Tag Archives: digitalization

Veronika Nagy: Surveilling Sentiments: When Emotion Becomes Evidence

Image 1: Illustration of AI by Champ Panupong Techawongthawon on Unsplash.

In 2024, the German cabinet approved a draft law that expanded deportation criteria to include public expressions that “approve” or “promote” terrorism on platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. Although the Ministry of the Interior subsequently clarified that a single “like” would not automatically suffice, the proposal nevertheless made newly visible a broader development in migration governance and the growing relevance of digital activities, including its affective and often highly ambiguous dimensions, to questions of risk, legitimacy, and deportability. By early 2025, deportation orders were already being issued under these expanded provisions, especially in cases involving protest speech and accusations of antisemitism or incitement. While these cases did not in fact hinge on isolated reactions alone, they made clear that nonverbal expressions on social media had acquired a distinct evidentiary potential within migration casework.

In this blog, I will not primarily analyse the legal status of migrants and the use of likes itself, nor will I argue that online expressions have straightforwardly replaced older forms of migration control. Passports, interviews, case files, and biometric checks remain central to contemporary migration control. Rather, I am interested in how the field of bordering has expanded, so that digital traces such as posts, comments, emojis, reactions, affiliations, and other small residues of everyday online life become increasingly available for institutional interpretation, and in doing so, alter the conditions under which migrants become legible to authorities. Migration scholars, like Petra Molnar (2024) and Annaliese Pelizza (2021), have long shown that the border is no longer confined to the territorial edge, but is distributed across administrative routines, infrastructures of data collection, and dispersed spaces through which mobile lives are rendered knowable. What my Virtual Asylum project showed is that this process is now extending more deeply into the affective textures of digital life, where sentiments, moods, and symbolic gestures may be re-read as indicators of disposition, alignment, or credibility (Nagy 2024).

The argument I want to develop is relatively simple. Across Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands, migrants who arrived during the so-called migration crisis rarely described dramatic encounters with surveillance. Instead, they recounted more subtle and routine changes in their social media practices, shaped by expectations of bureaucratic monitoring.. These adjustments were often framed as routine preparations for asylum or residency procedures, comparable to gathering documents or organising interview notes. Yet they reveal something significant about the present conjuncture, a securitisation of sentiments, where affective traces do not become politically relevant only at the moment they are expressed, but at the moment they are evaluated. In what follows, I first examine these everyday adjustments, which clustered around practices such as precautionary deletion, affective neutralisation, account stratification, and anticipatory compliance. I then show how these practices illuminate a broader shift in migration governance, in which digital traces are increasingly integrated into administrative assessments not only as information, but as cues through which people are sensed and interpreted. I end by reflecting on what it means when emotion becomes evidence and when digital life, once valued primarily as a resource for mobility, communication, and support, also becomes a site of affective bordering.

Everyday Adjustments to Digital Surveillance

During my fieldwork, people didn’t talk about their online practices regarding data sharing and polymedia use as a break with their past networks or a social performance conducted by constant fear. Instead, they described small, practical routines they use to deal with migration bureaucracy in an increasingly data-driven system. Participants from conflict countries along the Western Balkan route – the primary land pathway for irregular migration from the Middle East and Asia into the European Union via the Balkan Peninsula did not usually present these practices as resistance, nor even necessarily as responses to confirmed surveillance. More often, they spoke of them as forms of preparation, actions taken because digital traces had become relevant enough to matter, even if the exact criteria by which they might later be interpreted remained unclear. In that sense, what emerged across interviews was not a common social response to avoid migration authorities, but a series of recurring coping strategies through which migrants sought to manage how they might appear once their digital traces entered administrative circulation.

One of these strategies is what I call precautionary deletion. Several respondents described reviewing and removing older posts before interviews or appointments, not because those materials were overtly political or obviously incriminating, but because they had become too ambiguous once digital histories were understood to have potential relevance for casework. An Afghan respondent in the Netherlands explained that before a scheduled interview, he went through years of older posts and deleted jokes, emojis, and anything that might look disrespectful. The phrase is telling, because the issue was not prohibited content, but interpretive vulnerability. Humour, irony, and casual sociability felt safe within their original context, but not once imagined through the evaluative frame of a bureaucracy concerned with credibility and risk. In that sense, the practice was shaped less by the certainty of monitoring than by the possibility that routine and context-dependent expression might later be read within a framework of risk.

The majority crossing Schengen borders employed practices that I describe as affective neutralisation. Participants, especially those who were hoping to settle in Germany, spoke of refraining from reacting publicly to posts during politically charged periods, not because they lacked anger, grief, or solidarity, but because they wished to avoid generating visible emotional signals that might later be interpreted without context. One respondent explained that she had stopped reacting to public content altogether because “you never know how they read it,” a statement that captures well the uncertainty of these adjustments. The issue was not simply self-censorship in a classical sense, but the effort to minimise expressive traces in an environment where affective gestures, even a heart, an angry emoji, or a supportive comment were taken not only as momentary reactions but as indications of deeper ideological or social orientation. What was being managed here was less the content of speech than the risk of misalignment between intention and institutional interpretation.

The most impressive practice, mainly described by Syrian refugees in Europe, was the maintenance of multiple digital identities for different audiences and purposes. Across Greece and Hungary, respondents described keeping one relatively sparse and predictable account that appeared neutral and ordinary, especially where visibility to institutions was thought possible, while reserving other accounts or channels for more intimate, familial, communal, or politically expressive forms of communication. This was not usually framed as concealment in a dramatic sense, but as a practical way of organising visibility across different social and institutional settings. It reflected an understanding that not all digital spaces are encountered equally, and that emotional expression may be acceptable in one setting while framed as problematic in another. The segmentation of accounts thus worked as a way of separating audiences, obligations, and vulnerabilities, allowing migrants to maintain social connectedness while also managing the risks of being made legible to institutions through the wrong kind of digital exposure.

Running through these different practices in various stages of the mobility paths along the Balkan route, refugees emphasised a broader pattern that can be understood as a form of anticipatory compliance. Participants did not present themselves as reacting to explicit instructions from authorities. Rather, they adjusted in advance, in response to the uncertain but real possibility that online traces might be mobilised during interviews, assessments, or decisions. They had heard of posts being referenced in asylum interviews, or of online material being used to question credibility and some participants had even encountered this directly, while others knew of it through wider migrant networks. Their concern, then, was not abstract surveillance in the general sense, but the concrete and selective use of digital traces in decision-making. This anticipatory dimension is important because it shows that border effects do not only arise when digital content is formally used as evidence, but also when the possibility of such use becomes embedded in the practical reasoning of those subject to migration governance.

According to these narratives there was a clear polymedia culture of affective legibility explained by mobile user refugees as an administrative requirement on the road. Beyond documents and narrative coherence, digital histories and emotional tone are increasingly perceived as relevant to how a person is assessed. Respondents did not usually describe this through legal or policy language. Instead, they spoke through familiar routines of deleting, withholding, separating, cleaning, and simplifying personal responses via online platforms on smart phone devices. Yet these routines indicate that digital platform use has become incorporated into the labour of preparing oneself for bureaucratic encounters. They do not suggest fear-driven withdrawal from digital life, nor do they point to an all-encompassing regime of surveillance. Contextually speaking, these routines show how emotional and digital self-presentation have become part of navigating institutions whose evaluative frames now reach further into the small and often ambiguous traces of everyday online life.

Affective Governance Expands Migration Control

The incorporation of digital activity into migration casework is not occurring in isolation. It reflects a broader administrative shift in which risk-oriented governance increasingly relies on pre-emptive assessments rather than solely on past actions, and in which online expressions, such as comments, reactions, symbolic gestures, and visible affiliations become supplemental indicators of disposition, credibility, or possible alignment. During my fieldwork, I observed how this expansion of scrutiny operates through three interconnected mechanisms. First, the datafication of everyday interaction flattens the thick context of social life into discrete, legible data points, turning fleeting gestures into permanent “traces” for administrative review. Next, affective inference allows officials to judge a person’s character based on their emojis and comments. Finally, through the administrative integration of these traces, these digital fragments are woven into formal evidentiary procedures, transforming the messiness of lived experience into a solidified legal fact used to support legal decision-making processes.

With the rapidly increasing datafication of everyday interactions, the refugees from my research did not describe elaborate intelligence operations or systematic monitoring in a strong sense. Surprisingly, they normalised encounters in which officials referred to digital behaviour, public posts, or content that remained visible online, sometimes from years earlier digital data that were regularly investigated without consent. These instances indicate that digital traces are gradually moving into existing evidentiary frameworks, not necessarily as primary evidence, but as contextual material that can support or complicate judgments about coherence, sincerity, or trustworthiness. What began as a resource for maintaining social ties and accessing information during migration has gradually evolved into a source of administrative data, extending social media’s role into governance and surveillance practices. Platforms like Facebook and Instagram are no longer just for connection but also provide persistent, accessible data that is easily tied to an individual’s identity. Consequently, these digital footprints have become key indicators in migration casework. In this sense, digital interaction becomes not only socially but archivally useful. This practice also relies on a newly digitized affective inference as an assessment logic. This does not always depend on advanced emotional AI or formalised algorithmic analysis, even if those developments form part of the wider landscape discussed in contemporary scholarship on migration control. More immediately, affective inference (Hesp et al 2021) often occurs through modest but consequential acts of interpretation of officers, deciding whether an online expression appears hostile, sympathetic, supportive, provocative, or politically aligned. Respondents repeatedly described uncertainty about how reactions, comments, or expressive symbols might be understood, especially during periods of heightened political tension. The key issue here is that affect is not judged only for what it says, and how language and semantics could matter, but for what it is presumed to reveal about the person who produced it. A reaction becomes legible not only as emotion, but as a possible sign of disposition. This aligns with broader work on emotional AI and soft biometrics, which shows how affective cues are increasingly turned into actionable information. Yet in my fieldwork, I identified how this appeared as a mundane process of making interiority legible by translating private affects into bureaucratic facts, where institutions read the ‘vibe’ of digital traces as a way to fix a person’s character.

Most importantly, these easy-access personal digital traces become administratively integrated into existing procedures of border control practices. The significance of this step lies in the fact that online material does not necessarily need to stand on its own as decisive proof to matter. Participants described religious and politically sensitive posts being discussed during interviews, public profiles being checked for discrepancies, and older content becoming newly relevant because of developments elsewhere. In this way, digital material enters what anthropologists might call an administrative archive (Stoler 2008, Zeitlyn 2012), a digitized cumulative repository of heterogeneous materials used to build an image of a person’s background, reliability, and orientation. Once digital affect enters this archive, its interpretation gains institutional weight, even if selectively and contingently. This is why the distinction between expression and evidence becomes increasingly unstable. A post does not have to be conclusive to become consequential. It only needs to be legible enough to support an inference.

As my research exposed, these digital administrative screening processes do not unfold uniformly across national contexts. In Germany, the expanded deportation framework made people particularly attentive to the possibility that online expressions of political sympathy, anger, or protest might be scrutinised. In the Netherlands, respondents were more likely to describe the removal or cleaning of older posts reflecting their social networks as part of preparing for credibility interviews, reflecting the centrality of coherence within Dutch asylum procedures. In Hungary, concerns often focused on the misreading of multilingual expressions or non-standard dialects, especially where linguistic opacity could heighten the risk of interpretive error associated with terrorism or radicalisation. In Greece, participants more frequently described separating accounts and managing visibility across different social worlds including gender sensitive content. These differences matter because they show that affective governance is not a single coherent apparatus, but a differentiated set of practices shaped by national asylum systems, local bureaucratic cultures, and recent political developments. What ties them together is the techsolutionist perception grounded in concrete encounters that digital affect is relevant to institutional decision-making. Accordingly, what this amounts to is a shift from the evaluation of discrete behaviours to the assessment of affective legibility of the foreigner. Migrants from authoritarian conflict countries quickly understood that their digital presence is not assessed only for explicit wrongdoing, but for what it may signal about them more broadly. Managing visibility, then, becomes part of navigating asylum and residency procedures and daily safety measures, not because digital life has become wholly securitised in an abstract sense, but because expressive traces now travel more easily into evaluative settings where they can acquire new meanings. The border thus expands not only through more data, but through new ways of reading the atmospheres and dispositions that digital life leaves behind.

Experience of Bordering

One of the most striking features of these practices is that they are experienced not as dramatic political acts, but as ordinary forms of maintenance. Migrants described reviewing posts, withholding reactions, simplifying profiles, or dividing accounts much as they described collecting documents or preparing narratives before interviews. This ordinariness matters because it shows how affective bordering does not only take place at moments of enforcement. It becomes woven into the temporalities of everyday life, into habits of checking, editing, pausing, and anticipating. What changes is not simply what people say online, but how they sense themselves being potentially read. This is why it may be useful to think not only in terms of surveillance, but in terms of perception and legibility. The issue is not just that online traces can be seen. According to their testimonies, these can be sensed as clues, referring to fragments of tone, mood, sympathy, irritation, grief, or alignment that may later be folded into judgments about credibility or risk. Participants did not often articulate this through explicit theoretical language, but their practices visualised a shift in the sensory politics of migration governance. Administratively, they were not simply managing information, but the possible feelings and impressions their digital presence might evoke once translated into a bureaucratic setting, considering the risk of misidentification and therefore rejection of authorization of any kind, healthcare, visa, jobs or social housing.

The border, in this sense, is not only encountered at the territorial edge or across an interview desk. It also lingers in the feed, in the archived post, in the hesitation before pressing “like,” and in the late-night work of deciding what to keep and what to delete. This also helps clarify why the effects are often subtle yet consequential. Humour becomes risky because it depends on shared context. Solidarity becomes risky because it may be detached from the event that gave rise to it and reclassified as ideological alignment. Multilingual or culturally specific forms of expression become risky because they do not travel easily into standardised interpretive frames. Under these conditions, neutrality often appears safer than nuance, predictability safer than irony, and sparse self-presentation safer than emotionally layered visibility. The cumulative effect is not necessarily silence in an absolute sense, but a narrowing of the expressive range that feels administratively safe.

The smartphone, long recognised in migration research as indispensable for communication, navigation, and support, therefore appears here in an increasingly ambivalent light. It remains a vital infrastructure of mobility and connection, but it also stores the emotional residue of everyday life in forms that may later become administratively consequential. It contains routes, documents, and contacts, but also jokes, affiliations, grief, humour, and fragments of ordinary sociability. For people in precarious legal positions, this means that the border can no longer be encountered only as a physical line or an institutional procedure but transgressed through the possibility that one’s own digital history may be re-opened and re-read.

When Emotion Becomes Evidence

What began in public debate as a question about whether a single “like” could support deportation, actually points to a broader transformation in how migration control is enacted. Online expressions, including reactions, comments, emojis, affiliations, and other small affective traces increasingly acquire evidentiary potential once they enter administrative circulation. Digital activity now matters not only for what it explicitly says, but for what it may be taken to reveal about a person’s disposition, credibility, or alignment. Precautionary deletion, neutralisation and other forms of anticipatory compliance are not signs of radical withdrawal from digital life, but practical ways of managing how one becomes legible to institutions under conditions of uncertainty. People delete older jokes and emojis not because these are incriminating in themselves, but because they have become too ambiguous once digital traces are folded into case files. They maintain separate accounts not simply to hide, but to organise visibility according to different audiences, obligations, and vulnerabilities. Seen in this light, what is at stake is not only the datafication of migrant lives, a process already documented in digital migration scholarship, but the growing incorporation of emotional tone and online affect into the conditions of administrative legibility. Beyond documents and narrative coherence, the emotional residue of digital interaction is becoming part of how migrants are sensed and assessed. They show that affective traces become consequential at the moment of evaluation, when they are drawn into an administrative archive and made to support wider judgments about sincerity, risk, or political orientation. In that sense, this development resonates with broader discussions of the deep border, emotional AI, and digital migration infrastructures, even if, in practice, what participants encountered was often more ordinary: the selective and contingent use of visible online content in interviews and procedures.

The people I spoke with were above all, trying to avoid being misread. Their accounts suggest that contemporary border regimes increasingly operate not only by verifying facts or documents, but by interpreting atmospheres, dispositions, and expressive cues that are difficult to stabilise once removed from their social context. To recognise this shift is important because it clarifies how bordering expands into everyday digital life without always appearing as a dramatic new regime. The new border security regime lingers in the evaluation of moods, gestures, and sentiments, asking not only where someone comes from or whether they may stay, but what their digital life seems to say about who they are.


Veronika Nagy is a scholar of digital criminology, migration, and security whose work examines how data-driven systems reshape bordering, surveillance, and everyday experiences of institutional scrutiny. Her research focuses on the social and political consequences of digital governance for people in precarious positions.


References

Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021). ‘Deeply felt affect: The emergence of valence in deep active inference’. Neural Computation, 33(2), 398–446.

Molnar, P. (2024). The walls have eyes: Surviving migration in the age of artificial intelligence. The New Press.

Nagy, V. (2024). ‘Social sorting in Europe: Self-censorship in a digital asylum.’ Archiwum Kryminologii/Archives of Criminology, 46(1), 149-179.

Pelizza, A. (2021). Identification as translation: The art of choosing the right spokespersons at the securitized border. Social Studies of Science, 51(4), 487-511. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312720983932

Stoler, A. L. (2008). Along the archival grain: Epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense. Princeton University Press.

Zeitlyn, D. (2012). ‘Anthropology in and of the archives: Possible futures and contingent pasts. Archives as anthropological surrogates.’ Annual Review of Anthropology, 41(1), 461-480.


Cite as: Nagy, V. 2026. “Surveilling Sentiments: When Emotion Becomes Evidence” Focaalblog October 16. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/10/16/veronika-nagy-surveilling-sentiments-when-emotion-becomes-evidence/

Don Nonini: Scoring the U.S. Working Class: Expropriation and Digitalization

Introduction

Working-class people in the United States are now at a turning point – whether to compliantly return to the pre-Covid conditions capital set for them, or to shift toward a new militancy toward capitalism. Now, two years into the pandemic, they have suffered severe personal hardships due to Covid-related illness, hospitalizations and deaths, and sudden loss of employment. These traumas have occurred even as they have experienced an historically unprecedented hiatus of relative economic security, given the Covid-related payments and protections they received from the US state, while many have been praised as “essential workers.” This essay seeks to review what has happened to them over the last four decades that has made this into such a turning point.

Anthropologists speak of the period since the 1970s as one of neoliberalism. Instead, in this essay I adopt a different perspective by exploring the conditions prevailing under the transition from the liberal nation-state to the corporate-oligarchic state that has occurred widely with the integration of platform-surveillance capitalism into state administration and the use of massive databases by corporations and governments to govern populations (Kapferer and Gold 2018). Freedom and enslavement in the contemporary United States are linked to two now converging phenomena. One is digitalization; the other is the expansion of expropriation as a mechanism of capital accumulation beyond its historically racially marked boundaries to encompass the racially dominant white population. These changes have taken place with the rise to domination of finance capitalism in the world economy, a new period of economic decline and social crisis in the West.

A large sign reads "CHECKS CASHED" on a small building with a curved roof, stone facade, and glass walls in a parking lot.
Image 1: Payday Lender in Durham, North Carolina, photo by Don Nonini

First, as to digitalization. It has not only led to unprecedented levels of economic inequality among the population, but also to new mechanisms of accumulation organized around the generalized dispossession of working-class people made possible by their indebtedness combined with corporate and state deployment of digital technologies with large-scale predictive capabilities. The rise of surveillance capitalism and its integration into the corporate state has taken the form of a massive, commercialized apparatus of surveillance – “a single behemoth of a data market; a colossal marketplace for personal data” (Harcourt 2015, 198).

The ascendance of finance capital has come to operate in tandem with a racialized corporate state formation using an apparatus of analog surveillance and control of working people combined with digital surveillance over them. This apparatus has come to rationally extract and then realize large volumes of surplus value from them outside the capitalist workplace. This apparatus employs digital technologies (i.e., artificial intelligence) to increase the hyper-exploitation and expropriation of racially vulnerable groups, but also extends to the racially dominant white population. I focus my attention on the United States because its relentless attachment to new forms of financialized repression of working people through capitalizing (on) their debt repayment and petty income streams leads the way for capitalist regimes in other “advanced industrialized” countries undergoing economic decline.

Second, connected to the dominance of finance capital since the 1970s there has been the generalization of mechanisms of expropriation beyond racially marked vulnerable groups to the broader majority/plurality white population. In an important article, Nancy Fraser (2016) argues that capitalism throughout its history has always been accompanied by the racialization of the populations governed by the states that support it, and that this has continued up to the present. She distinguishes the industrial exploitation of a Euro-descended or white population within the cores and peripheries of the European (British, French, etc.) and United States empires that has been set apart from the expropriation of people of color within the cores and peripheries of these empires. By expropriation Fraser means, “distinct from Marxian exploitation, expropriation is accumulation by other means. Dispensing with the contractual relation through which capital purchases ‘labor power’ in exchange for wages, expropriation works by confiscating capacities and resources and conscripting them into capital’s circuits of self-expansion” (Fraser 2016, 166). This is important: dispossession as such is only the loss of labor-power, reproductive capacity, land, money, or property by those dispossessed. Expropriation, however, goes beyond dispossession to confiscate these use-values and transform them into exchange-values incorporated into capital’s circuits of accumulation. Expropriation leads to accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2004: 74-75).

Fraser goes further to assert that as an historical regularity until quite recently capitalism has survived at times of economic crisis only because the expropriation of people of color accelerates the rate of capital accumulation beyond that possible through sustained exploitation of white workers within industrial production. “Expropriation… covers a multitude of sins, most of which correlate strongly with racial oppression… such as territorial conquest, land annexation, enslavement, coerced labor, child labor, child abduction, and rape” but also “assumes more ‘modern’ forms – such as prison labor, transnational sex trafficking, corporate land grabs, and foreclosures on predatory debt, which are also linked with racial oppression” (Fraser 2016, 167).

Although Fraser has captured an historical regularity of capitalism in the United States, she points out that expropriations by corporations and the US state are increasingly imposed on the dominant racial group of whites as well as on racially subordinate groups. In her periodization of capitalism since the 17th century, she refers to the current period of “financialized capitalism” which she dates from the 1990s to the present as characterized by the emergence of “the expropriable-and-exploitable citizen-worker, formally free but acutely vulnerable” (Fraser 2016, 176). To be more accurate, they are also exploitable and expropriable when they own petty property (e.g., low-end real estate), or are not “legal” U.S. citizens (e.g., “non-documented” Latinx immigrants among hyper-sweated workers in the meat processing industry). This figure refers to working people who racially may be of color or may be white.

Fraser’s (2016, 176) argument that “expropriation has become ubiquitous, afflicting not only its traditional [racial] subjects but also those who were previously shielded by their status as citizen-workers” has much support. This can be identified in the events leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 when subprime mortgage lenders in 2000-2001 shifted their target demographic for peddling these mortgages away from African-American elderly couples and women toward “a white, blue-collar construction worker who drinks beer,’” in the words of Roland Arnall, the CEO of Ameriquest, one of the largest and most fraudulent subprime mortgage lenders (Hudson 2010, 148). Other subprime mortgage lenders followed suit. In consequence, 3.8 million families from 2007-2010 lost their homes due to foreclosures. Is the racialized class hierarchy within US capitalism being reordered by redefining the white/non-white boundary? Are déclassé whites becoming less “white” or even “non-white”?

How do generalized expropriation and digitalization now combine to characterize capitalist society in the United States? Expropriation made more precise and discriminating in its objectives by artificial intelligence is often but not always centered on taking advantage of working people through indebtedness (from subprime mortgages, payday lending, student loans, etc.). It allows for the rationalized and sustained extraction of working peoples’ income streams, thus allowing such extraction to be scaled up and “securitized.” Under these conditions, expropriation enhanced by digitalization directed at working people has become a major mode of realizing (surplus) value from working people, outside the “normal” profit-making by corporations through consumer markets.

The New Digital Scores and the Corporations’/States’ Management of Life

Consider persons’ awareness in the U.S. of their FICO credit score when applying for a loan. Most soon learn of their FICO Score and its importance but they may not know of other less-regulated consumer scores that evaluate their potential to incur, manage and repay debt, and tap on their income streams for money – scores like “ChoiceScore,” “Risk IQ”, the geographically defined “Median Equivalency Score,” and the “Consumer View Profitability Score” (Dixon and Gelman 2014, 43-44). Similarly, persons in the US may not know about many other aspects of their lives that are being quantified and analyzed through AI-based algorithms to create scores for them that predict and shape their lives. 

These scores are commercially available to any corporate or state buyer that can afford to purchase them. They assess the individuals forming the US population as debtors, potential job occupants, rent or utility payers, real estate buyers, hospital patients, disease sufferers, consumers of specific commodities, securitized air travelers, student borrowers, political dissidents, “street people,” defaulting child supporters, perpetrators of domestic violence, or criminals, among many other possibilities. My analysis of the data in Dixon and Gelman (2014) discovered more than 50 such common scores, and eight years later there undoubtedly are dozens more that have been invented and applied to the US population.

The Dynamics of Dual Enslavement: Analog and Digital

In addition to extracting super-profits from debtors (e.g., via “foreclosures”), there are other ways in which expropriation and digitalization appropriate value from working people. The Behemoth’s algorithms – the FICO credit scores, the legally unregulated “consumer scores” that profile individuals’ work, consumption, and credit histories, the predictive policing scores, the digitalized background checks for prospective job applicants and apartment renters, and much more – dynamically reinforce and cement the connections between the surveillance by digital technologies and the “on the ground” analog expropriations that once only targeted racial groups like African Americans for special treatment, but now extend to the working class as a whole. 

The defining characteristic of the putative “middle class” individual is the job. African-Americans are known to have lower average and median credit ratings than whites (Garcia Perez, Gaither and Darity 2020). One survey found that the 60% of employers surveyed ran credit checks of job applicants as part of the job application and review process (Wang 2018: 129). These could involve the applicant’s official FICO score, but more likely include one of the financial consumer scores referred to above (e.g., “Consumer Profitability Score”). In one study, one out of ten respondents who were unemployed were informed that they would not be hired for a job because of their credit report, while one in seven applicants with “blemished” credit histories were told they were not being hired because of their credit record. Those not even aware of the use of their electronic scores against them constitute many more who have been discriminated against. There is evidence that employers concerned about curbing their future health insurance costs due to unhealthy employees use health scores, scores from personality tests, and reputation scores to exclude persons with medical conditions when they apply for jobs (O’Neil 2017:213).   

Credit scores are now used routinely by landlords who require these from prospective renters before agreeing to rent to them. These credit scores are increasingly derived from massive digital databases of prior renters as well as applicants without prior rental histories, are increasingly refined by electronic vetting corporations, and are resorted to by the large-scale absentee corporate landlords that took over distressed apartment housing after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. TransUnion advertises its SmartMove ResidentScore as estimating “the reliability and level of risk” an individual rental applicant brings, draws on the prior credit, rental/eviction and criminal histories of the applicant, and brags that landlords will “get a 15% better prediction score than a typical credit score.” The codification of discrimination through these new scores that draw on underlying databases as one might expect leads disproportionate numbers of African-American applicants for rental housing to be rejected, but large numbers of whites and Latinx applicants are also excluded.

In the cases of job hires and rental applications, expropriations brought on by digital and analog surveillance not only deny applicants access to specific kinds of jobs and housing, but also drive them into more insecure hyper-exploitative labor and predatory rental markets – where their labor power and incomes can be confiscated and put to work for accumulation by employers and landlords.

Even those who are too impoverished to be creditworthy have use-values that can be capitalized by capitalists. This illustrates another connection between expropriation, digitalization, and value extraction. If the presence of “street people” in the way of gentrification jeopardizes the realization of the market value of real estate, they must be separated by force from its spaces. This leads to police harassment and arrests of young men and women, disproportionately African-Americans and Latinx, but also including many whites.

Their arrests transform incarceration itself into a commodity. Large numbers of urban poor people are arrested and remain in local jails on trivial misdemeanor charges because they cannot afford to pay bail – a form of debtors’ prison. The families of those arrested and jailed send them money to pay for their food and telephone calls, thus subsidizing the privately-owned industries providing these services ($1.6 billion and $1.3 billion respectively). Even though three-fourths of all prisoners in local jails are never convicted of a crime, their jailing leads their families to raise money to pay for their bail, thus providing a $1.5 billion subsidy to the bail industry.

Criminalization and imprisonment of poor people are not only inscribed in the official hardcopy records of City Hall, but also in the digital data on “justice-involved” African-Americans and others collected, analyzed with algorithms, and commercially disseminated as scores by data brokers. Their electronic “criminal records”, even just arrests without convictions, follow them into the digital world and are used against them in job interviews and rental applications. Algorithms for predictive policing software (e.g., PREDPOL, COMPAS) pull the impoverished urban defendant down more tightly under the yoke of electronic prediction and control. PREDPOL concentrates police “stop and frisk” in specific urban areas with “high crime” and reinforces previous discrimination and leads to more arrests, injuries, and deaths among the urban poor. COMPAS scores the degree of “risk” of those convicted of “crime” to help judges determine whether they should be allowed free on probation or conversely sentenced for longer periods of time.

Employers, realtors, bankers, speculators, et al. profit from the expropriation of use values from poor people when such confiscations yield the values these economic elites realize (e.g., lower wages paid, higher rents extracted, houses foreclosed on and resold, higher payday loan and student debt interest payments, court fines and fees assessed, bails posted). Allies of these economic elites also profit from such expropriations. Judges set high court fees and impose steep fines on arrested and convicted poor people to raise revenues for local governments (Wang 2018, 155-161). Police confiscate the cash, houses, and cars of arrestees suspected of  committing a crime through “civil forfeiture,” and use the plunder to benefit the local police force. Local Chambers of Commerce attract new capital to invest in gentrifying urban neighborhoods by supporting the evictions of poor residents from their rental units.

The Age of Covid: “Essential Workers,” Ironic Respite, Labor Militancy

Since March 2020, working-class people in the United States, especially African-Americans and other people of color, have suffered disproportionately from Covid-19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. They have witnessed  one of the largest direct transfer of wealth from the state to corporations and the 1% in US history – more than $2 trillion alone in one year in payments and tax breaks to corporations from the Covid-relief CARES Act. At the same time, they have also experienced the temporary economic security provided them by Covid-related transfer payments from the US state (CARES Act and American Rescue Plan), while a CDC-imposed eviction moratorium has only recently come to an end. Historically, this is the first time that the US state has intervened to provide basic income support for most of the working-class population over a protracted period of time, irrespective of whether they were employed. Finally, many have been rhetorically elevated in their status to “essential workers,” that is the idealized national sacrifice – most at risk of contracting and dying from Covid yet deemed most indispensable to “the economy.”  

These contradictory experiences – temporary economic security, awareness that corporations received far more support than workers, disproportionate losses from Covid and unemployment, and for some, praise as essential workers – have been a revelation for many considering the decades of expropriation and hyper-exploitation recounted in this essay. Deadly pandemics, like war, tend to revolutionize one’s self-awareness and concentrate one’s imagination of the possible. 

It is therefore not surprising that nurses, hospital orderlies, oil rig workers, Amazon warehouse laborers, and workers in cereals and agricultural equipment manufacturing  are showing a profound unwillingness to rejoin “the economy” on capitalism’s terms – including persisting risks to their health from Covid imposed by employers – through workers’ militancy. In increasing numbers, for the first time since the emergence of the corporate state and the domination of finance capital, they are organizing themselves to confront the abuses of capital. Hopefully, these militants will soon be joined in larger numbers by low-end service and gig workers, as is already occurring in the fast foods industry.


Don Nonini is Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He has published extensively on Chinese trans-nationalism, on class and ethnic relations among the Chinese diaspora of Malaysia and Australia, and on local politics and race relations in the US. He has authored, co-authored, and edited numerous books and reviewed journal articles on these topics.


References

Dixon, P., and R. Gelman. (2014). “The Scoring of America: How secret consumer scores threaten your privacy and your future.” World Privacy Forum, 1-89.

Fraser, N. (2016). “Expropriation and exploitation in racialized capitalism: A reply to Michael Dawson.” Critical Historical Studies 3(1), 163-178.

García-Pérez, M., S. Gaither, and W. Darity Jr. (2020). “Baltimore study: Credit scores.” Working Paper Series, Washington Center for Equitable Growth. Washington, DC.

Harcourt, B. E. (2015). Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in The Digital Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harvey, D. (2004). “The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession.” Socialist Register 40, 63-87

Hudson, M. W. (2010). The Monster: How a Gang of Predatory Lenders and Wall Street Bankers Fleeced America – and Spawned a Global Crisis. New York: Times books/Henry Holt and Company

Kapferer, B. and M. Gold (2018). A nail in the coffin. Arena Magazine 152, 37-43.

O’Neil, C. (2017). Weapons of Math Destruction. New York: Broadway Books.

Wang, J. (2018). Carceral Capitalism. Intervention Series, 21. South Pasadena: Semiotext(e).


Cite as: Nonini, Don. 2022. “Scoring the U.S. Working Class: Expropriation and Digitalization.” FocaalBlog, 28 March. https://www.focaalblog.com/2022/03/28/don-nonini-scoring-the-u-s-working-class-expropriation-and-digitalization