Since Bashar Al-Assad was overthrown as President of Syria in early December 2024, the political situation in the country has been volatile. Although a new group of powerholders have taken over, their grip on power is far from complete just as some Syrians are unsure or worried about what such a complete grip on power might entail. As Syrians have endeavoured to navigate this volatile period, the past has emerged as significant in several ways. Understood as both specific renditions of historical events and as particular experiences of life in Syria under first Hafez and then Bashar Al-Assad but also before, the past has been a point of contestation in itself, it has been invoked as a justification for various political claims and projects, and it has been employed as a framework through which to interpret unfolding events.

This has taken various forms. For instance, in the first months after the toppling of the Assad-regime it took the form of contestations over how the very distant past of the pre-Islamic history of the area we today know as Syria should be presented to Syrian school children as somehow formative of the Syria they now live in (see Kielsgaard this feature). There have also been frequent references to the atrocities committed under Assad rule with various groups and individuals making demands about how to enact justice for that (see Al-Khalili, Masoud – both in this feature). Moreover, many Syrians (professional analysts and non-analysts alike) have invoked examples of how Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his group HTS (Hay’a Tahrir Al-Sham) have ruled in Idleb (where the group held control for several years) to assess/predict how the group was likely to rule from Damascus (e.g., Kalam 2024).

Hence, from very early on in the post-Assad period in Syria, the past featured prominently in Syrians’ attempts to navigate the political transition, including formulating political claims and visions for the future of Syria as a nation/homeland/state. The contributions to this feature examine these diverse uses of the past by various groups of Syrians with the purpose of unravelling some of the complexities of the ways in which the past is shaping the present in Syria but is also shaped by the present. Accordingly, while much attention is presently devoted to questions of how Syria’s new rulers herald continuations or discontinuations of the geopolitical, economic and religious landscape as it looked before the overthrow of the Assad-regime (e.g., Tuğal 2025), this feature rather dives into the question of how various groups of Syrians (including the government) invoke the Assad-years and other pasts to navigate the present.

The past, political identities and political turmoil

On the one hand, the past arguably figures prominently in many processes of identity formation and constructions of political projects. Charles Taylor (1989) argued that to know who we are, we must know how we have become and where we are going. Similarly, scholars of nationalism have suggested that nationalists often point to a specific rendition of the past that allows them to argue that the nation is a continuation of previous groups in a different form. This claim regarding the nation in turn allows nationalists to make political demands on behalf of one such earlier group, which they portray as central to national becoming (e.g. Hobsbawm 1983; Smith 1971). Ideas akin to Taylor’s have also been used in various analyses of how political parties claim a coherent group identity through reference to the past and through their agendas for the future (e.g., Bryan 2000).

On the other hand, the context of political transition in the aftermath of a radical break with a previous political order often appears to intensify such processes. In the wake of the collapse of a regime that prohibited or heavily circumscribed contestation of the officially prescribed line of historical rendition, we often see a profusion of engagements with the past. These engagements pertain to questions of who was a victim of what, but also to questions of what events are significant, how they should be interpreted and especially what this means for who “we” are (Krawatzek and Soroka 2021). Moreover, when a political order is upended, uncertainty about the future often follows and as events in the present evolve in unforeseen directions, new perspectives on the past might emerge (Thomassen and Forlenza 2017). This impacts the construction of identities and also of political projects that are caught up in ongoing redefinitions of past, present and future.

In Syria, we have, for instance, seen that past grievances have led to renewed violence which in turn led to new claims about victimhood as well as new political agendas. Hence, while the current Syrian government seems to be heading towards institutionalising their particular version of the connections between past, present and future for Syria, the present moment offers a unique opportunity to grasp the multifaceted ways in which various Syrians are coming to understand these connections and use them to navigate the current political situation. This feature unravels some central aspects of these processes.

Key developments during the first post-Assad year

Overall, the contributions to this feature make clear that while the new government is institutionalising its multidimensional vision of Syria’s past, present and future, this happens in a context of numerous counter stories.

One way in which the past is invoked is to formulate a national identity or a state identity. The new government has taken several steps to designate a direction. As discussed by Kræn Kielsgaard in his contribution, changes to school curricula were one of the first items on the agenda and was initiated already in December 2024. So far, this work has mainly been about editing out any improper references to the Assads while remodelling religious education to the standards of the new Islamist rulers. In addition to amending schoolbooks, in early autumn 2025 the government proclaimed that several national holidays would be scrapped in favour of new ones. Among the cancelled holidays were Martyrs Day and Tishreen Independence Day. Martyrs Day refers to 16 Arab Nationalist Syrians hung by the Ottomans in 1916. Cancelling it may indicate a distancing from Arab Nationalism and a simultaneous toning down of any criticism of the Ottomans (who were Sunni). Tishreen Independence Day marks a victory in the October war in 1973 (against Israel). Cancelling it indicates that no achievement under the Assads should be celebrated. Instead, 8^th December, the date when Bashar Al-Assad was toppled in 2024, and 18^th March, the date when the revolution began in 2011, are new holidays celebrating achievements of the new government.

While such changes institutionalise a specific national memory (cf. Connerton 2010) that aligns with the religious and political agendas of the new rulers, the government also appears to support (or at least not be against) less institutionalised forms of memory production. Government supporters have, from the early days of the post-Assad period, been saying that the overthrow of Assad rule by a coalition of Arab Sunni Islamist groups (headed by HTS) amounts to a return of the Umayyads. The Umayyad Caliphate was one of the first Sunni Islamic Caliphates and was led from Damascus. Invoking a reference to it underlines the Sunni character of the new rulers. It, moreover, connects Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his government not only with a glorious Sunni past but also with the successful eviction from Damascus of what many Sunnis perceived to be Shia occupiers. During the civil war, the Assad-regime received support from Iran and Shia militias (often of Iraqi origin) were stationed in Damascus. This was a source of much distress among many Sunnis (especially Islamists). They now invoke the reference to the Umayyads also as a way of marking the overthrow of this perceived occupation.

Against this very Sunni vision of the new Syrian state, leading minority figures and also secular intellectuals (Sunni or otherwise) posit that Syria is historically an ethnic and religious mosaic. They hope that this vision can take a prominent place in the definition of the Syrian nation and state in the coming years (e.g., Haj Saleh 2025). That suggestion finds a perhaps surprising resonance with the new government’s continued emphasis on the rich cultural heritage of Syria. As discussed by Christine Crone in her contribution to this feature, the state-controlled news site SANA (Syrian Arab News Agency) continues to produce content that celebrates the diverse parts of Syria’s past. As such, although Syria’s new rulers appear to want to emphasise that the state is now led by Sunnis and that their claim to power is justified by the revolution, they also leave space for claims-making based on the multifaceted history of the area.

In addition to invocations of the past that impart particular messages about the character of the new Syrian nation and state, the past is also invoked by various groups of Syrians in ways that indicate the specific political agendas or models of rule they believe the new government should implement. One issue at the forefront of many Syrians’ concerns is the question of how to rectify the violations committed by the Assad-regime. As Charlotte Al-Khalili shows in her contribution, different Syrians have diverging wishes for how justice should be served in response to these crimes. While some hope for justice through legal routes, others argue that access to knowledge or socio-economic reconstruction of Syria would be more just approaches. Zoya Masoud moreover discusses how the crimes committed under the Assads form the grounds of claims of exclusive victimhood that in turn reignite rifts between Syrians as they lead to a lack of recognition of crimes committed after Assad.

Some groups of Syrians are, however, also invoking slightly more distant pasts as models to think with regarding the question of what kind of new political structure to erect in Syria. As Thomas Pierret analyses in his contribution, the Sunni Ulama (that is, the leading Sunni clerics in Syria) are invoking mainly the 1950s and 1960s, when Syria was newly independent, as a model for rule. Although one might expect the Ulama to highlight instead past periods of Islamic rule, Pierret suggests that they prefer the 1950s and 1960s because this was a time when the Ulama was listened to by politicians and given a freer hand.

Besides the Ulama, some parts of another group of Syrians (that this feature does not discuss in detail) are also invoking the 1950s as a model for rule. This regards what one could call the secular intellectuals who are at present attempting to find their feet in a new reality where the Assad-regime that many of them opposed has been overthrown by religious Sunnis rather than secular Syrians. This group is not unified, and they do not have a coherent position on the new rulers. Some individuals do, however, attempt to impact decisions by the new government. One such attempt emerged already in December 2024 when Syrian filmmaker Ali Atassi (2024) argued that Syria’s interim government should temporarily reinstate the 1950 constitution. This constitution, he suggested, would allow for free elections. After elections, the work to draft a new constitution could start as this work would then be undertaken by democratically elected officials. He pointed out that this exact model has been used before, in 1954 and 1961 respectively, and that there was no reason to do things differently now.

The near and the slightly more distant past is thus invoked in diverse and conflicting ways by different Syrians to make specific political claims about the kinds of actions a new government must take.

Lastly, the past is also used by Syrians to navigate the present volatility. In that regard, Syrians’ responses to the massacres of Alawis in March 2025 and then Druze in July 2025, both at the hands of government affiliated militias, must be highlighted.

Although the massacres had particular political motivations and therefore arguably did not amount to a threat to all minorities, all minorities were affected by them in the sense that the violence roused fears of further attacks on others. Christians are a case in point. When I visited Damascus in February 2025, the Christians I talked to were wary about the prospects of Sunni Islamist rule but also referred to the ways in which minorities had been promised some self-governance in their villages and towns as the Islamist coalition came and left during the “Deterrence of the Aggression” advance (when Bashar Al-Assad was overthrown). Citing these acts of the new government to allow minorities self-determination, the Christians I talked to expressed hope for the future. When I returned to Damascus in April 2025, the massacres on Alawis along the coast had shifted perspectives. People now talked about renewed persecution at the hands of Sunnis. Many invoked examples of sectarian violence unleashed by Islamist militias during the war and some even referred back to 1860 when around 5000 Christians were killed by (predominantly) Sunnis in Damascus. In June 2025, after the bombing of the Mar Elias Church in Damascus, the Patriarch of Antioch and all the East for the Greek Orthodox Church, John 10 Yazigi, made this reference as well. The fear among the Christians I talked to in April was that this historical persecution would continue in the future.

What I want to highlight about this is that while previous persecution of minorities was most likely always in the back of the minds of my Christian interlocutors, the massacres along the coast made them invoke this history actively as a lens through which the present could be understood and the future predicted. As discussed by Salam Said and Maria Kastrinou in their contribution, the Syrian Druze after the massacres committed against them in Suwayda are invoking the past in another way. On the one hand, they are attempting to comprehend how the past of (overall) inter-sectarian conviviality could be shattered so profoundly in the space of a few days. On the other hand, some are invoking historical references to understand what kinds of destruction of the national fabric is unfolding at present. Hence, in divergent ways Christians and Druze are relying on the past as a compass with which to navigate uncertainty, but this does not relieve that uncertainty.

While the massacres are crucial, Katharina Lange (in the final contribution) points to the significant issue that the toppling of Bashar Al-Assad has not entailed significant changes for everyone. She describes how Syrians in some parts of Syria that were neglected by Assad and are also neglected by the new government have invoked the past of tribal political leadership customs to fill the void of an absent state and position themselves in relation to competing powerholders. Hence, Lange’s post demonstrates that the past is not only a navigational tool for those who are caught up in the current changes in the country but also for Syrians who experience the present time as very similar to the recent past.

The significance of the past in the political present

While not exhaustive, the developments unfolded above are some of the key examples of the uses the past is put to by Syrians in the present period. Interrogating these uses, as the posts in this feature do, is significant because the new government, various political actors and divergent groups and communities in Syria have not yet solidified their approach. There is a space to make changing claims. While they may not be listened to, they show us how divergent Syrians are coming to see themselves in relation to Syria past, present and future.

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References

Atassi, Ali. 2024. “تفعيل دستور 1950 كمظلة للمرحلة الانتقالية في سورية”. Al Jumhuriya. https://aljumhuriya.net/ar/2024/12/18/%d8%aa%d9%81%d8%b9%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%af%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b1-1950/

Bryan, Dominic. 2000. Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control. Pluto Press.

Connerton, Paul. 2010. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haj Saleh, Yassin. 2025. ”الوطنية السورية وبدائلها”. Al Jumhuriya. https://aljumhuriya.net/ar/2025/09/02/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%b7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a8%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%84%d9%87%d8%a7/

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”. In Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kalam. 2024. “Who are HTS? The New Rulers of Syria – with Orwa Ajjoub.” Kalam podcast. December 2024. https://open.spotify.com/episode/6p8VU2HL3fdcbXReN9XvuC

Krawatzek, Félix and George Soroka. 2021. “Circulation, Conditions, Claims: Examining the Politics of Historical Memory in Eastern Europe”. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 36(1): 198–224

Smith, Anthony. 1971. Theories of Nationalism. London: Duckworth.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Thomassen, Bjørn and Rosario Forlenza. 2017 (2013). “The Pasts of the Present: World War II Memories and the Construction of Political Legitimacy in Post–Cold War Italy”. In Christian Karner (ed.) The Use and Abuse of Memory. New York: Routledge.

Tuğal, Cihan. 2025. “The Evolution of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Syria’s Future.” Spectre Journal. https://spectrejournal.com/the-evolution-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-syrias-future/

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Birgitte S. Holst is an associated researcher at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin (ZMO). She is an anthropologist focusing on processes of political and social change with a special emphasis on Syria. Her first monograph Authoritarianism, Displacement and Syrian Family Life: Reckoning with the State (Berghahn Books) will be published in 2026.

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Cite as: Holst, B. 2026. “Introduction: Uses of the past in the post-Assad political transition in Syria” Focaalblog March 20. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/03/20/birgitte-s-holst-introduction-uses-of-the-past-in-the-post-assad-political-transition-in-syria/