This post examines how the new Syrian state seeks to reconstruct public memory through revisions of public-school curricula in a period of profound political and social transformation after December 8, 2024. It unfolds how education, and more specifically official historiography, are employed by the new state as symbolic tools through which the former regime is delegitimized as not authentically Arab. It focuses particularly on how the new state achieves this through a reconfiguration of the portrayal of Israel and of the historical relationship between Israel and Syria. Israel has figured prominently as an enemy character in official rhetoric and legitimization efforts of the Assad regimes. The post discusses how this has changed with the new al-Shara regime and suggests that a realpolitikal emphasis on non-antagonism towards Israel as well as an agenda to downplay the achievements of the previous regime is at the heart of these changes.
Background – revision of schoolbooks
On December 8, 2024, the rule of Bashar al-Assad came to an end after 14 years of uprising and civil war when the Islamist militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its allies marched into Damascus and the former president fled to Moscow. A major priority of the new regime´s reconstruction efforts has been dedicated to education. This has included physical reconstruction as the war has left more than 7000 schools destroyed and more than 2 million children without schooling (Vignal, 2021). It has also entailed revisions of Syrian schoolbooks with a specific focus on differentiating the content from the former regime´s curricula.
In early January 2025, the Syrian ministry of Education of the recently installed caretaker government published 12 pages via its official Facebook page bringing immediate changes to all levels of Syrian schoolbooks (Syrian Ministry of Education, 2025). It also announced that the subject National Education would be cancelled all together and that Religious Educationi would substitute it as a graded course (Mortensen, 2025). The new minister of education Nadhir al-Qaderi explained in an interview in February that the course would be replaced by a new one, and that the ministry was working on “creating a genuine, nationalistic subject that will raise a Syrian people on the basis of citizenship and a real national feeling.” (al-Arabi, 2025). The curricula revisions generated strong criticism. The ministry was accused of transgressing its mandate as an interim caretaker government, and of Islamizing Syrian education and changing its history (al-Jadid, 2025). Al-Qaderi defended the changes saying that it was necessary to erase references to and “wrongful understandings” of the former regime. But the changes went further than just removing the old flag and pictures and quotes of the former president(s). They included deleting pictures of figurines of pre-Islamic Gods from history books (in addition to the word āliha “Gods”), leaving out the theory of evolution from biology and changing nationalistic formulations such as “in defense of the homeland” to the religious wording “in defense of belief” (BBC News عربي, 2025).
A new Minster of Education took office in March 2025, and in October 2025 the revisions were implemented in the new textbooks that were distributed to the schools and uploaded to the ministry´s curricula website. In some cases, the revisions went further than the “emergency changes” announced by the caretaker government in January. However, the minister has insisted that the changes are only “deletions” – most recently in an interview with the state-run Ikhbariyya TV in December 2025 (al-Ikhbariyya, 2025). New paragraphs were added to contemporary Syrian history describing the 2011 revolution, its goals, and major events leading up to the revolution like the Kurdish intifada in 2004 (also known as Qamishli Uprising), the Damascus declaration and the regional context of Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Other changes include removals of whole chapters that are not related to the former regime like a paragraph on the Alepine Nineteenth-century thinker and reformer, al-Kawakibi. Yet, the revisions are moderate as they have been based on the 2013-versions of Syrian schoolbooks and thus bypass major revisions by the Assad-regime in 2017 that aimed at promoting a version of Syrian history emphasizing Syria as a land of religious coexistence where Islam was but one of several religious traditions shaping Syrian culture and nationhood (Mortensen, 2026). Also, the 2017 versions have a more thematic and skills-oriented approach, whereas the older versions are classic chronological textbooks.
The revision process has not been very transparent. Whereas the older schoolbooks listed the authors, this is not the case with the revised versions. Furthermore, it is not clear how the emergency revisions from January turned into the revisions that we now see in the books. One thing that is certain is that this should not be seen as the final product but a “work in progress”. Still, it reflects what the new regime deems relevant information and framings of historical periods for a new generation of Syrians. Therefore, it is not surprising that the textbooks that underwent the most substantial revisions were history books. This is a pattern recognizable from other states emerging from political rupture where historiography is mobilized to rework public memory (Wertsch, 2002; Fukuoka, 2023; Lavabre, 2009; Greene, 2013).
The relationship with Israel
A major revision—closely linked to Syria’s position within the international and regional order and, simultaneously, a key component of the former regime’s legitimization strategy (Beetham, 1991) —concerns the reinterpretation of the wars with Israel and Syria’s role in the Arab world under the former regime. The two Assads consistently portrayed Syria as the final bulwark against Israeli hegemony in the Middle East and as a central member of the Iranian-led “resistance axis” (a narrative it maintained until its very last days). For several years the pan-Arab Baath-flag – identical to the Palestinian flag due to their shared origins in the 1916 Arab revolt – was the most common on public buildings until the Syrian flag gradually substituted it as part of an effort to downplay pan-Arab Baathist rhetoric after Bashar took power in 2000. In Syria under Bashar al-Assad – especially after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah – pictures of Hasan Nasrallah (then head of Hezbollah) and Iranian leaders became ubiquitous and state sponsored demonstrations against Israel in the streets of Damascus during the wars on Gaza were a common sight. Syria also hosted several Palestinian factions -PFLP, PFLP-DC and Hamas that, however, fell out with the regime in 2012 over its public endorsement of the Syrian revolution (Danin, 2012). The Golan Heights that were occupied by Israel in 1967 and annexed by Israel in 1981 were a daily feature on Syrian state tv. News segments celebrated the steadfastness of the Syrian citizens in the Golan and emphasized that Syria had a rightful and lawful claim to the area. This intensified especially after the Trump administration’s recognition of the annexation in 2019.
A central pillar in this state promoted narrative was the surprise attack on Israel that Syria launched in October 1973 (Tishreen in Arabic) in coordination with Egypt. Although the war ultimately proved a strategic failure, it was carefully embedded in official state ideology through school curricula, commemorative events, a major memorial complex in Damascus, and the naming of hundreds of state institutions, neighborhoods, and even a dam in Northern Syria. In older history textbooks, the war was described as “one of the greatest achievements of the Corrective Movement” (12th grade, 2013).ii To underscore its significance, a national Tishreen Day was celebrated annually from 1973 in schools, in the public squares all over Syria and in state media where a reporter in the street would ask ordinary Syrians about their memories from the war (Syrian Ministry of Interior, 2020). After the 2011 revolution, the commemoration was adapted to the new reality as the Syrian army’s efforts to repress the uprising were presented as retaking lost areas from an enemy that was working in the service of the Zionist enemy.
Under the new al-Shara regime, this national holiday has been abolished by presidential decree along with the Martyrs Day that commemorated the execution of Syrian and Lebanese nationalist activists by the Ottoman governor in 1916 (Souriaalghad, 2025). Also, public institutions such as Tishreen University in Latakia have been renamed (Burhan, 2025), as has the official newspaper, now titled Freedom الحرية)). The official name of the war in state discourse has been changed to the “1973 War” instead of the celebratory “the Tishreen War of Liberation”, a shift that was already announced in the January 2025 revisions that were published on Facebook.
Overall, the description of Israel has not undergone significant changes, but the framing of Syrian-Israeli relations has changed in schoolbooks. A comparison of new and old versions of the history and the social studies curricula reveals that the books’ authors are still exploring what language to appropriate and how to forge a coherent narrative around the historically fraught relationship between Israel and Syria.
In the 12th grade history curriculum, we see that the description of the 1967 Israeli surprise attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria has been changed from “the Zionist entity with the support of imperialist forces launched a widescale aggression on the Arabic states neighboring occupied Palestine (Syria, Jordan, and Egypt” (12th grade, 2013). This framing emphasized the centrality of Palestine to the conflict and sought to delegitimize the Israeli claim to statehood. In contrast, the revised version adopts a more neutral tone. It states: “Israel started the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on June 6, 1967.” (12th grade, 2025).” The new version also describes the war as the al-Naksa (“the setback”). This term typically signifies the collective trauma of the defeat and contains a critique of the Arab political systems that situates their shortcomings as a partial explanation of the defeat (Bilal, 2017). While the older versions explicitly attributed the war to the inherent expansionist motive of the Zionist ideology – stating that “Zionism adopts aggression as a way to expand” – the new versions only partially retain this explanation. It notes that the attack was in “accordance with [Zionism’s] expansionist and aggressive nature” and thereby preserves only elements of the previous framing.
Regarding the terminology employed to describe the State of Israel, a degree of continuity is evident. Though the neutral “Israel” or “the Israeli Army” are added in the new versions, numerous instances of more ideologically charged language persist, including “the Zionist Entity”, “the Zionist Enemy”, and “the Zionist terrorist Enemy”. The latter in a chapter on children´s rights in 5th-grade social studies where Israel is sidelined with the Assad regime as perpetrators of crimes against children (Social Studies, 5th-grade, 2025, pp.41).
While we see some continuities in how Israel is described, the role of Syria as an actor in this conflict has been subject to significant revision. Most notably, responsibility for Syria’s territorial losses is now attributed to Hafez al-Assad in several books. The revised texts assert that Israel occupied the Golan Heights in collusion with Hafez al-Assad, who, according to the new history books for 12th and 9th grades, declared the territory occupied a day before the actual event occurred. In the 12th grade book this information is added in a yellow information box on the left side of the page. Hence, it is highlighted as particularly relevant information. By contrast, in the 9th grade book the information is part of the main body of text that states that the Syrian Golan was occupied “in collusion with the Syrian Defense Minister at that time (Hafez al-Assad)” (Ministry of Education, 9th grade, 2025, pp. 30). Significantly, this claim has been put forward previously as well. It was made in an Al-Jazeera documentary on the 1967 war broadcast in 2015 (al-Jazeera 2015) and gained widespread currency in opposition circles even though many Syrians would dismiss it as a conspiracy theory.
The same narrative trope – presenting the Assad-regime as secretly collaborating with Israel and undermining the Palestinian cause – is evident in chapters on modern Lebanese history as well. Here, we find the claim that the Sabra and Shatila massacres, perpetrated by the Lebanese Phalange militia, was in fact committed in cooperation with the Syrian regime. It is also mentioned that the former regime intervened in Lebanon and committed massacres against the Palestinian people. Here the 1976 Tel al-Zatar massacre is highlighted without including the Lebanese militia that did the actual killing. Whereas the Syrian forces were without doubt implicated in the siege of and killings at Tel al-Zatar camp this was not the case with Sabra and Shatia, which were besieged by the Israeli army that had launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon that year (Khalidi, 2021).
This narrative is part of an attempt at presenting the former regime as acting against broader Arab interests through its alliance with Iran against the “brotherly” Iraq (here adopting typical pan-Arab discourse), and through the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri – as well as other Lebanese “nationalists” like Kamal Jumblatt. The Syrian revolution, with its conclusion in the 2024 liberation, is described as restoring “the authentic Arab face of Syria” (12th grade, 2025, pp. 56). One could say that the new material in certain ways competes with the older versions over being more Arab. Cultural Arabism is thus still presented as a normative ideal in the new books.
Geo-political, regional and internal concerns at the heart of revisions of schoolbooks
The most sweeping changes to Syrian schoolbooks concern the war between Syria and Egypt on one side and Israel on the other. The term Tishreen is among those banned and has been systematically removed from textbooks and public discourse. Through my comparative reading of history textbooks, I only found a single use of this term (in a chapter on Russian history, referring to Soviet support for the Tishreen Liberation War) that has somehow escaped the editors´ attention. In the new textbooks, the 1973 war is mentioned only briefly, in connection with Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power in 1970. Here, the war is characterized as a “show war,” with “illusory victories” intended “to legitimize his rule” and “consolidate his power” (9th grade, 2025, pp. 111).
Nevertheless, the texts introduce a degree of ambiguity and, at times, seem internally inconsistent in their attempt at undermining the victory claims of the Assad-regime while criticizing Israeli behavior. For instance, the short paragraph in the 12th-grade book on the war has only been slightly revised from “The Tishreen liberation war in 1973 embodies Arabic Solidarity” (12th -grade, 2013 pp. 56) to “the 1973 war embodies solidarity” (12th grade, 2025, pp. 54). Even though the book argues that the war was a “propaganda war” with the aim of” conferring legitimacy to [Hafez Al-Assad’s] rule” the paragraph also mentions the military contributions of several other Arab states. The regional backing during and after the war is preserved again in an information box on the oil crisis that notes Saudi Arabia’s support for Syria and Egypt, which, according to both versions, “restored the Arab umma’s agency and prestige.” (8th-grade, 2025, pp. 111). The new materials thus seek to balance recognition of Syria’s regional backing as a “frontline state” with the portrayal of Israel as a genuine geostrategic threat while avoiding unnecessary provocation of Israel.
Since December 8, Israel has bombed both military and civilian infrastructure and occupied territory beyond the demilitarized zone established between Syria and Israel in 1974 (Chughtai & Haddad, 2025). A recent example of the consequences of heightened rhetoric occurred in October 2025, when the Ministry of Culture in Aleppo planned an event commemorating October 7, which was subsequently raised in the UN Security Council by the Israeli representative. Similar scrutiny will likely be directed at the new educational materials, as has already been observed regarding Saudi Arabia (Gold & Al Lawati, 2023) and the Palestinian Authority (Moughrabi, 2001) where comparable trends toward normalization of relations with Israel and gradual de-escalation of anti-Israel rhetoric have emerged.
It is too early to predict how the Syrian-Israeli relationship will evolve. Yet, the textbook revisions make one point clear: the al-Shara regime cannot entirely escape the legacy of Syrian-Israeli relations and the historic enmity between the two states. Hence, the revised versions of the history books to some extent retain older framings. Several factors will shape this trajectory, including whether the ongoing rounds of negotiations between Israel and the new leadership in Damascus result in a security agreement or even some degree of normalization. What is certain, however, is that the era of hostile rhetoric against Israel and the instrumentalization of the Palestinian cause as a pillar of regime legitimacy has ended. Ahmad al-Shara can tap into alternative and way more potent claims of revolutionary legitimacy, as well as the promise to bring back the state and the country to its people and bring Syria out of its political and economic isolation.
Kræn Kielsgaard. I am a Phd fellow at the Institute of Cross-cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, where I study how Syria´s ongoing nation- and state- building efforts since December 8, 2024, take shape through education reform. I first visited Syria in 2007 and moved to live there between 2009 and 2011 as part of my Arabic studies at the University of Aarhus. I have worked with translation, interpretation and teaching Arabic at the University of Copenhagen before starting my doctoral research in September 2025.
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i The curriculum is divided into Islamic Education for Muslims and Christian education for Christian.
ii The corrective movement in Baath parlance signifies Hafez al-Assad´s coup in 1970 against his former Baathist companions from the military.
Cite as: Kielsgaard, K. 2025. “Rewriting Syria´s history – the case of Israel in Syrian schoolbooks after December 8, 2024” Focaalblog, March 20. https://www.focaalblog.com/2026/03/20/kraen-kielsgaard-rewriting-syrias-history-the-case-of-israel-in-syrian-schoolbooks-after-december-8-2024/
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