolitical moment. In the absurd pairing of figures like Putin, Trump, Kim Jong-un, Messi, Van Gogh, and Harry Potter, these socks stage a kind of chaotic equivalence, flattening political, historical, and moral distinctions into a fashion/tourist garment. This flattening, however, does not have to be a celebration of authoritarianism, nor an explicit critique; it is something messier: an affective disorder sublimed into an everyday object as mundane as a sock.

The garment itself contributes to the absurdity of this whole story. Their physical position intensifies the sense of ambivalence, as the political message here is displaced from the more traditional messages written on T-shirts or baseball caps. The images of the strongmen are pushed down to earth, below eye-level messaging, on garments that can be easily shown or hidden, intimate, but importantly, often associated with dirt and stench. This shift leaves the meaning of the socks open to varieties of decoding (Davis 1992). Should they be taken seriously or dismissed as a joke? Are they bought and worn in admiration, irony, provocation, or simply for fun? The answer is never fully settled, and it is precisely this unresolved quality that makes them such apt carriers of contemporary populist feeling.

While not a typical space of political speech, socks as a fashion garment carry potential for subversion. They sit low on the body, close to the ground, and often partially hidden, yet they offer a recognised space for subversion within otherwise regulated outfits. In many corporate and professional environments, where suits and shirts are standardized, socks become one of the few tolerated sites of individuality. When I lived in London in 2009–2010, I noticed men in almost identical dark suits whose only visible departure from the dress code was brightly coloured or patterned socks. The rest of the outfit signalled obedience, but the socks remained as the space of individuality, a small insistence on not being fully absorbed by the uniform.

Today, socks also have a momentum and represent a symbolic battleground. For younger generations, especially Gen Z, socks have become a highly visible fashion surface, a place where logos, images, and slogans circulate as markers of taste, irony, or stance. Online, there is an entire “sock war” between millennials and Gen Z: while millennials are presupposed to favour short, invisible socks, Gen Z insists on longer, visible socks that are meant to be seen. The fashion industry has followed this shift, building whole lines and trends around socks as statement pieces rather than neutral accessories.

Strongman socks in Belgrade tap into the longer history of socks as a space for expression of individuality and the current Gen Z-driven fashion moment. They occupy a small but symbolically dense zone in the outfit, where political images can be worn without fully declaring themselves, and where individuality, irony, and unease can be articulated in a small but persistent way. They can be shown or kept hidden, treated as “just a joke” or as a quiet statement, depending on context. Anti-hegemonic yet non-revolutionary, the socks reflect the logic of populism that speaks not in programs, but in symbols; not in policies, but in feelings (Moffitt 2016). They do not offer a clear alternative, but use fashion as a field to symbolically challenge the existing order (Hebdige 1979). They capture the mood of collapse, the sense that something is ending, but nothing coherent is taking its place. And in doing so, they allow the publics, both local and international, to laugh, recoil, recognize, and step into the confusion together.

Image 3: Gift shop in Belgrade, June 2025, photo by Nikola Mijović

When I asked the souvenir vendor who buys these socks, he replied lightly: “Our people, and tourists equally.” This shared consumer interest suggests that the contradictions and political taboos these objects embody extend far beyond Serbia. The political ambivalence is global. The sense of ideological disorientation, the collapse of clear moral or geopolitical categories, is something many people feel. However, in most places, it remains unspoken, not because it does not exist, but because the vocabulary that could express it is not available. The categories invented during the Cold War, such as “East” and “West,” as well as liberal and authoritarian, good and evil, security and threat, no longer capture the complexity of the moment. The boundaries that once organized the world as Cold War binaries, moral hierarchies, and communist versus democratic geopolitical allegiances are rapidly blurring. The “West’s” presumed moral superiority is increasingly challenged, not only by the powers like China or Russia or the rise of South-Asian, African, and Latin American economies, but from within, as demands to reckon with colonial violence, historical erasures, and structural inequalities intensify. The very institutions that claim to uphold universal values, such as the UN, NATO, ICJ, ICC, and the EU, are viewed in many places as partial, self-interested, or inconsistent.

After Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, Israel launched a large-scale military attack on Gaza. As the death toll among Palestinian civilians rose and humanitarian organizations raised alarm over war crimes and genocide, many “Western” governments remained silent or offered unwavering support to Israel. Many observers noted the double standards of “Western” powers. The double standard casts doubt not only on the “West’s” credibility but on the very idea of universal human rights, suggesting that some lives are more grievable than others, and some civilian casualties more politically useful. The vocabulary of international law, human rights, and humanitarian intervention, once mobilized to justify the post-1989 liberal order, now seemed hollow, selectively applied, or brutally ignored. The invasion of Ukraine and then the attack on Gaza reactivated language, fears, and geopolitical imaginaries of the Cold War. Still, this time, the clarity of the ideological divide had eroded. In 2025, the global stage appears more complex than ever, caught between nostalgia for a past structure and the inability to define or navigate the present one. Liberalism no longer feels like a neutral, impassive pillar, but like one political option among many, often failing to account for people’s lived experiences of inequality, disillusionment, or humiliation.

Image 4: Gift shop in Belgrade, June 2025, photo by Nikola Mijović

Serbia, however, and Belgrade in particular, offers a space where that confusion is not only visible, but lived and openly consumed. The state itself occupies an in-between position, not fully aligned with any of the powers, and this liminal stance seems to enable a kind of open market for ambiguity. In Belgrade, the things that cannot be articulated elsewhere, such as the political contradictions, the uncomfortable affinities, and the guilty fascinations, are not silenced and repressed, but sold at eye level for a few euros on socks. To wear Victor Orban, Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-un on one’s feet is not necessarily to endorse them. It is to participate in a new kind of meaning-making, one that is bodily, ironic, and resistant to simple interpretation. These objects blur the line between joke and statement, between mockery and nostalgia. They reflect a world where people no longer trust the categories handed down from above, where “East” and “West,” “good” and “bad,” “rational” and “irrational,” no longer hold explanatory power.

And for that that cannot be named, the socks speak instead.They articulate confusion not through clear-cut discourse, but through juxtaposition. On one stall, Trump, Orban, Kim Jong-un, and Messi coexist without hierarchy, commentary, or context. The socks do not explain; they stage. They do not tell people what to think, but rather reflect what people already feel, joke about, or cannot yet fully articulate. Not sure how to feel about the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize? Have a pair of Maduro socks!

By placing dictators and pop icons side by side, by turning power into fashion, and by refusing to explain themselves, these socks expose the very contradictions that liberal democracies try to hide: that moral clarity is unstable, that ideology is marketable, and that political feeling is messy, unresolved, and often absurd. They testify to the change in the rules of the game once invented and refereed by the winners of World War II. They, however, do not proclaim new political loyalties, but instead give form to a spectacularized disorientation in which current politics is driven less by ideology than by affect, aesthetics, and irony. Like memes or graffiti, they operate through juxtaposition and absurdity, recalling the logic of what Laclau (1996) named the empty signifier, a symbol whose power lies in its ambiguity, able to unify diverse and even contradictory demands by standing in for a broader sense of discontent, without anchoring itself to a single fixed meaning.

A version of this text was originally published on the MEMPOP project blog.


Astrea Nikolovska is an associated researcher on the ERC project “Memory and Populism from Below” (MEMPOP), hosted by the Institute of Ethnology at the Czech Academy of Sciences. Her research interests are devoted to the visible and invisible legacies of the Cold War, questions of sovereignty, counter-liberalism, the aesthetics of commemoration, and popular forms of politics. She holds a PhD from the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Central European University, and has an interdisciplinary background in theatre and cultural studies.


References

Bennett, Michael Y. 2015. The Cambridge Introduction to Theatre and Literature of the Absurd. Cambridge Introductions to Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bieber, Florian, and Nikolaos Tzifakis. 2019. The Western Balkans as a Geopolitical Chessboard? Myths, Realities and Policy Options. Policy Brief. Graz: The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG). https://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/The_Western_Balkans_as_a_Geopolitical_Chessboard.pdf.

Byford, Jovan, and Michael Billig. 2001. “The Emergence of Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories in Yugoslavia during the War with NATO.” Patterns of Prejudice 35(4):50–63.

Davis, Fred. 1992. Fashion, Culture, and Identity. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Đorđević, Vladimir, Mikhail Suslov, Marek Čejka, Ondřej Mocek, and Martin Hrabálek. 2023. “Revisiting Pan-Slavism in the Contemporary Perspective.” Nationalities Papers 51(1):3–13.

Dufalla, Jacqueline, and Asya Metodieva. 2024. “From Affect to Strategy: Serbia’s Diplomatic Balance during the Russia-Ukraine War.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 0(0):1–20.

Hall, Stuart. 2018. “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power (1992).” Pp. 141–84 in Essential Essays, Volume 2: Identity and Diaspora, edited by D. Morley. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Hebdige, Dick. 1979. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London and New York: Routledge.

Krastev, Ivan, and Stephen Holmes. 2019. The Light That Failed: A Reckoning. London: Penguin Randomhouse.

Laclau, Ernesto. 1996. Emancipation(s). London: Verso.

Mazzarella, William. 2019. “The Anthropology of Populism: Beyond the Liberal Settlement.” Annual Review of Anthropology 48(Volume 48, 2019):45–60.

Moffitt, Benjamin. 2016. The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. 1st ed. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Mouffe, Chantal. 2014. “By Way of a Postscript.” Parallax 20(2):149–57.

Stubbs, Paul, ed. 2023. Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: Social, Cultural, Political, and Economic Imaginaries. Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press.


Cite as: Nikolovska, Astrea 2025. “Geopolitics Socks” Focaalblog November 17. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/11/17/astrea-nikolovska-geopolitics-socks/

Laura Adwan: Commentary: On fragmentation and decolonization. The demise of a collective liberation dream

Image 1: Street in Gaza in February 2025, by Jaber Jehad Badwan

Before, times like these have come before

Times when we witnessed hurricanes that never stopped uprooting trees

We thought that we had learned how to travel the road to the gods’ gate

How to carry the burden and rise up again after the flood

How to go, again

If days come when we see hurricanes that never stop uprooting trees

Sargon Boulus

When Arpan Roy invited me to write a commentary for the “Staying-With Palestine” feature, I did not know where to begin. Should I start from where I am “staying” today, in al-Khalil (Hebron), helplessly witnessing the ongoing genocide in Gaza, only 50 kilometers away, while anticipating the elimination of what remains of a dismembered Palestine? The ongoing fragmentation of the West Bank, once depicted as an archipelago of fragmented islands by the French artist Julien Bousac in 2009, turned Palestinian towns and villages into isolated military zones scattered by around 1000 checkpoints (including earth mounds and roadblocks) and iron gates blocking the main entrances. We hear the bombs falling on Gaza, watch the horrific live-streamed death and destruction of all forms of life, and do nothing to stop the genocide in Gaza or “the earthquake” in the West Bank (Nabulsi 2024). In their ongoing attempts to expand their colonial settlements in what remains of Palestine, the Israeli state army and settler gangs, almost daily raid Palestinian localities with their armored vehicles.

Seemingly endless Israeli attacks and military invasion are expanding beyond Palestine, in Lebanon and Syria, with impunity, while acts of support or solidarity are suppressed in neighboring Arab states. The exception to this is Yemen’s Ansar Allah, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and a few Iraqi resistance factions. The Arab support for Gaza today has been reduced to small popular stands in solidarity, which are hardly visible when compared to the larger solidarity protests and encampments by demonstrators outside the Arab world. Worst of all the leaders of several Arab states make deals and trade worth tens of billions of dollars with the Israeli colonial state, even when the free people of the world are demonstrating to push their governments and companies to boycott Israel politically and economically.

The contributors to this forum explored various dilemmas that partially address one of the questions raised in the introduction: “A hundred years of the Palestinian cause, and the support that it has received from various actors from various stages, has not resulted in the liberation of Palestine.” During these times of despair, it is important to remember the times when Palestinians had a larger space to dream of liberation and justice in Palestine and neighboring postcolonial states. I argue that fragmentation as a colonial tool to rule and divide the colonized communities in the Palestinian and Arab cases reduced several possibilities of local solidarities and support that have been essential in creating the conditions for sustaining the Palestinian collective dream of liberation. The ability to dream of liberation and decolonization require “the creation of new men,” as described by Franz Fanon (2001: 28). A process that demands solidarity to create the conditions necessary for defying colonial plans of fragmentation and generating collective political consciousness among the colonized. The “new men” involved in the decolonization process, as Fanon told us, must not reproduce the colonizer’s world. They should build the conditions which will create new possibilities that require an act of collective dreaming and “revolutionary action” (Fanon 2001: 140).

To explain the decline of the Arab nationalist support to the collective dream of liberating Palestine (Muslih 1987), I will refer to the Iraqi example of fragmentation. The importance of the Iraqi case stems from its experience with fragmentation following a long period of violent wars and economic embargo, that seems to be replicated today in the Syrian and Palestinian cases. During the first three decades after the Nakba, the question of Palestine was articulated as an Arab question, especially among the Arab nationalist movement and the Baath party (Sayigh 1997, Charif 2021). The Baathist Iraq (1960s-1980s), like Assad’s Syria, and unlike Sadat’s Egypt, provided various levels of support to the Palestinian collective liberation dream, at least when it came to their Arab nationalist politics against normalization with Israel, in addition to hosting displaced Palestinians who maintained their refugee status, while enjoying substantial rights, and various Palestinian political factions whose leftist (and later Islamic) rhetoric emphasized resistance, liberation, and return. This was more evident in Syria, where Palestinian factions were more active than in Iraq, with fluctuating relationships with the various ruling regimes (Gabiam 2016, Al-Hardan 2016). For example, al-Yarmouk refugee camp was often called by the Palestinians the “political capital” of the refugees’ struggle for self-determination and the right of return, where leftist factions were active with their numerous grassroots social and political organizations. Following the collapse of the USSR and the Socialist bloc, the Islamic factions became more visible, especially after the Oslo Accords of 1993 allowed for a limited form of self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for abandoning full liberation and the right of return.

Rather than contributing to the establishment of the conditions that will help create “the new men” who should lead the decolonization process in postcolonial Arab states, the colonial interventions, of which Oslo Accords were a major strategic component, promoted the birth of a so-called “New Middle East” by creating “new” fragmented political periphery states in an ancient world such as the new Iraq, or new Syria to be dominated by the then recently established Israeli state as part of the Zionist expansive settler-colonial project. In 2003, George W. Bush introduced his vision of the “new Iraq”—an Iraq liberated from Saddam Hussein’s despotic regime. The plan started earlier, after the US-led bombing of the state infrastructure in 1991 and during the thirteen years of economic embargo and sanctions to force Iraq to disarm, paving the road for invading and occupying a formerly sovereign state by the US and its allies (Gordon 2010, Khoury 2013, Dewachi 2017). The new Iraq in the official statements of Bush and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was presented as an oasis of democracy and free market economy. As in the case of Palestine, fragmentation was one of the main tools used in the new Iraq; it was introduced by privatizing the post invasion Iraqi economy and selling off its industries, which eventually led to the expulsion of several Iraqi bureaucrats and professionals from their jobs in the public sector. Many of the private contractors’ projects were funded by the USAID and once the money was disbursed, it ended up in the hands of private companies, most of which were American. The ultimate aim was to create a newIraq based on a neoliberal model.

In his reading of the disorder that erupted in Iraq, anthropologist Marshal Sahlins criticized the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the essentialism informing the invaders’ conquer-and divide policies—which ignored a long history of coexistence: “It takes a lot of culture to make a state of nature” (Sahlins 2011). Within two years of invasion, the United States had created a novel sectarian system, what is described in the media as the “Lebanonization of Iraq”: the parliament was eventually established in 2005 and ministries were allocated according to the relative weight of such parties and of parliamentary blocs, and the reconstructed armed forces followed this pattern. Previously, of little significance, sectarian parties and networks started to exert a much stronger influence in the absence of a strong central state (Marfleet 2007).

The walling of Baghdad was another step in dividing the city into small manageable pieces with walls and military checkpoints, which further intensified militia attacks on sectarian pretext and forced many inhabitants to relocate. Like Palestine, walling also increased the daily suffering of Iraqis who had to waste long hours to reach their places of work or study or medical treatment. The sectarian wall, as it was often called, was a physical embodiment of the destruction of the social Baghdadi inter-communal life. It split neighbors and families and further reduced the already limited possibilities of living for the majority, who did not feel safe leaving their homes and could no longer reach their work and schools. It created the

conditions for anomie, the Durkheimian concept that refers to a situation in which former norms of solidarity break down due to a rapid change in society. Iraqis were forced to search for new ways to bring a sense of connectedness and solidarity in their lives.

However, it would be naïve to blame the fragmentation and rise of religious and sectarian divisions in the Iraqi society solely on the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The politicization of ethnic, tribal, and religious differences was practiced by the Iraqi state at various levels during times of wars and sanctions (Zubaida 2011). Other factors were involved in the rise of sectarian views or intolerance in previous Iraqi historical periods at various levels during the British colonial rule through sectarian division (Batatu 1978, Tripp 2007). After 2003, being Iraqi was not enough to continue living in Iraq, one had to be sectarian (See Eldridge’s contribution to this feature). In the current Iraq, solidarity is reduced to family origin, which became more important to gain access to political and administration positions than qualifications and skills (al-Mohammad 2012, 2015). The Iraqi and other experiences (Friedman 2008) show that when a social system produced its strong socio-economic productive basis, these religion/sectarian differences move to the background and lose their political roles. However, whenever the collective social system was attacked, whether by former state oppressive policies or foreign military interventions, these differences were politicized and were assumed as a social system for their followers (Adwan 2020).

Two decades later, in late-2024, the international community celebrated the creation of a “new Syria” after the fall of the Assad’s despotic rule. Yet, in Syria today (as in Iraq), one’s presence or absence is determined by one’s sect, ethnicity, and their former relationship to the fallen regime. This new situation in the region at large, imposed new representations on the inhabitants of those states, including the former Palestinian refugee communities who became almost invisible in those places where they used to live on equal terms with local Iraqi and Syrian citizens for seven decades. In the process of “liberation” from their former regimes, both Iraq and Syria have dismantled their armies and handed their weapons, a condition that obviously serves the Zionist expansionist dream of “Greater Israel” between the Euphrates and the Nile.

One major effect of the regional and Palestinian fragmentation is related to the Palestinian refugees who no longer represent a collective presence in Iraq and Syria, while we witness the ongoing annihilation of refugee communities in an increasingly fragmented Palestinian reality (Nabulsi 2024). Since January 2025, tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees have been forcibly displaced from their homes in several West Bank refugee camps—Jenin, Nur Shams and Tulkarem—where they lived for 77 years after the Nakba. Decades of international aid failed to address the Palestinian refugee suffering and ongoing Nakba that has often been reduced to a “humanitarian problem” (Feldman 2009), which culminated in the killings of the starved refugees in Gaza in a particularly cynical version of aid orchestrated by the so-called “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” (Jadaliyya, 2025).

In the last paragraph of his conclusion chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon explicitly turns to the importance of imagining new possibilities: “For ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man” (2001, 255). Fanon’s call is a demand that the colonized peoples should imagine new ways to achieve freedom and justice. For decades, Palestinians have sought to amplify their call for freedom and justice through solidarity from the global Left and the global South, a legacy critically examined by contributors to this forum in response to Roy’s question: “What does it mean to stand with Palestine?” A central issue that follows is: to what extent has such solidarity been oriented not only toward Palestine as a humanitarian issue but also toward seriously confronting the Zionist settler-colonial project, and why has this solidarity failed to produce the conditions necessary for liberation? The critical dimension, in my view, lies in the decline of Arab state support. Neighboring Egypt, for instance, has consistently sought to restrict material and political assistance to Gaza. Iraq and Syria positioned themselves, historically, as champions of the Palestinian cause, granting Palestinians rights and protection that exceeded those available in most Arab host countries from 1948 to the 2000s. Yet today, Palestinian communities in Iraq and Syria have nearly disappeared.

In this commentary, I have tried to show the effects of fragmentation on the Iraqi society in an attempt to explain my main argument that fragmentation played a decisive role in weakening the Iraqi and Syrian standing-with Palestine. To stand with Palestine today means resisting not only the further fragmentation of Palestine itself but also of the region at large. Defragmentation must be seen as a vital step toward decolonization. Standing with (as much as staying-with) Palestine also means learning from past solidarities: from the martyrs who returned to their families thanks to resistance, and from the legacy of anti-colonial fighters both near and far.

I will end here with a note “on hope” recalled from a longer interview with a Palestinian refugee I met in al-Yarmouk camp in Syria in summer 2008 about the martyr-refugees; a new concept she used to describe the 199 Arab and Palestinian freedom fighters who returned to their families as part of al-Radwan prisoner exchange operation between Hezbollah and Israel:

Palestine has always been our dream. When the revolution began, we had a clear goal. Our goal was the liberation of Palestine, and if we remained steadfast as Arabs and Palestinians, we could have achieved it […]. Thanks to the resistance, hope returned to us, when the martyrs returned. After all those long years and decades, the martyrs returned to their people and families. This proves that everything we fight for will return to us.”


Laura Adwan is an Assistant Professor at Al-Quds Bard College for Arts and Science. Her work focuses on forced displacement and transformations among refugees, rural and Bedouin communities in occupied Palestine and the region, by exploring the ways communities view their lived experiences, situated in a historical political economy.


References

Adwan, Laura. (2020). ‘Iraqis on the Move: Displaced Professionals, Protection/ ‘Aman Space in Jordan and Memories of a Destroyed State.’ PhD Dissertation. University of Bergen.

Batatu, Hanna. (1978). The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A study of Iraq’s old landed and commercial classes and its communists, Ba’thists, and Free Officers. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Boulus, Sargon. (2008). ‘Times: The song of a Sumerian who lived for a thousand year.’ (S. Anton, Trans.) In Azma Ukhra li-Kalb al-Qabila (Another Bone for the Tribe’s Dog). Beirut/Baghdad: Dar al-Jamal.

Bousac, Julien. (2009). ‘L’archipel de Palestine Orientale,’ drawn for Le Monde Diplomatique, based on documents provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and B’Tselem. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cartes/l_atlas_un_monde_a_l_envers/a60660

Charif, Maher. (2021). The Palestinian National Project: Development, Dilemma and Destiny. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. (In Arabic).

Dewachi, Omar. (2017). Ungovernable Life: Mandatory Medicine and Statecraft in Iraq. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fanon, Franz. (2001). The Wretched of the Earth. (C. Farrington, Trans.). London: Penguin Classics.

Feldman, Ilana. (2009). ‘Gaza’s humanitarianism problem.’ Journal of Palestine Studies. 38 (3): 22-37.

Friedman, Jonathan. (2008). ‘Transnationalization, Sociopolitical Disorder, and Ethnification as Expressions of Declining Global Hegemony.’ In Historical Transformations: The Anthropology of Global Systems, edited by Kajsa Ekholm Friedman and Jonathan Friedman,

203-226. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Gabiam, Nell. (2016). The Politics of Suffering: Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Gordon, Joy. (2010). Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Al-Hardan, Anaheed. (2016). Palestinians in Syria: Nakba memories of Shattered Communities. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jadaliyya (2025, August 12). ‘Anthony Aguilar: GHF Whistleblower – Connections Podcast #107. Guest: Anthony Aguilar Host: Mouin Rabbani.’ YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijT86BHnGY8&t=1809s

Khoury, Dina (2013). Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marfleet, Philip. (2007). ‘Iraq’s Refugees: ‘exit’ from the state.’ International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. 1 (3): 397-419.

Al-Mohammad, Hayder. (2012). ‘A Kidnapping in Basra: The Struggles and Precariousness

of Life in Postinvasion Iraq.’ Cultural Anthropology 27 (4): 597-614.

Al-Mohammad, Hayder. (2015). ‘Poverty beyond Disaster in Postinvasion Iraq: Ethics and the “Rough Ground” of the Everyday.’ Current Anthropology 56 (S11): S108-S115.

Muslih, Muhammad. (1987). ‘Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism.’ Journal of Palestine Studies 16 (4): 77-94.

Nabulsi, Jamal. (2024). ‘“to stop the earthquake”: Palestine and the Settler Colonial Logic of Fragmentation’. Antipode 56 (1), 187-205.

Tripp, Charles. (2007). A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. (2011). ‘Iraq: The State-of-Nature Effect.’ Anthropology Today 27 (3): 26-31.

Sayigh, Yazid. (1997). ‘Armed Struggle and State Formation.’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 26(4): 17–32.

Zubaida, Sami. (2011). Beyond Islam: A New Understanding of the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris.


Cite as: Adwan, Laura 2025. “Commentary: On fragmentation and decolonization. The demise of a collective liberation dream” Focaalblog October 6. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/10/06/laura-adwan-commentary-on-fragmentation-and-decolonization-the-demise-of-a-collective-liberation-dream/

Omid Mehrgan: Palestine the Wound: A Report on the Iranian Reception of the Cause

Image 1: Stamp of Iran memorizing the Day of Qods, printed 1986

A Postscript Note: I finished writing this piece prior to the Israeli-US attacks on Iranian cities and nuclear facilities, which killed over a thousand people. There is, therefore, no trace of that consequential war in the piece. Another event also took place between the time of writing this and the onset of that war: the “For Palestine” rally on the 22nd of May in front of the University of Tehran to protest the Gaza Genocide. Though modest in size, this marked “a moment when a diverse group of citizens, without any formal call, unaffiliated with power centers, and beyond prevailing ideological frameworks, raised their voices in defense of the human dignity of the Palestinian people” (Shabani 2025). When I speak of the losses of the Iranian Left in the following paragraphs, I would like to remember such delicate gains, too.

Taking stock of the Iranian response to the Palestinian cause since the Nakba can point out a history of militant solidarity but must also face the melancholic realization that the Iranian Left has lost something big. What mediated the two—and this can be the great irony of Middle Eastern history—was 1979 Revolution in Iran. An epoch–making event that emerged as a resistant block against imperialist forces and a powerful state backer of Palestinians in its secular and religious strains, the Revolution went on to transform the very meaning of relating to Palestinian anticolonial resistance. Whether, and how exactly, the government that was established in its wake helped Palestinians since is a convoluted topic with many chapters, yet to be studied. What is less obscure is the fact that the Iranian Left—a material, discursive, and cultural force in giving birth to modern revolutionary Iran—no longer possesses any seductive and material forces for performing a necessary double task today: building a working class movement strong enough to push back against the increasingly harsh oligarchic capitalism inside Iran, and helping resist the US–Israeli aggression in the region that is piling up ruins after ruins in its trail. Iran’s Islamic Republic has largely alienated the real forces on the ground from which it once appropriated the Palestinian cause. Those forces that it has instead recruited and organized—legions of the unemployed and of undocumented immigrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan to be deployed to Syria during the 2010s (Azizi and Vazirian 2022)— it has not done so based on labor. But nor have the progressive forces inside or outside Iran succeeded to win the marginalized and increasingly impoverished masses who periodically take to the streets only to face brutal repression.

The net result has been the loss of a political identity in Iran that could understand itself in a collective way by identifying its real sources of vitality. An epitome of this phenomenon which can be called apolitical radicalization, the Diaspora Opposition politics of “subversion” (barandaazi) in the past Iranian long decade (from 2009 Green Movement to when Iranian forces left a fallen Syria in 2024) has shifted toward the right to the bewildering extent that siding with Israel has become a form of performing resistance against the Islamic Republic (Shams 2025). The war industry has recruited its own figures from the exiled (Shohadaei 2023). Many, many people embrace them, apparently. But, under the black sun of Gaza that has cut through all statuses, identities, positions, forcing each to reckon with itself anew, Iranian political culture too is bound to find itself re-evaluated for its own actors and observers. And because the word “Palestine” has for decades permeated official discourses of politics in Iran to the point of exhaustion, speaking to it in relation to emancipatory politics is exceptionally difficult.

In such an atmosphere, writing about Iran in English is more aporetic for me today than ever before. By “today” I mean a moment in history marked by two consequential events that have changed much about Iran: The Women, Life, Freedom (WLF) movement (following the death-in-custody of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Jina Amini in Tehran in September 2022) and the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Months after the women and girls’ life-and-death historic fights in the streets with the riot officers over the mandatory hijab (with clear socio-political victories) were widely repressed, October the 7th took place. On around the anniversary of the Palestinian assault on Israeli settlements near Gaza’s borders, a video came out showing the correspondent of the London-based TV Iran International writing the movement’s slogan in Persian on the wall of a destroyed home in Gaza (Middle East Monitor 2024). The obscene contrast between the message and the medium, between the words life, woman, freedom, and that context of suffocating blockade, lethal masculinity, and death, posed the question: How could those words be allowed to travel to the abyss of Gaza with pure affirmation and total blindness to its setting? The smiling ease with which the Israel-based Iranian reporter performed the act in front of the camera demonstrated a secure confidence in the public reception of his horrid message. He probably felt it like an act of resistance rather than pervert violation. Reportedly, the news outlet, funded by Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, is being watched by millions of Iranian households, having widely been preferred over the standard BBC Persian and a host of hopeless national TV channels (Gamaan 2023). Was there no symbolic counterforce defying this messaging? Apparently, not. The vocal figures of the WLF movement did not voice any visible solidarity with Palestinians, nor articulated any radical critique of Israeli aggression to prepare people for protecting themselves against identifying with the aggressors. The Nobel Peace Prize winner and prominent activist who spent years in jail and has been particularly vocal about solitary confinement and death penalty in Iran did not mention the word Gaza in a statement she issued from Evin prison where he called for an end to ”war.” The media coverage of her statement in English added the word “Gaza” (IranWire, November 1, 2023).

All this shift to the right in mainstream Iranian opposition politics, if not in people themselves, shows an astounding departure from the pre-Revolutionary times when Palestine shaped the discourse of both the Marxist left and the radical Shia’ clergy as well as Muslim intellectuals. Recent scholarship has shed light on the indebtedness of Iranian political culture to the Palestinian cause from around the time of the Nakba onward (Alavi 2019, Elling and Haugbolle 2024, Sadeghi-Boroujeni 2025). This was in the aftermath of the US-sponsored 1953 Coup that blocked the path of a popular national independence movement. In attempts to break through the total political blockage of the post-Coup era beyond traditional party politics already crushed by the Shah, Iran’s guerrilla movement (1970-79) learned tactics of armed struggles from Palestinian fighters in the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria, gaining insights into the deep ties that linked capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism in the region—places destined to define the future trajectory of Iran’s political life for decades to come (Vahabzadeh 2010: 12-15, Montazeri 2024). The Palestinian cause effectively contributed to a revolution in Iran, having ended the Monarchy’s alliance with America and Israel. In this way, it seems, Iran in its turn shaped the trajectory of the Palestinian cause by becoming the first state officially incorporating it into its very identity—and that in the wake of Camp David’s deal with Israel which lost Egypt for Palestinians. Did this victory come with a curse?

The Cause after the Revolution rapidly moved from the streets to the institutions and the law in Iranian politics. Such a shift took place in the context of a bloody fight for power primarily between the Leftist parties and the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the first couple years after the 1979 Revolution. The IRP clerics reluctantly had to deal with the more secular, nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership. To win over the socialist, guerrilla forces who had legitimate claims to the Revolution, the IRP moved to rid the Palestinian cause of its leftist discursive elements. One telling example was when their official newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami published the headline “Arafat pleads to Muslims of the world against Israel’s expansive offensives,” while Arafat’s 26 August 1979 plea addressed diverse universal identities including “public conscious around the world” and “resisting nations of the world.” (Alemzadeh 2024, 12) It was a real case of inclusive exclusion or exclusive inclusion. Yasser Arafat’s unfortunate decisions in key moments, from trying to mediate the releasing of the American hostages held by Iranian revolutionaries during the Hostage Crisis to siding with the invader in the Iraq-Iran war, only facilitated such a move.

“Felesteen” in Persian thus started losing its original socialist ring, becoming more and more Islamic—a tendency that culminated in the Islamic Republic’s consequential rapport with the Islamic Jihad and then Hamas a couple decades later. These were, of course, the contingent tendencies in Palestinian history within various contexts to which the Iranian support adapted. The nature of this support has been reported not to have dictated internal politics of Palestinian movements. Nizar Banat, the Palestinian intellectual killed by Palestinian Authority forces, said: “Whether Fatah, PLFP, Communists, anyone; it [Iran] never intervened in the ideological conceptions of our resistance.” (Banat [2021]) Even so, the name of Palestine did not enjoy such political diversity inside postrevolutionary Iran. With the violent suppression of the Left during the 1980s, Iran’s popular politics inevitably moved towards a liberal-democratic rights-centered activism in civil society in the Reformist Era (1995-2004). The pro-government forces, in turn and in effect, started building up a new security practice and discourse that gave rise to the Axis of Resistance in the aftermath of failed American interventionist projects that generated a vacuum in which floated many fragmented forces sponsored by regional and international powers. Palestine was won for national security and largely lost for justice and freedom (Alemzadeh 2025).

In terms of security—in the post-9/11 world, where the US-led Coalition forces invaded countries to the left and the right of Iran (Gregory 2004)—Palestine appeared in the depth of a fortified field seen from the heights of Iranian plateau. The “offensive defense” strategy brought Iranians extremely close to Israeli fortifications around the Golan Heights—perhaps too dangerously close. Iran’s oldest ally through decades, Syria, made this progression possible. The same troublesome route that Iranian guerrilla fighters during the sixties and the seventies took from Tehran to Beirut to join PLO militants was upgraded in the mid-2010s into a highway trodden by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) overseas forces (Magnier 2021). The story of Iran’s intervention in the Syrian War, its human toll, political economy, and geopolitical import, is yet to be told. But the claim on the part of the Islamic Republic has been that we are defending our borders against imperialist and Zionist assaults at military, cultural, social, media levels. Intellectuals, activists, artists, and the entire middle-class cultural makers were never fully convinced. The presence of American-Israeli footprints in any major national disaster from the eight-year Iran-Iraq War to devastating sanctions and terror attacks throughout the past four decades has been documented, and yet Palestine is absent from the most progressive political discourses in Iran.

A central question for the highly fragmented, disorganized Iranian leftists today is why many Iranians appear to go along with the cruelest forces in the world today. A big bulk of answers given do not pose the question or clarify its premises adequately or in good faith, providing instead conclusions that only beg the question anew. They tend to use the language normally deployed by pro-Israeli platforms. For instance, Ali Afshari, a former organizer of the Iranian student movement turned regime-change activist, asks why there is no sympathy with Palestinians in Iran without discussing in any terms what it is they should sympathize with. This is because the author cannot even name the situation: the genocidal killings of a people daily. It is either “Israel’s war” or a “conflict.” And yet, he reserves the naming for Hamas, summing up his answer by setting the equation thus: “Meanwhile, the atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, against Israelis by Hamas only reminded the Iranian people of their government’s ideological, turbulent, and costly foreign policy.” (Afshari 2024) In this piece as in several others about the topic of Palestine and Iran, authors tend to draw on one slogan first heard chanted in the 2009 protests: “Neither Lebanon, Nor Gaza, I’ll give my life for Iran.” (Ziaberi 2025) It is presented as a confirmation of the Iranians’ judgment on the fate of the Palestinian cause in Iran. The texts omit the other slogan that I heard in the streets of Tehran that same year also within the Green Movement: “People, why are you sitting down, Iran has become Palestine.” The origin of the slogan goes back to the time of the Iranian Revolution. It signified the understanding that Palestine has a universal import, shedding light on any situation where an indigenous population is being suffocated by forces of the state or states. The generational continuity between 1979 and 2009, evident not least in their shared slogans, was broken in the long decade following when Iran went to Syria. The relation to Palestine both made and broke it. (In a correspondence, Akbar Masoumbaigi, a prominent intellectual and a veteran organizer in the Iranian leftist movement, told me about the origin of the slogan which he had heard in the streets of Tehran at least as early as 1979. Before the date, he said, similar slogans were common.)

Today, while there have been statements from Iranian feminists, artists, scholars, and activists against the Gaza Genocide (A Call to Action 2024, Moezidis 2025), most Iranian identifications with the suffering of Palestinians much more resemble a spirit of appropriation: “We too are undergoing genocide. We too are occupied. We too are under (gender) apartheid. We too are colonized, even if by a regime which we brought to power through a revolution.” Iranian protests proclaim such positions in the BBC Persian service or on Iran International, much of it is also echoed in recent works by scholars on “internal colonialism,” “gender apartheid” used for Iran without naming Israel (Eskandari 2023, Seltzer 2023, Elyasi 2024; for a critique, see Shohadaei and Mehrgan 2024). Or conversely, at its worst, as in Afshari’s piece quoted above, they go for the equation: Hamas represents for Israelis what the Islamic Republic means to Iranians living under its rein. Although the reason for this has much to do with how official apparatuses of power, policy, and media in Iran have failed to incorporate the Palestinian cause they inherited from a revolution into projects of social justice domestically, many individuals and groups in civil society, too, have participated in what can be called a pervert relation to Palestine: absolute negation or absolute cooptation.

Disappearing with the Left is thus the very possibility of the solidarity of singular experiences of oppression and empire. What has been lost is the very possibility of an Iranian political identity. Palestine is not only a moral or humanistic cause—which, given the incredible ethical indifference at the global institutional level to the daily massacres and starvation in Gaza, can only mean coming catastrophes. It is rather also a mode of relating to the politics of material conditions of life that touches all forms of politicization in the globalized ecologies of war and of remnants of life today. The Iranian Left realized with much pain through Palestine: Anti-imperialism without class struggle is empty, and class struggle without anti-imperialism is blind. In the case of Iran today, the double task has pressed the Left, or any real progressive politics (the women’s movement in particular) to the point of collapse as it must deal with this: an oligarchic capitalism backed by state repression inside and genocidal imperialist forces outside against which, well, that very repressive state has posed a resistance—for now.


Omid Mehrgan is a philosopher teaching in the Department of Liberal Studies at New York University. He is the author of The Narrowest Path: Antinomies of Self-Determination in Four Aesthetic Studies (Brill, 2024) and the translator of several key philosophical texts into Persian.


References

‘A Call to Action: Against the Imposed ‘New Order’ in the Middle East’. No-to-Genocide, October 2024, https://www.no-to-genocide.com/english.

Afshari, Ali. 2024. ‘Why are So Many Iranians Seemingly Indifferent to the War in Gaza?’, Stimson, May 13, 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-are-so-many-iranians-seemingly-indifferent-to-the-war-in-gaza/.

Alavi, Seyed Ali. 2019. Iran and Palestine: Past, Present, Future. New York: Routledge.

Alemzadeh, Maryam. 2024. “The Islamic Republic Party and the Palestinian Cause, 1979-1980: A Discursive Transformation of the Third-Worldist Agenda,” in Rasmus C. Elling and Sune Haugbolle, eds., The Fate of Third Worldism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond (Oneworld Academic, 2024)

Alemzadeh, Maryam. 2025. ‘Iran, Palestine and the Axis of Resistance’,Middle East Report, no. 313, Winter 2024. https://merip.org/2025/01/iran-palestine-axis/

Azizi, Hamidreza, and Amir Hossein Vazirian. 2022. ‘The Role of Armed Non-State Actors in Iran’s Syria Strategy: A Case Study of Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun Brigades.Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 25 no.3: 540–57. https://doi:10.1080/19448953.2022.2143864.

Elling, Rasmus C. and Sune Haugbolle, eds. 2024. The Fate of Third Wordlism in the Middle East: Iran, Palestine and Beyond. London: Oneworld Academic.

Elyasi, Arefe. 2024. ‘Gender Apartheid: Unraveling Systemic Segregation and Its Socio-Legal Implications’. Master’s thesis, Global Campus of Human Rights, 2024. https://repository.gchumanrights.org/handle/20.500.11825/2779

Eskandari, Sarah 2023. ‘Internal Colonialism in Iran: Gender and Resistance against the Islamic Regime’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 55, no. 4 (November 2023): 739–743.

Gamaan. 2023. ‘Iranians’ Attitudes Toward Media 2023’. September 8, 2023. https://gamaan.org/2023/09/08/iranians-attitudes-toward-media-2023/

Gregory, Derek. 2004. The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. London: Blackwell.

Magnier, Elijah J. 2021. ‘The Axis of Resistance’s road from Tehran to Beirut is open and secure’, The Cradle, August 12, 2021. https://thecradle.co/articles-id/5976.

Moezidis, Ciara. 2025. ‘(Dis)Entangling Iran and Palestine/Israel: The Lesser-Known Narrative of the Pro-Palestine Iranian Diaspora in the U.S.’ Jadaliyya, 28 January 2025. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/46477

Montazeri, Omid. 2024. ‘Abandoned Legacy: The Left of Iran and Palestinians’, Verso Blog, June 12, 2024. https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/abandoned-legacy-the-left-of-iran-and-palestinians?srsltid=AfmBOooi5BMPMWFD8brHOu9HBoHLQyTfVPIcfiBIyGNhrJWIorw2_AXm.

Nizar Banat. [2021]. ‘Nizar Banat on Iranian support of Palestinian resistance’, The East Is a Podcast YouTube Channel. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHqSH7Gwc7g&t=3s. Accessed September, 21, 2025.

Sadeghi-Boroujeni, Eskandar. 2025. ‘Iran and the “Axis of Resistance”: A Brief History’, Jadaliyya, May 19, 2025. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/46685/Iran-and-the-%E2%80%98Axis-of-Resistance%E2%80%99-A-Brief-History.

Seltzer, Lena Yasmine 2023. ‘Gender Apartheid in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Intersection of Religion and Human Rights’. Master’s thesis. Università degli Studi di Padova, 2023. https://thesis.unipd.it/handle/20.500.12608/50102

Shabani, Azadeh. 2025. ‘From Tehran, “For Palestine”: Disrupting the State’s Discursive Monopoly on Anti-Imperialism and Pro-Palestine Solidarity’, Jadaliyya, June 11, 2025. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/46777/

Shams, Alex. 2025. ‘Our Man for Tehran’, Boston Review, August 6, 2025. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/our-man-for-tehran/

Shohadaei, Setareh, and Omid Mehrgan. 2024. ‘“Apartaidi jensiati”, “jang alayhi zanan”, ya tasahobi dobareyi muqavemati zanan?’ [‘Gender Apartheid’, ‘War on Women’, or the Reappropriation of Women’s Resistance?] Radiozamaneh, May 27, 2024. https://www.radiozamaneh.com/818312/

Shohadaei, Setareh. 2023. ‘Is Masih Alinejad Really the Voice of the Iranian Women’s Movement?’, Public Seminar, September 13, 2023. https://publicseminar.org/2023/09/is-masih-alinejad-really-the-voice-of-the-iranian-womens-movement/

Vahabzadeh, Peyman. 2010. A Guerrilla Odyssey Modernization, Secularism, Democracy, and Fadai Period of National Liberation in Iran, 1971-1979. Syracuse: Syracuse State University.

Ziaberi, Kourosh. 2025. ‘Iranians Have Become Desensitized to the Question of Palestine’, New Line Magazine, November 17, 2025. https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/iranians-have-become-desensitized-to-the-question-of-palestine/


Cite as: Merghan, Omid 2025. “Palestine the Wound: A Report on the Iranian Reception of the Cause” Focaalblog October 6. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/10/06/omid-mehrgan-palestine-the-wound-a-report-on-the-iranian-reception-of-the-cause/

Aaron F. Eldridge: The Palestinian Cause Contra Sectarian Thinking

Image 1: “The Palestinian Cause” from the subtitle of Mahdi Amil’s 1980 book, An Entryway into Overturning Sectarian Thinking. Photo by Aaron F. Eldridge

“History is what hurts,” stated Frederic Jameson; “it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis” (1982, 102). And the situation today in Lebanon is a painful one, indeed. For many, the settler-colonial Zionist efforts to bring about the total obliteration of Palestine and the invasion and bombing of Lebanon can scarcely be spoken of without already appropriating the situation through what the communist thinker Mahdi Amil (1936-1987) critiqued as al-fikr al-ṭā’ifī —“sectarian thinking.” This dominant mode of thinking lays out an (idealist) eternalization of the essence of “sects” and their statist “balance”; that is, their becoming “nature.” In this thinking, what becomes seemingly self-evident is that nothing can change—and from this, the moral injunction emerges: nothing should change. At the same time, Amil averred that it is precisely al-qadiyya al-filastiniyya—“the Palestinian cause” which overturns this thinking.

Committing to Palestine was, for Amil, a question of orienting life in struggle. The bearing of this struggle in Lebanon was occasioned by the Palestinian cause insofar as the latter transgressed, as it still does today, the “natural” order of the Lebanese polity, which subsists in what Amil termed the “colonial relation”—the constellation of forces in the Mashriq that he names as imperialism, reactionism, and Zionism. This conjuncture is evident today where one sees the strong desire to relegate and contain “the Palestinian cause” to an extraneous element, naturally outside of Lebanon’s national situation. The Palestinian cause subsequently appears “within” Lebanon only as the religious fetish of a specific “sect.” This relegation—common today, for example, in the discourse of the anti-communist Kataeb Party and in American-led efforts to enforce UN Resolution 1701—is also practiced in the specific actions of the war by the IDF: the bombing of Beirut and other parts of Lebanon as well as its invasion in the south are seen as merely military actions directed toward “Shi’i” areas—“the South,” the Beqaa, or Dahieh—that are described as Hezbollah “strongholds.” The result is that the war, rather than pivot on the cause of Palestinian liberation, becomes understood as a “sectarian” battle, a metonym of the intractable conflict between East and West, civilization and barbarism, Islam and Christianity, or religion and modernity, for which Zionism is a late vehicle.

Amil was the Lebanese Communist Party’s most prolific writer during the years of Lebanon’s wars (1975-1990), which were in a large part determined by the contours of Palestinian struggle after the defeat of 1967 and the expulsion of 1970. What that “determination” means was (as it remains) a crucial problematic into which Amil consistently intervened. Indeed, Hicham Safieddine (2020: 10) notes that it was one of Amil’s earliest teachers, Shafiq al-Hout—one of the founders of the PLFP and later a prominent member of the PLO—who introduced him to Marx’s writings.

This enjambment of anti-colonial struggle and the class struggle would persist as a problematic in Amil’s theoretical practice. While studying in France and teaching in revolutionary Algeria he developed the concept of the “colonial mode of production” for this overdetermined structure, one characterized by a relation of “dependency” for capitalist domination “in” the colony on imperial capital. The ideological articulation of this structure he termed the “colonial relation,” and it is there, on the question of the matter of that relation, that “sectarianism” and “the Palestinian Cause” collide.

Amil’s return to Lebanon from Algeria was compelled by the defeat of 1967. During the ensuing years the LCP was rearticulating its relationship to anti-colonial struggle and the Soviet Union (a major issue being the latter’s acceptance of the 1948 partition of Palestine). And when in 1975 the fighting began in Lebanon—instigated, we must recall, by the conflict between fishermen in Saida and state organized capitalist expropriation (Traboulsi 2008, 323)—Amil looked to articulate the relationship between “sectarian thinking,” Arab state reactionaries, and Zionism as a question of the class struggle, anticipating the constellation of forces that would eventuate in the Syrian (nominally, the Arab Deterrent Force’s) occupation of Lebanon from 1976 and the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Between these two pivotal military interventions Amil composed and published his 1980 Madkhal ilā naqḍ al-fikr al-ṭā’ifī: al-qaḍiyya al-filastīniyya fī aydiyūlūjiyāt al-burjuwaziyya al-lubnāniyya (An Entryway into Overturning Sectarian Thinking: The Palestinian Cause in the Ideology of the Lebanese Bourgeoisie) in which “the Palestinian cause” occasions the falling away of the spontaneous ideology of the ruling class (sectarianism). It does this not through a ‘critique’ of how one ‘views’ the Palestinian cause, but by allowing sectarian thinking’s own mistaking of the Palestinian cause as a ‘sectarian’ problem to prevail. It is for that reason that the Madkhal is largely made up of a symptomatic reading of the texts of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, from the writings of Michel Chiha (1891–1954), the Mandate-era banker and phalangist politician, to Amil’s contemporary Pierre Gemayel (1905-1984) and other writings of the latter’s Kataeb Party.

The formation of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a coalition of reformists and revolutionaries that constituted the chief antagonist of the reactionary Lebanese Front (LF), was largely premised on the constitutional reform of the country’s politics. It was oriented, according to Karim Mroué, a Political Bureau Member of the LCP, toward “eliminating the domination of a kind of religious autocracy” (quoted in Ismael and Ismael 1998, 102n8). However, the Madkhal shows such bourgeois “sectarian thinking” to be undone in its own grasping of “the Palestinian cause.” Hence, while Amil was at pains to show that militant support for the PLO and the Rejectionist Front, with whom the LNM was allied, was the miḥwar, the“axis,” of the national and anticolonial class struggle in Lebanon and not an external element, the Madkhal was to effect a change in thinking—to show that the Palestinian cause as it is articulated in the ideology of the dominant class leads to the latter’s ideological armor, sectarian thinking, to fall away, as Marx says, “like rotten touchwood [wie mürber Zunder].” (1976 [1867], 932). Indeed, while naqḍ in modern Arabic gives the strong sense of a juridical interdiction, earlier meaning of the word directly invoked the unravelling of a cord. This work of unravelling, of the falling away of sectarian thinking, Amil showed, is affected in the Palestine cause. Why this is the case can only be briefly adumbrated here, by setting out the axioms that programmatically orient Amil’s theoretical work in answering the inaugural query of the Madkhal: “How do the Lebanese bourgeoisie, from the vantage of their class ideology, view the Palestinian cause?” (Amel 1980: 11). [1]

The Madkhal takes as its first axiom the orientation of class struggle, which bifurcates (rather than pluralizes) into the position of “dominant class” and the “revolutionary class.” The “ideological position of the labouring class” is what enables “seeing” the ideological practice of the Lebanese bourgeoisie as the political necessity of domination—it follows that the question of which“sect” is dominant (“the Maronites,” “the Sunni,” etc.) not only cannot see the class struggle but participates in the very sectarian thinking that obfuscates it. Moreover, the result of the breakdown of this domination in maintaining the colonial relation was the then-ongoing military action: “the bourgeoisie did not find another way to treat this political crisis of theirs but to ignite civil war; it is the logic of the dying bourgeoisie, ever urging them to descend into the abyss of their intractable crisis” (Amil 1980: 23). It is incumbent upon us to note how successful the ‘civil war’ and threat of its return has been in maintaining this domination in Lebanon over the past half-century.

The second axiom of the Madkhal is that this class-ideological position is the adequation of thinking to a real force of negation. Against the theoretical humanism of a mirrored subject/object—wherein “the Palestinian cause” is an object that can be composited properly by collating these different ‘perspectives’ (whether “one-“ or “two-state” solutions, for example)—the “soil” of this “actual field” is the class struggle that is “in the mode of overturning [naq

].” Breaking with this thinking, then, “consists specifically in bringing to presence this, the political that the ideological absents.” In other words, “seeing” the “Lebanese bourgeois ideological-conceptual structure…in its relation with this political necessity,” bears the activity of overturning it.

It is from these axioms that Amil sets up the relationship between the activity of “overturning” the class ideology of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and “the Palestinian cause”:

Viewing the Palestinian cause is not possible—no matter the position from which we view it—apart from the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples. The Palestinian national movement is an inseparable part of this movement; the internal mechanism that governs the common Arab national movement is itself what governs the Palestinian national movement, the mechanism being the liberation from imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionism. (Amil 1980, 12)

In this sense the Palestinian cause condenses the “colonial relation,” the specific conjuncture of forces (imperialism, the Arab capitalist class, and Zionism) that ideologically articulates the colonial mode of production in Lebanon. Hence Amil’s thinking is already disabused of the (idealist) tendency to systematize and absolutize the distinction between “post-colonial” and “Marxist” thought in the so-called Global South. The overdetermined structure of the “colonial mode of production” exists in the collision of these forces.

But this is precisely why it is the question of the overdetermined colonial structure itself that the Palestinian cause occasions for thinking:

Therefore, determining the Lebanese bourgeoisie’s class position on this axial cause (the Palestinian cause) in the struggle of the Arab peoples, required by necessity determining its class position on the Arab liberation movement. For in the light of this position the other position is determined, especially since the Palestinian resistance movement did not manifest, in an actual way, in the Lebanese arena (that is, in the field of the specific class conflict in the Lebanese social structure), and would not become a foundational element therein, until after the defeat of June 1967. (Amil 1980: 12)

The existence of the Palestinian cause as anterior to the anti-colonial class struggle in Lebanon does not mean that it is a genetic outgrowth of the situation, even if it is “determined” by it. Here, Amil is notinterested in instructing a historicism. Rather, he shows how the Palestinian cause’s status as, at once, contingent and axial in Lebanon’s national situation proves to be a decisive obstacle for ‘sectarian’ thinking:

It is an error, then, on the methodological level, not to show the necessary correlative relationship in the Lebanese bourgeois ideology between the position on the Arab liberation movement and the position on the Palestinian cause; as, in truth, this position is a natural, logical consequence of that position that finds, for its part, its explanation in the structure of the existing colonial relations of production in the Lebanese social structure, and in the class relation of dependence that ties the dominant bourgeoisie within it to imperialism. But if we establish a partition between the two positions, not attributing the second to the first, and we do not bring to light that the practice of the outright hostility of the Lebanese bourgeoisie toward the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinian cause is a result of the hostile relationship and class warfare that stamps its relationship to the Arab liberation movement, we would at that time fall into the trap of its class ideology, instead of being capable of overturning it. (Amil 1980: 13)

The position of these liberation movements thus turns on the Palestinian cause which articulates with them to become the symptomatic point specific to the national situation of Lebanon. It becomes the axis of a set of contradictions and of political struggle; it carries the force of the real movement of negation. But it is for precisely this reason that it cannot be thought outside the class struggle internal to Lebanon’s national situation. “We will not,” Amil writes succinctly, “overturn ‘sectarian thinking’ through sectarian thinking” (Amil 1980: 17).

In other words, the Palestinian cause, its pain and therefore its history, is one site that makes the overdetermination of the capitalist mode of production in the present, that is, modern colonisation, thinkable as what can be overturned. “The class struggle is the motive power of history; history is not moved in accordance with the dominant class’s system of class control but in the struggle against it” (Amil 1980: 22). Witnessing the current attempts to obliterate Palestine and its present existence-as-cause as well as its covering-over by the ideological practice of sectarian thinking in Lebanon today, the need to articulate the falling away of sectarian thinking is no less pressing.


Aaron F. Eldridge is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Toronto. He studies collective responses to cultural destruction and social precarity in the Middle Eastern and Muslim/Eastern Christian world.


Notes

[1] We should note here the polysemy of al-qaḍiyya al-filasṭīniyya in Arabic. It is not only “the Palestinian cause” but also “the Palestinian issue” and “the Palestinian question,” terms which, in English, ramify into terrains of political transformation or armed struggle, social antagonism, and juridical dispute respectively. This question of translation is relevant because what is at stake for Amil, following his contemporary Palestinian comrades in their articulation of resistance, is precisely the transformation of a juridical “question” (to be resolved in the future by statist, international law) into a material “cause” that articulates present time, situated in what Omid Mehrgan aptly describes in this feature as “the remnants of life today.”


References

Amil, Mahdi. 2020. Madkhal ilā naqḍ al-fikr al-ṭā’ifī: al-qaḍiyya al-filastīniyya fī aydiyūlūjiyāt al-burjuwaziyya al-lubnāniyya (An Entryway into Overturning Sectarian Thinking: The Palestinian Cause in the Ideology of the Lebanese Bourgeoisie). Beirut: Dar-al Farabi

Ismael, Tareq Y. and Jacqueline S. Ismael. 1998. The Communist Movement in Lebanon and Syria. University Press of Florida.

Jameson, Fredric. 1982. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Symbolically Social Act. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Marx, Karl. 1976 [1867]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Benjamin Fowkes. New York: Vintage.

Safieddine, Hicham. 2020. “Introduction: The Anti-Colonial Intellectual.” In Arab Marxism and National Liberation: Selected Writings of Mahdi Amel, edited by Hicham Safieddine and translated by Angela Giordani, 3–9. Leiden: Brill.

Traboulsi, Fawwaz. 2008. Tarikh lubnān al-ḥadīth [A History of Modern Lebanon]. Beirut: Dar Riad El-Rayyes.


Cite as: Eldridge, Aaron F. 2025. “The Palestinian Cause Contra Sectarian Thinking” Focaalblog October 6. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/10/06/aaron-f-eldridge-the-palestinian-cause-contra-sectarian-thinking/

Nico Putz: On Anti-Deutsche and Neo-Imperial War

Image 1: Pro-Palestine demonstration in Berlin, October 2023. Photo by Montecruz Foto

This forum has shed light on vastly different but interrelated contexts of Palestine solidarity. The essays draw attention to the interplay of shifting solidarities with Palestine and the amorphous formation of “the (political) left” across geographical and temporal contexts. Germany, although not belonging to the postcolonial and neocolonial contexts as in the other essays, is one among many puzzle pieces interlocking with political realities elsewhere, and across worlds. Like other “post”- imperial regions, Palestine continues to be an uncomfortable question mark in the German national narrative of post-Nazi redemption. It is a question mark which has split the German radical left into two seemingly irreconcilable sects: a staunchly pro-Zionist, pro-American, and markedly bellicose faction—the Anti-Deutsche—and their equally convicted counterpart, the pro-Palestinian, anti-colonial, and supposedly antisemitic Anti-Imperialists. The German and international media cyclically regurgitates this dichotomy, with every escalation of violence in Palestine sparking German leftist networks to organize protests both in support and in opposition to Israel, at times clashing violently with one another. While inter-factional violence amongst leftists is certainly not unique to this context, the locking of arms between members of the Christian Conservative Party (CDU) with antifascist groups at pro-Israeli protests just might be.

German leftists who continue to stand with Palestine were not surprised by the intensification of governmental restriction and police violence targeting pro-Palestinian support. After all, the post-war political discourse in West Germany branded anti-Zionist and otherwise pro-Palestinian leftist voices and positions as antisemitic at least since the 1960s. By the 1990s this radical pro-Zionist stance manifested increasingly in many radical leftist circles across reunified Germany. Triggered by the geopolitical fall-out resulting from the presumed end of the Cold War, like the Yugoslavian wars and the invasions of Iraq, the Anti-Deutsche left emerged as a distinct political current in the country. In this essay, I aim to deliver a longue durée of the German debate around Palestine and Israel through the idiom of this idiosyncratic political formation, pointing at entanglements that continue to link the imperial-colonial to the present. Perhaps, this helps to explain why broad sections of the German left find it easy to look the other way at the face of the destruction of Gaza or the targeting of political dissent at their own doorstep.

In the wake of the Berlin Wall and informed by Nazi atrocities as well as their acceptance of a paradigm of collective guilt, a diverse group of authors and organizers saw the potential rise of a Fourth Reich on the horizon of a reunified Germany. The rise of right-wing extremist attacks in both Germanies seemed to confirm their prophecy of a resurgence of nationalism and authoritarianism reminiscent of the Nazi era and German imperialism. This fear motivated the formation of groups that explicitly identified as antinational and later Anti-Deutsch, emphasizing a critical stance toward German history and identity, opposing German national sentiments, symbols, and slogans. (Hagen 2004, Errlanger 2009)

While a sizable, heterogenous section of the Anti-Deutsche movement eventually continued down a theoretical path, which led them to disavow themselves from “communism” and even “leftism” altogether, in the beginning they very much saw themselves as communists. But from the start, they sharply diverged from the broader radical left by challenging the prevailing anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist consensus. The West German New Left had often aligned itself with anti-colonial national liberation movements and socialist governments in the Global South, while being critical of Israel, in particular since the 1967 War. The West German radical left stood in solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinians. Similarly, in socialist East Germany, solidarity with the PLO and a critical stance towards Israel had been an element of the raison d’état (Staatsräson). Breaking with this leftist tradition, Anti-Deutsche took a militant stance of unconditional solidarity with Israel. This position was not only a political choice but framed as moral imperative grounded in their recognition of Israel as the refuge and homeland of Holocaust survivors.

Anti-Deutsche criticized the left for a tendency to relativize or downplay the Holocaust, and accused it of harboring latent antisemitism, lurking in its admittedly at times quite militant anti-Zionism. In consequence, the attitude toward the Palestinian question became a defining and divisive issue in activist circles. A further point of departure was the Anti-Deutsche’s stance on war and military interventions beyond Palestine, where they further broke with traditional leftist pacifism and anti-imperialism. This shift became particularly pronounced starting with the Gulf War in 1991, with a decisive split in the movement during the wars in Yugoslavia and continuing through the post-9/11 era. As I will show, the Anti-Deutsche ideology took shape not just in response to the German responsibility for the Holocaust, but also in reaction to violent conflicts which ensued with the global transition out of the Cold War’s stalemate, rather than out of a German exceptionalism. In fact, it is the Anti-Deutsche’s discursive linkage between these post-Cold War conflicts and the Holocaust, that have been a decisive factor in building the movement’s political identity and its relations with other formations on the left and beyond.

To fully understand this development, let’s retract again to the global sixties and the New Left. Like many other locales, the post-war generation of the left in West Germany emerged from universities and had—also in response to the Stalinist interventions in a range of popular uprisings—began to align itself with China rather than the Soviet Union. Further exacerbated by the atrocities committed in Vietnam, this anti-imperialism, which some have called Third-Worldism, became staunchly anti-American, with American foreign policy often branded as fascist. The German New Left had begun the decade trying to break their parents’ deafening silence. They acknowledged the bloodsheds of the World Wars and the genocidal Nazi apparatus, while pointing at influential members of society with previous allegiance to the Nazi Party—judges, politicians, generals, professors, etc. Reframed onto Palestine, this translated to an understanding of Israel as colonial enterprise backed by the American empire and its Western allies, with the 1967 War crystalizing this position further, thereby shaping the German New Left as “the natural home of camaraderie with Palestine,” as Roy puts it in the forum’s introduction. The unfolding dialectical radicalization of the West German state and the New Left had eventually even produced a brief active alignment between some militant elements of the German left and some militant elements within the PLO, namely the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Jean Améry (1912–1978), author and Holocaust survivor, was among the earliest to denounce leftist anti-Zionism as disguised antisemitism. Published from the mid-1960s onwards, his essays stressed Germany’s obligation to support Israel as a refuge for Holocaust survivors. He condemned the New Left’s equation of West German state repression with Nazi crimes as a gross relativization. In 1974, Hermann L. Gremliza became editor-in-chief of the West German leftist monthly Konkret (published since 1957 – except for a short break in the 1970s). While Konkret at the time still published opinions of the pro-Palestinian Red Army Faction, Gremliza would incorporate Améry’s critique and become a key figure among the early Anti-Deutsche. Despite this, he was still able to sufficiently locate a sympathy for the Palestinian cause to make statements unthinkable from German intellectuals today. For instance, he said in 1985: “Why, instead of the poor Arabs, shouldn’t the legal successors of the perpetrators [of the Holocaust] provide the Jews with a state territory, for example, Bavaria […].” Around this time, other authors like Eike Geisel and Wolfgang Pohrt appeared in Konkret, highlighting again the persistence of antisemitism and criticizing the left’s loose commitment to the PLO. Moishe Postone, a key figure for Wertkritik, reinterpreted Marx to show antisemitism as a distorted critique of capitalism. His ideas influenced later Anti-Deutsche groups and publications like Krisis, EXIT!, and Austria’s SINet. By incorporating psychoanalytic insights to critique ideology and nationalism, Ideologiekritik (critique of ideology) became central to certain strands of Anti-Deutsche theory. (Erlanger 2009: 100) While the (re-)discovery of and/or engagement with critical theory, particularly the Frankfurt School, had a long tradition within the German New Left, it gained a centrality in Anti-Deutsche theory, which eventually led to some eliminating Marxism and communism from their ideology.

A key catalyst in the emergence of the Anti-Deutsche, came in response to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Many West German leftist, from anarchists to formerly Maoist members of the Green Party, opposed reunification, fearing a “Fourth Reich” would emerge out of a newly reunified Germany. The Gulf War of 1991 was another pivotal moment in the definition of Anti-Deutsche. While attacks on the German peace movement for its alleged anti-Israeli and anti-American positions had been present before unification, this first invasion of Iraq radicalized some of the antinational left further, which immediately split the movement. Gremliza and others supported the war—a position that was unprecedented for the general anti-war ethos of the radical left. Their argument framed the war as a necessary defense of Israel from Iraqi chemical weapons and, by extension, a stand against a new form of fascism and antisemitism. Although this pro-war position did not gain majority support within the antinational movement at the time, it nonetheless established an analytical framework for the Anti-Deutsche, which involved drawing analogies between contemporary conflicts in the postcolonies, framing the United States and its allies as antifascist forces opposing new forms of fascism and antisemitism beyond the Global North.

The Kosovo War (March 24 to June 9, 1999) served as another point of departure, profoundly impacting the Anti-Deutsche’s ideological development and their relationship with the broader German left. This conflict, which saw NATO intervention to decisively shift the tide in favor of Kosovo Albanians, culminating in the withdrawal of the Serbian army and the establishment of an international protectorate over Kosovo, marked Germany’s first active military involvement since 1945. In his speech at the Green Party’s special conference on May 13 of that year, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer notoriously defended the NATO assault on Yugoslavia by stating: “Auschwitz is incomparable. But I stand on two principles: never again war, never again Auschwitz, never again genocide, never again fascism. Both belong together for me.”

This implicit Auschwitz comparison and the humanitarian justification for military action ignited an intense debate within both the Green Party and the left in Germany and Austria. In a highly idiosyncratic and anachronistic interpretation, some Anti-Deutsche viewed the Kosovo conflict primarily as a German war against Serbian nationalism, asserting that Germany was leading the intervention with the Americans in a subordinate role. Conversely, the Anti-Deutsche themselves supported Serbia and vehemently opposed NATO intervention, seeing it as a direct continuation of German nationalism and imperialism, replicating the alliance between the Croatian fascists of the Ustaše regime and the Nazis. The remainder of the antinational left on the other hand, tended towards an abstract rejection of both Serbian nationalism and the NATO intervention, condemning all parties involved.

The next external impetus for controversial Anti-Deutsche stances followed soon thereafter in shape of the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. This confirmed their monochrome assessment of (militant) resistance to Western modernity as inherently antisemitic, in turn radicalizing their position on Palestine and beyond. The Anti-Deutsche then endorsed military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as essential for the defense of Israel and Western civilization. We can see here, as with the cases of the Gulf War and the Kosovo War, how the German image of the postcolonial (particularly Muslim) world has been closely intertwined with the responsibilities resulting from the Holocaust and a narrative of a benevolently superior West. This militant pro-war and pro-Israel stance considerably deepened divisions within the German left and, notably, even within the Anti-Deutsche’s own ranks. While a minority retained some critical perspectives on US foreign policy, a significant faction fully embraced a pro-American, pro-Israel position and the broader Global War on Terror. In their evolving analysis, political and even cultural Islam was increasingly viewed as a new fascism, analogous to fascism in the German tradition. Their uncompromising rhetoric led to their exclusion from various left-wing anti-fascist demonstrations and a general alienation from anti-fascist circles, but, at the same time, they won support from the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, even attracting some party-members to participate in protests they had organized.

The Anti-Deutsche strongly oppose the traditional left-wing sympathy for Palestine. The Second Intifada and subsequent uprisings were almost exclusively framed as inherently antisemitic attacks on Israel, and Anti-Deutsche discourse consistently emphasizes Israel’s role as a crucial bulwark against global antisemitism and Islamist extremism. Anti-Deutsche critique categorically rejects any concessions to Palestinian movements, indiscriminately devaluating perspectives as diverse as the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement, leftist intellectuals like Noam Chomsky, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, often drawing parallels to Nazi antisemitism.

Over time, the Anti-Deutsche movement became increasingly isolated from other leftist groups. Some members began publishing in conservative media outlets, further blurring the boundaries between left and right, and provoking criticism from both sides. Despite this, the Anti-Deutsche remain a unique phenomenon in German political culture.

Assessing the Anti-Deutsche’s s impact on German society, particularly the left, is challenging, primarily because it was never bound to a monolithic rhetoric. Beyond unwavering support for Israel and a tendency to back US – led invasions, their positions were at times unpredictable and spontaneous responses to current events. Recurring popular declarations of the Anti-Deutsche left’s demise and irrelevance, or its public stripping of “leftist” status, further complicate impact assessment. As early as 2006, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (a major German think tank affiliated with the leftist party Die Linke) published an article implying that the Anti-Deutsche did not fit traditional leftist ideals of optimism, anti-capitalism, and nuanced critique (Erdem 2006). Yet, the Anti-Deutsche’s voice persists in the German public arena, the academy, the media, and in the parliament. Partially, this is explicable by the careers of some Anti-Deutsche, particularly later generations, who might not identify as such anymore but could be bringing their Anti-Palestinian stance along the way up the career ladder.

The Anti-Deutsche were and are an amorphous group, producing sometimes valid and necessary critique of ideological narratives, sometimes cultural agitprop like danceable tunes, and occasional high-meta theory of society under capitalism. To the reunifying German left, they were also the source of countless headaches, accusations, rifts, and breakups, some culminating in symbolic and even physical violence between potential comrades. Alienating their contemporaries, the early Anti-Deutsche have made a lasting impact on future generations, who often diluted the former’s hardcore positions, but simultaneously spread their ideology in academia, the press, and leftist institutions. In Germany, the secret service in charge of surveilling and defining political extremism, has recently re-discovered the Anti-Deutsche left, after deeming its divisive potential exhausted back in 2007. The reports of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz have in response to the developments on and following October 7 included a new section, titled Auswirkungen des Nahostkonflikts und Antisemitismus (Consequences of the Conflict in the Middle East and Antisemitism), in which they acknowledge the continued existence of radical leftist groups with a militant pro-Zionist stance. Yet, the German state’s tradition of ontologically separating Palestinian secular anti-imperialists in Germany from their “native” German counterparts on the other hand, continues in an unbroken chain reaching across several decades of annual reports. Consequently, the Palestinian organization Samidoun, which the German state considers a frontal organization of the PFLP, is lumped in with militant Islamists, Kurdish and Punjabi separatists, and Turkish right-wing extremists, in a separate chapter titled Auslandsbezogener Extremismus (Foreign-related Extremism). This revealing manifestation of Staatsräson might also explain the mainstream acceptance of the criminalization of this organization in 2023.

Taking stock of the larger German scene, Chancellor Friedrich Merz earlier this year welcomed the US-Israeli attack on Iran as a justified strike against an immoral “terror regime” at war with the West’s liberal values. Merz and his government’s views are driven by two core beliefs, both entangled with the legacy of Germany’s post-war leftist schisms: (1) that the post-Cold War transatlantic order, driven by liberal markets and values, is the best path to a democratic and equitable society, and (2) that Islam and Palestinian nationalism are incompatible with this order. These beliefs are increasingly prevalent across the German political spectrum, often as a frantic catching-up to the alt-right’s political gains. Paradoxically, these views often overlap substantially with positions developed from an extreme left that feared the remilitarization of Germany overseen by Merz and his predecessor. As Omid Mehrgan puts it in this forum, Palestine here is a “mode of relating to the politics of material conditions of life that touches all forms of politicization in the globalized ecologies of war and of remnants of life today.” It is also a mode of explication, for those among the readers who may have been stupefied as to why Germany’s repression of pro-Palestine demonstrations on the streets of Berlin and elsewhere have been so over-the-top violent. These demonstrations, in spite of everything, challenge the very trajectory of politics in Germany, especially leftist politics, since the Nazi event.


Nico Putz researches Afro-Asian entanglements during the Cold War at Leibniz-Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, and is on the editorial board of MIDA Archival Reflexicon. 


References

Erdem, Isabel. (2006). Anti-deutsche Linke oder anti-linke Deutsche? UTOPIE kreativ (192), 926–39.

Erlanger, Simon. (2009). “The Anti-Germans – The Pro-Israel German Left. Jewish Political Studies Review 21, (1–2), 95-99.

Hagen, Patrick. (2004). Die Antideutschen und die Debatte der Linken über Israel. MA thesis, University of Cologne, 2004, 2-7, 58.


Cite as: Putz, Nico 2025. “On Anti-Deutsche and Neo-Imperial War” Focaalblog September 27. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/09/27/nico-putz-on-anti-deutsche-and-neo-imperial-war/

Olivia C. Harrison: Who’s Afraid of Palestine Solidarity?


Image 1: The logo of Mouvement des travailleurs arabes, from the Saïd Bouziri collection at Archives de La Contemporaine.

One question has been haunting me since the current wave of repression of pro-Palestinian speech began in the wake of the October 7 attacks and the genocidal campaign-disguised-as-reprisal that followed: who’s afraid of Palestine solidarity? This is an urgent question on US, French, and German campuses today, but its purview is not limited to the Global North. In fact, this question puts pressure on the distinction between Global North and South, as if the newly minted leaders of formerly colonized nations had created the “new man” that Frantz Fanon so passionately called for (Fanon 1963: 316). As dissidents, intellectuals, and artists from former European colonies have taught us, the simple transfer of power cannot be mistaken for what Fanon called decolonization, a process that begins with sovereignty but does not end there. The mass transfer of populations set in motion by colonial settlement and postcolonial migration is one of the vectors that disrupts the neat temporal and epistemic divisions between the imperial era and the purportedly postcolonial era. So too is Palestine, the object of a century-long process of settler colonization that flares up every few years in a new war of elimination. The migrant question and the Palestinian question are not separate questions. The ways in which they overlap go a long way to explaining the threat Palestine and Palestine solidarity represent across our still decolonizing world.

At first sight, Palestine appears to be an outlier on the sanitized map that has made permanent the borders drawn by European colonial powers – as if Palestine were a belated hangover from the era of full-throttle imperialism and settler colonialism. But the impermanence of Palestine’s ever-dwindling borders gives the lie to the fantasy of decolonization as a fait accompli. Palestine is a thorn in the side of postcolonial regimes too quick to forget the revolutions that carried them to power – perhaps especially those regimes that pay lip service to the Palestinian cause while quashing dissent, including Algeria, a self-declared ally of the Palestinian resistance that has long suppressed any speech deemed critical of the state. As dissidents in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have repeatedly warned, Palestine has long served as an alibi for repressive Arab regimes.

And yet Palestine solidarity is alive and well, as the mass protests of the past two years have shown us, even though the conditions on the ground have deteriorated to the point that the goals of Palestine solidarity in the era of Third Worldism – total decolonization in the form of a single, democratic state for all inhabitants of historic Palestine – seem completely unattainable today. The facts on the ground have all but foreclosed the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty. So why does Palestine continue to pose a threat, not only to the settler colonial regime that has been steadily replacing the Palestinians for over a century, but for nation-states that have apparently no stake in the outcome of settler replacement or indigenous resistance? This is not a rhetorical question, although the answer may seem obvious in the nation-state in which I write, the US, a settler colonial regime likewise premised on the replacement of its indigenous populations. Settler colonial solidarity goes a long way to explain the threat that Palestine and Palestine solidarity represent to Israel and the US. This is also true of other settler and post-settler regimes like Australia and France (more on the latter below). But this does not explain the threat that Palestine solidarity poses to the postcolonial regimes of former European colonies – including former settler colonies like Algeria. This is the flip side of Arpan Roy’s caution against taking Palestine solidarity as a given. If we need to rethink what it means to commit to Palestine, anti-Palestinian backlash, too, should be denaturalized. In what follows I discuss several case studies that shed light on dangers that commitment to Palestine represents in France, Algeria, and the US, focusing on the links that tie the migrant question to the Palestinian question.

*

I begin with a document that stages our relationship to decolonization as an unfinished process, one in which Palestine figures among other more or less successful anticolonial revolutions. French-Moroccan artist Bouchra Khalili’s twenty-two minute digital video Foreign Office is part of an installation which includes fifteen photographs of the now-deserted embassies of Third World revolutionary movements in Algiers and a silkscreen print that assembles these sites in an “Archipelago” of now disconnected points. The video begins with a medium shot of Ines and Fadi, two young Algerians, sitting side by side at a black desk that turns into an editing table as they handle the maps, photographs, audio and video recordings that together compose the archive of Algiers as a “Mecca for revolutionaries,” in Amílcar Cabral’s poetic phrase: the soundtrack of the 1969 Pan-African Festival; black and white photographs of Eldridge and Kathleen Cleaver at the Black Panthers’ international headquarters in Algiers; and portraits of Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X, Agostinho Neto, Mário Pinto de Andrade, and other Third World revolutionaries who gathered in Algiers to discuss their plans for decolonization (Khalili 2015). In the wake of the Algerian revolution, anticolonial and antiracist movements from around the world found refuge in Algiers, sometimes headquartered in the same colonial-era building, vacated to make room for transcolonial solidarity. But this legendary past is long gone. “We have inherited only disenchantment and history in pieces,” Ines observes. What has happened to Algeria, she wonders, to make everyday Algerians yearn to leave for France? Ines speaks in Darija (Algerian Arabic), Fadi speaks in Taqbaylit, an indigenous language that predates the Muslim conquest of North Africa in the seventh century, and they understand each other perfectly. Together, they edit the archives of an era they never knew to understand the present they share, summoning the voice of Algerian writer Kateb Yacine, who left behind the French language – his “butin de guerre” (war booty) – to forge new cultural forms and idioms in a newly sovereign nation that was already betraying its revolutionary ideals.

Shot in Algiers a few years before the pro-democracy movement (al-hirak) took to the streets in February 2019 to protest Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s attempt to secure a fifth term as president, Foreign Office sketches the coordinates of transcolonial solidarity and its undoing in the aftermath of decolonization. What lessons can we draw from Ines and Fadi’s “revolutionary heartbreak” (to cite a term coined by my colleague Neetu Khanna) as we witness the destruction of Gaza in the twenty-first century? And what can Palestine teach us about our relation to the anticolonial past and neocolonial present? The lines that Foreign Office draws between past and present, here and elsewhere are an invitation to rethink what commitment to Palestine means at a time when the intensity of Palestine solidarity stands in inverse proportion to the possibility of Palestinian futurity.

To begin answering the question “who’s afraid of Palestine solidarity,” I take Ines and Fadi’s invitation to return to the work of Kateb Yacine, an outspoken advocate for Palestinian rights who deployed Palestine in a twinned critique of the roles Algeria and France played in transforming the figure of the indigène (the colonized) into the figure of the immigrant, divorced from the settler colonial histories that produced it. In response to Ines’s question as to why Algerians continue to leave the “Mecca of revolutionaries,” Kateb’s play proposes that they do not have a choice. Settler colonialism set in motion the mass transfer of populations from the metropole to the colony, from the colony to the metropole, and, if the anti-immigrant right has its way, from the post-settler colony back to the former colony. It’s not coincidental that settler colonialism set this train in motion, or that Palestine, the object of another project of settler replacement, elucidates this dynamic in Kateb’s writings and in the forms of migrant activism that followed. As I will show in my concluding discussion of Palestine solidarity in 1970s France and the US today, Palestine has become a litmus test for national belonging in the settler postcolony.

*

In 1970, the beloved anticolonial writer Kateb Yacine returned to Algeria with the aim of working in the languages of the people, Darija and Taqbaylit, better suited, according to him, to achieving cultural decolonization than the colonial tongue he mastered so brilliantly. On his friend Ali Zamoum’s recommendation, he joined Masrah al-bahr (Theater of the sea), a popular theater troupe that had already performed several plays, including one on Vietnam, a topic dear to Kateb’s heart. Based on collaboration, improvisation, and audience participation, the troupe began adapting parts of Kateb’s thousand-page French-language manuscript play, Boucherie de l’espérance (Butchery of hope, 1968-69) in their headquarters in the working-class neighborhood of Kouba, in Algiers. Their first play, Mohamed arfad valiztek (Mohamed pack your bags), premiered on October 17, 1971, marking the tenth anniversary of the murder of hundreds of Algerians peacefully protesting against a racist curfew targeting Français musulmans d’Algérie (colonized Muslim French nationals of Algeria) by Paris police forces five months before the signing of the Evian Accords that would put an end to the Algerian war of independence from France. The irony of the title, Mohamed pack your bags, was initially lost on the Algerian immigrants who saw the poster for the play during the troupe’s French tour in 1972 – they reportedly panicked, assuming it was a call for the expulsion of immigrants. (The far-right National Front party was founded on this very campaign promise in October 1972. It remains the number one agenda of its de-demonized successor, the National Rally, and the plethora of anti-immigrant parties and organizations that have cropped up since.) While one of the self-declared aims of the play was, in fact, to convince Algerians to return to their homeland to continue the work of decolonization, the play is also a fiercely funny denunciation of the collaboration of postcolonial Algerian authorities and French government and industrial forces in recruiting, deporting, and exploiting Algerian workers in France. Mohamed arfad valiztek remained the troupe’s most popular play, reaching an estimated 75,000 spectators during the French tour, from February to June 1972, and another 350,000 in Algeria in the next four years, where the troupe (renamed Al-nishat al-thaqafa lil-‘umal/Action culturelle des travailleurs or Worker’s cultural action, hereafter ACT) continued to perform Mohamed arfad valiztek alongside plays on Palestine (Filastin al-maghdura, Palestine betrayed, 1974) and the neglected role of Imazighen (“Berbers”) and women in Algeria’s millennial history (Malik al-gharb, The king of the west, 1977). Initially funded by the Ministry of Work and based in the popular Bab El Oued neighborhood of Algiers, the troupe’s irreverent and openly critical performances soon caught the attention of government censors. In 1977 the troupe was forced to relocate to the Western province of Sidi Bel Abbès, where they continued to perform until Kateb’s premature death in 1989.

An often bitingly funny satire of the backroom deals between the Algerian and French governments that resulted in the emigration of an estimated 750,000 Algerians by the time the first decade of independence was over, Mohamed arfad valiztek depicts the trials and tribulations of the titular character, a down-on-his luck migrant who faces a series of setbacks that ultimately lead to his triumphant return to Algeria where he resumes possession of his expropriated home thanks to the proverbial nail in the wall (this scene is based on a popular “Juha” tale known throughout North Africa) and vows to join the struggle against injustice “until the end of colonialism!” (Kateb 1999: 336). Although no opponents are named – Mohamed battles in turn the slavedriver, the police officer, the qadi (judge), the mufti (religious leader), and Boudinar (“father of money”) – the satire of the national elites and their French counterparts is impossible to miss. More subtle is the play’s critique of the transformation of indigènes (natives), as the Algerians were dubbed in French colonial law, into immigrants, construed as a disposable labor force that greases the wheels of the French and Algerian economy alike. The satirical name Pompez-tout (“Pump-it-all”), a near homonym of Pompidou, the French president’s name, neatly captures the labor-for-oil deals of the postcolonial migrant economy. But a less expected figure joins the chorus of characters on stage to expose the colonial genealogies of the migrant economy in France: a Palestinian laborer. What does Palestine have to do with Algerian immigration to France?

Mohamed arfad valiztek begins with a scene split between French Algeria and Mandate Palestine. On one side of al-halqa (a circle drawn by the spectators) stand Mohamed I, an indigenous laborer, and Ernest, a French settler; on the other, Mohamed II and Moses, a Zionist settler. The two Mohameds till the land under the supervision of the settlers, until the pairs depart, seemingly taking the same path home. After a good night’s rest, the two Mohameds and settlers wake up and begin chasing a single rooster with the generous aim of offering it to their “guest” for breakfast. The hilarious battle for hospitality that ensues satirizes the contest for indigeneity in a now chiasmic settler colony (“If only this rooster could speak… – He’d say France! . . . – Israel! – Algeria! – Palestine!) but also, as the rest of the play implies, in the settler postcolony, where yesterday’s indigène has been transformed into an immigrant, and the settler of old has become a native (Kateb 1999: 214). Rooting French anti-immigrant discourse in the longue durée history of French Algeria, Mohamed arfad valiztek exposes the settler colonial genealogies of the forms of nativism that were taking hold in France at the time. That it delivers this critique through a comparison with Palestine should not surprise us. If settler colonialism is based on land expropriation rather than labor exploitation, it remains the case that both French Algeria and Israel relied on native labor – notwithstanding the Zionist myth of Jewish labor – and that the indigènes (natives) have been transformed into foreigners in both France and Israel. But the play goes further than this. If the migrant economy is a product of settler colonialism, settler replacement also provides the rhetorical framework for calls for “remigration” satirized in the title Mohamed pack your bags. The fantasy of the “great replacement” – the purported replacement of Français de souche, white French people, by immigrants – was born at the colonial frontier.

When the ACT toured Mohamed arfad valiztek in France, North African migrant workers were already organizing around Palestine. In the wake of Black September, the 1970 massacre of thousands of Palestinian fedayeen by King Hussein’s troops in and around Amman, a group of Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian activists got together at the Maison du Maroc (Morocco House) of the Cité Universitaire in Paris to form the Comités de soutien à la révolution palestinienne (Committees in support of the Palestinian revolution, hereafter CSRP). The first autonomous organization dedicated to the rights of migrant workers and students in France, the CSRP allied support for Palestine to advocacy for migrants, raising money and donating blood for the fedayeen even as they organized mass protests to denounce racist crimes and anti-immigrant legislation. The French authorities, aided by their counterparts in North Africa who were busy tracking their nationals’ political activities abroad (including activism against the authoritarian regimes of Morocco and Tunisia), arrested scores of pro-Palestinian activists and deported several to their home countries, where they were duly collected by domestic police forces. These punitive measures did not deter CSRP activists, who went on to found the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (Arab workers’ movement) and a theater troupe, Al Assifa (The Tempest), named after the armed wing of Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement). Popular theater was, for Al Assifa as it was for the ACT, a weapon in the struggle for migrant rights in France. Whether or not the members of Al Assifa attended any of the ACT’s performances in France – there is no evidence of this in the archives – the North African genealogy of Palestine solidarity in France is clear. North African migrant workers and students identified with the Palestinians on the grounds of a shared experience of colonization and settler replacement. But they also looked to Palestine for inspiration, explicitly positioning themselves as successors to the Algerian revolutionaries and allies of the fedayeen. Migrant rights were, for these activists, part of a process of decolonization that did not stop with formal independence or at the borders of France-Algeria. The French government was right to suspect that Palestine solidarity meant activism on many fronts, including in defense of migrant rights, just as its North African counterparts were right to see Palestine solidarity as a first step in the struggle for decolonization in the purportedly postcolonial era. For the past half century, Palestine has been a “rallying cry” for decolonization in former colonies and metropoles alike (Said 1979: 125).

*

The repression of pro-Palestinian speech in 1970s Algeria and France prefigures the repression of pro-Palestinian speech today, even though there are important differences between these two moments, not least the impossibility of calling for cohabitation in a single democratic state – let alone the right to resist colonialism, once enshrined in international law – without being branded a terrorist. Today the suppression of pro-Palestinian speech remains intimately tied to the suppression of migrant rights, as illustrated most recently by the Abu Daqqa case in France and the Mahmoud Khalil case in the US. In conclusion, I briefly turn to these two cases, which are exemplary of the intimate links between Palestinian and migrant rights, and the continued instrumentalization of pro-Palestinian speech by anti-immigrant policy.

On October 16, 2023, undercover French police arrested Palestinian feminist activist Mariam Abu Daqqa in Marseille, following an Interior Ministry expulsion order that claimed that her presence on French territory after the Hamas attacks of October 7 was a threat to “public order” (Abu Daqqa is a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is blacklisted as “terrorist organization” in France and the US). A pioneer of the Palestinian feminist movement, Abu Daqqa was invited by French feminist organizations in September 2023 to speak about the rights of Palestinian women and the plight of female political prisoners in Israeli jails. The timing of her presence on French territory proved ideal for the nativist right. Her arrest came one week after the October 7 attacks and one day after an Islamist Russian national murdered a French schoolteacher, Dominique Bernard, in Arras. Despite legal attempts to stay the deportation order, she was deported to Cairo on November 10 (the state did not deport her to her native Gaza, on humanitarian grounds). In the following weeks, the Abu Daqqa and Bernard cases were instrumentalized to support a proposed law that would make it possible to deport immigrants displaying “behavior not compatible with French values.” Abu Daqqa is a feminist activist, and an unveiled one at that – in this sense, her behavior is presumably compatible with the values of the French Republic. But this does not make her less threatening in the context of France’s ongoing war on terror. To be Palestinian or pro-Palestinian is to be a potential terrorist.

The long history of the French state’s suppression of pro-Palestinian speech offers lessons for activists and scholars who continue to commit to Palestine in a range of diverse contexts, even though we must attend to the specific forms these commitments take, and the particular contours of the backlash against them. Writing as a French-American teacher and scholar based in the US, I am struck by the parallels between the foreignization of Palestine solidarity in France over the past fifty years and the decades-long reduction of Palestine solidarity to terrorism in the US. Remember that one of Donald Trump’s first reelection campaign promises was to deport foreign pro-Palestinian protestors. True to his word, he has spent the first few months of his second term targeting pro-Palestinian activists, starting with students carrying visas and green cards. Although I’m not aware of any inkling within his team that France has a proven record of doing the same, it’s clear that the deportation of pro-Palestinian migrant workers in 1970s France and, more recently, the deportation of Mariam Abu Daqqa offer a playbook for the foreignization of Palestine solidarity in the US, one that fits perfectly in the narrative of the war on terror that governs both French and American domestic and foreign policy. The current arrest of pro-Palestinian protestors by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the most recent example of anti-Palestinian policing in the settler postcolony, where migrant rights are the first (but not the last) to be sacrificed in the name of security. That the government is threatening to deport a permanent resident, Mahmoud Khalil, apparently marks a departure from the French state’s practice of deporting immigrants, whether on French territory legally or not. And yet twenty-first century debates about denaturalization in France, and more recently in the US, make it clear that Palestine has become a litmus test for national belonging: if you’re pro-Palestinian, you’re not really French, or American.

That the criminalization of pro-Palestinian speech has been reenergized in the wake of October 7 and the unfolding genocide in Gaza should not delude us. If the killing subsides, as one must hope it will, Palestine solidarity will not die down, nor will attempts to suppress it. Commitment to Palestine has only become more urgent as a result, particularly for those of us who have the privilege of carrying a French or US passport – at least the kind that cannot be revoked. We know who’s afraid of Palestine solidarity, and we’re not afraid of them.


Olivia Harrison is Professor of French, Comparative Literature, and Middle East Studies at the University of Southern California, and author of Natives against Nativism: Antiracism and Indigenous Critique in Postcolonial France (2023) and Transcolonial Maghreb: Imagining Palestine in the Era of Decolonization (2016).


References

Fanon, Frantz (1963). The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press.

Kateb, Yacine (1999). Boucherie de l’espérance: œuvre théâtrale. Paris: Seuil.

Khalili, Bouchra (2015). Foreign Office. Digital video.

Said, Edward W. (1979). The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Press.


Cite as: Harrison, Olivia C. 2025. “Who’s Afraid of Palestine Solidarity?” Focaalblog September 26. https://www.focaalblog.com/2025/09/26/olivia-harrison-whos-afraid-of-palestine-solidarity/